Goksel Atakan
@gokselatakanIstanbul, Turkiye GoXDR.fyiTrusted contributorCompletionist
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91 detections
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This rule performs a software inventory search to identify devices running specific versions of Nginx within a targeted range (1.9.5 up to 1.30.7, or 1.31.0 up to 1.31.9). This is typically used for vulnerability management and asset discovery.
Detects instances where the Nginx web server process initiates a shell or scripting interpreter, which may indicate web application compromise, remote code execution, or exploitation of a public-facing application.
Detects outbound network connections to webhook.site from non-browser processes, which can indicate data exfiltration or automated callbacks by scripts or tools like Python.
Lists Java runtimes that actually started on endpoints, grouped by device, install path and reported version. Use it to find bundled or forgotten Java runtimes during a Java vulnerability response, such as unmanaged copies inside third party apps. Renamed launchers and apps that embed their own JVM are not matched, and the reported version can differ from the java -version output. It does not decide whether a build is vulnerable.
Detects non-browser processes on endpoints making successful connections to well-known AI model API hosts. Shells, CLI tools and script runtimes are listed first. Use it to build an inventory of shadow AI use and to find unapproved automation or unexpected use of AI API keys.
Detects AWS API activity linked to the ARTEX and AntiFox agentic pentest frameworks: published source IPs, the tool name in the user agent, CloudWatch log searches for keys and passwords, placeholder S3 object probes and fast enumeration across many services with many denied calls. Needs CloudTrail in Sentinel, and S3 probes need data events. The enumeration branch skips IAM Identity Center sessions, browser user agents and Lambda automation. Logic tested with synthetic events and run against live CloudTrail data.
Detects creation, modification or renaming of AI assistant tool server configs, instruction files and settings, with the writing process labelled as a shell or script (including Node and Python) or another process. Matches exact file names, Cursor rule files with the mdc extension and settings files only in the .claude, .cursor, .codex, .gemini and .windsurf folders, so settings kept elsewhere are not covered. A rename onto a monitored name is caught and shows the previous name, a rename away from one is not. File content is not visible and developer devices can return many rows. Logic tested with synthetic events. Ran in a live tenant without errors. Not yet validated against live matching events.
Hunting query for a CoffeeLoader variant delivered by a revived Retadup USB worm. The loader drops a patched 7-Zip DLL into a folder under ProgramData or AppData\Local and names both the folder and the file with an eight hex digit value. It starts the DLL through rundll32.exe from a Run key value. The query returns three signals per device. The first is a Run or RunOnce value that starts such a DLL through rundll32.exe. The second is a rundll32.exe process that loads such a DLL. The third is a connection to a command and control or hosting domain published for the campaign, including its subdomains. Logic tested with synthetic events. Not yet validated against live infections.
Process injection into dllhost, WerFault, svchost, OpenWith and AtBroker is not covered. The USB spread, the DLL write itself and DNS lookups without a network connection record are not covered. The published request path (/payload?md5=) is not covered because network events usually carry only the host name. Connections recorded by IP only are not covered, and the research published no IP indicators. Run values written before the lookback window or before a device was onboarded produce no event. Other autorun locations (RunOnceEx, RunServices, Policies\Explorer\Run) and renamed copies of rundll32.exe are not covered. The domain list only holds what the original research published.
Process injection into dllhost, WerFault, svchost, OpenWith and AtBroker is not covered. The USB spread, the DLL write itself and DNS lookups without a network connection record are not covered. The published request path (/payload?md5=) is not covered because network events usually carry only the host name. Connections recorded by IP only are not covered, and the research published no IP indicators. Run values written before the lookback window or before a device was onboarded produce no event. Other autorun locations (RunOnceEx, RunServices, Policies\Explorer\Run) and renamed copies of rundll32.exe are not covered. The domain list only holds what the original research published.
Detects connections and DNS lookups to seven domains published as infrastructure linked to poisoned third party web scripts, a card stealing payload and mobile exploit loaders, using exact host and subdomain matching. Needs DeviceEvents DnsQueryResponse or DeviceNetworkEvents with RemoteUrl populated. Browser traffic is often missing from both. Logic tested with synthetic events. Not yet validated against live infections.
Detects IIS worker processes (w3wp.exe) that start shells, run whoami or icacls, search for web.config files, read connection strings through PowerShell or write .aspx and config copy files, which matches the web shell and configuration discovery steps reported in AntiFox intrusions. Needs Defender for Endpoint on the IIS servers, and file events can be sparse. Logic tested with synthetic events and run against live Defender data.
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