Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects scenarios where a user account grants high-privilege permissions (e.g., mail access or file modification) to an OAuth application within a short time frame (2 hours) following a sign-in event flagged as risky by Entra ID (Azure AD). This pattern is indicative of an adversary abusing OAuth consent flows as a persistence and credential-access mechanism following account compromise.
Detects the creation or modification of mailbox inbox rules that configure forwarding or redirection to external addresses, or rules that automatically delete or move messages based on sensitive keyword filters (e.g., 'invoice', 'password'). It specifically looks for indicators of mailbox hiding (hidden rules) which are frequently used by attackers to maintain persistence and conceal activity, particularly following unauthorized access or token theft.
Detects the modification of Microsoft IIS configuration to disable HTTP logging using the appcmd.exe utility. This technique is often used by adversaries to impair security monitoring and evade detection after compromising a web server.
Detects unauthorized modification or deletion of AWS Bedrock model invocation logging configurations. Adversaries may use this technique to disable visibility into LLM usage or redirect logs to an attacker-controlled storage location to hide subsequent malicious activity.
Identifies NetScaler ADC or Gateway software versions in the inventory that are known to be vulnerable to CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772, despite having received the patch for CVE-2026-19490.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID applications or service principals involving the addition or configuration of 'externalauthprovider' redirect URIs or properties. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to establish a malicious federated identity or persistence mechanism by manipulating application configuration to use an adversary-controlled authentication provider.
This rule correlates multiple telemetry sources to detect a sophisticated cloud identity compromise chain. It identifies suspicious MFA-satisfied logins (potentially via Adversary-in-the-Middle) followed by the granting of high-risk OAuth application consents, the creation of persistent mailbox rules for hiding or forwarding communications, and finally mass data access or exfiltration from the user's account.
This rule detects when a user or admin grants consent to an unverified OAuth application that simultaneously requests sensitive delegated permissions across multiple categories (Mail, Files, Directory, and Contacts). This pattern is a strong indicator of consent phishing attacks, where adversaries trick users into granting broad permissions to a malicious application to harvest sensitive data or gain persistent access to a Microsoft 365 environment.
Detects instances where an administrator or user grants an application consent with highly sensitive permissions in Azure AD (Microsoft Entra ID). This activity is often associated with OAuth application phishing, where an adversary lures a user into granting excessive permissions to a malicious application, potentially leading to long-term persistence or unauthorized access to directory data and conditional access policies.
Detects instances where a non-administrative user grants OAuth application permissions that include high-risk delegated scopes. This activity is a primary indicator of illicit consent grant phishing attacks, where an adversary lures users into authorizing malicious applications to access sensitive data (such as emails or files) without administrator approval.
Detects the addition of certificate-type credentials (AsymmetricX509Cert, usage=Verify) to Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) applications or service principals. This behavior is indicative of an attacker adding an adversary-controlled certificate to impersonate an application or service principal to achieve persistent, long-lived access.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) applications, service principals, or Application Proxy configurations that could be indicative of an adversary establishing persistent external access. This includes updates to external URLs, SSO settings, and authentication types, which are frequently used to facilitate persistence via malicious cloud application configurations.
Detects a sequence where an OAuth application is granted 'Mail.ReadWrite' or 'MailboxSettings.ReadWrite' permissions, followed shortly thereafter (within 4 hours) by the creation or modification of an Inbox Rule by that same application within the same mailbox. This pattern is indicative of a persistence mechanism where an adversary uses elevated OAuth permissions to manipulate mailbox mail flow rules for stealth or exfiltration.
Detects high-risk activities related to SAML token-signing certificates, including certificate export from Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) or Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) and unauthorized configuration changes to enterprise application certificate management. These activities are potential precursors to Golden SAML attacks, where an adversary attempts to forge authentication tokens.
Detects the addition of suspicious redirect URIs, such as those containing wildcards, non-HTTPS protocols, or known URL-shortening services, to an OAuth application registration. Such configurations can be exploited by attackers to perform OAuth authorization code or token interception (e.g., through adversary-controlled endpoints).
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user performs a device-code authentication flow from a previously unseen application, followed within a two-hour window by sensitive account activities such as OAuth application consent/registration or mailbox-related administrative operations. This behavior is characteristic of passkey-phishing campaigns designed to steal access tokens and achieve persistence or data access via malicious OAuth applications.
This rule detects potentially malicious OAuth application consent grants where a user authorizes an application with high-privilege scopes (such as mail or directory access). The detection flags consent grants for applications that are either unverified by the publisher or newly created within the last 30 days, and correlates these events with suspicious sign-in activity (high/medium risk or failures) for the same user within a two-hour window.
Detects the LEMURLOOT ASP.NET web shell deployed by Cl0p following exploitation of CVE-2023-34362 in MOVEit Transfer
Monitors Azure AuditLogs for application consent events that grant high-privilege Microsoft Graph API scopes, such as Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All, or Directory.ReadWrite.All. This activity is a common indicator of illicit consent grant phishing attacks, where adversaries trick users into granting permissions to a malicious OAuth application to gain persistent, unauthorized access to sensitive data without requiring direct user credentials or MFA.
Monitors Azure AuditLogs for application consent events that grant high-privilege Microsoft Graph API scopes, such as Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All, or Directory.ReadWrite.All. This activity is a common indicator of illicit consent grant phishing attacks, where adversaries trick users into granting permissions to a malicious OAuth application to gain persistent, unauthorized access to sensitive data without requiring direct user credentials or MFA.
Detects modifications, creations, or deletions of critical CI/CD pipeline configuration files (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, Azure Pipelines) across cloud service logs. The rule correlates these actions with the account's historical IP baseline to identify potentially unauthorized changes originating from anomalous locations.
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