Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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KQL Query from file: High Fidelity Outlook Zero-Day Detection
KQL Query
Detects potential phishing emails abusing Exchange Online service health outage notifications (specifically referencing outage EX1550543) using specific sender domains and landing pages to track user interactions and potential credential harvesting.
Microsoft Threat Intelligence reported an active phishing campaign exploiting the Microsoft 365 service disruption, using fake service-health notifications and malicious links to target recipients.
IOCs:
- Sender domains: `moments-notice[.]com`, `planetmaison[.]com`, `newbooker[.]com`
- Redirect/landing domain: `reallifeaccounting[.]com`
- URL path: `/themelist0.html`
- Subject pattern: `Outage - [six-character code]`
- Related Microsoft incident: `EX1550543` (Exchange Online)
IOCs:
- Sender domains: `moments-notice[.]com`, `planetmaison[.]com`, `newbooker[.]com`
- Redirect/landing domain: `reallifeaccounting[.]com`
- URL path: `/themelist0.html`
- Subject pattern: `Outage - [six-character code]`
- Related Microsoft incident: `EX1550543` (Exchange Online)
Detects when mailbox audit logging is disabled or audit bypass is enabled on a specific mailbox via Exchange administrative commands such as Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation or Set-Mailbox. Attackers configure this to hide subsequent mailbox access and actions from defenders.
Detects OUTLOOK.EXE connecting to public IP addresses over SMB (445/139), which Outlook does not normally do. May indicate forced NTLM authentication and NTLMv2 hash leakage via a crafted message file (CVE-2026-124194, exploited in the wild). The exact file extension of the trigger is not confirmed; likely candidates are .msg and possibly other Outlook message formats (.eml, .oft).
This analytic pairs an Apache AH00051 worker segmentation-fault notice with
the most recent logged request from that child PID on the same host and Apache
instance. It looks for multipart POST requests within short time frame around
the crash, a pattern that can occur during PHP2Shell exploitation. Captured
access event is a candidate for the associated request that leads to crash.
Yet, request that kills the worker may never reach the access log.
the most recent logged request from that child PID on the same host and Apache
instance. It looks for multipart POST requests within short time frame around
the crash, a pattern that can occur during PHP2Shell exploitation. Captured
access event is a candidate for the associated request that leads to crash.
Yet, request that kills the worker may never reach the access log.
Detects HTTP GET requests targeting the xwconsole.cgi endpoint with the 'sh' parameter, indicating an attempt to exploit setuid-root CGI vulnerabilities to pass shell commands via popen().
This rule detects the installation or presence of a rogue ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) instance by extracting client IDs from file creation events and comparing them against a baseline of known historical client IDs over a 30-day period.
Ptrace Attach from Container
Cortex XDR
Detects TRACE_ATTACH events originating from within containers. ptrace can be used for process injection, container escape via host processes, or credential dumping from process memory.
KQL Query from file: Defending against ARTEX and CyberStrikeAI
Detects AWS API activity linked to the ARTEX and AntiFox agentic pentest frameworks: published source IPs, the tool name in the user agent, CloudWatch log searches for keys and passwords, placeholder S3 object probes and fast enumeration across many services with many denied calls. Needs CloudTrail in Sentinel, and S3 probes need data events. The enumeration branch skips IAM Identity Center sessions, browser user agents and Lambda automation. Logic tested with synthetic events and run against live CloudTrail data.
https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/openssh-issues-emergency-fix-for-flaw.html
Detects external consumer Microsoft Teams accounts (live: accounts) attempting to impersonate internal organization employees by matching display names or swapped first/last names against internal identity records.
Detects a password spray attack pattern (characterized by multiple failed authentication attempts across numerous distinct accounts from a single source IP or known Storm-0940 IPs) followed by successful sign-ins and subsequent credential additions or role assignments to OAuth applications or service principals within a 6-hour window.
Detects the Trigram (Kimsuky/UNK_DeadDrop, OverLord) Windows dropper pattern where cmd.exe or PowerShell strips the Mark-of-the-Web via Unblock-File or Zone.Identifier removal, followed on the same host by the execution of a hidden VBScript worker using wscript //B.
Detects the execution of known offensive security, network scanning, exploitation, and reconnaissance tools based on binary filenames, original filenames, and specific command-line arguments across devices.
Detects file creation or modification events within the Windows Common Files Microsoft Shared Ink folder by non-standard and non-system processes, indicating potential execution flow hijacking or unauthorized component replacement.
Detects potential NTLM credential leaks where Outlook processes (.msg file handling or execution) are followed closely by outbound network connections on ports 445 (SMB) or 80 (HTTP/WebDAV) to external IP addresses.
Detects command-line execution or script activities targeting web browser extension directories and configuration files on macOS systems, indicating potential credential theft, session hijacking, or malicious extension deployment.
Finds GSocket activity on Linux endpoints. The query matches known tool names, hashes and relay hosts from Microsoft's report. It also looks for behavior: a web server runtime starting a shell that pipes a download into it, execution from hidden folders in /dev/shm, processes renamed to look like kernel threads and persistence files written by web runtimes.
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