CoffeeLoader Retadup Hex Named DLL Persistence and Loader Domains

Hunting query for a CoffeeLoader variant delivered by a revived Retadup USB worm. The loader drops a patched 7-Zip DLL into a folder under ProgramData or AppData\Local and names both the folder and the file with an eight hex digit value. It starts the DLL through rundll32.exe from a Run key value. The query returns three signals per device. The first is a Run or RunOnce value that starts such a DLL through rundll32.exe. The second is a rundll32.exe process that loads such a DLL. The third is a connection to a command and control or hosting domain published for the campaign, including its subdomains. Logic tested with synthetic events. Not yet validated against live infections. Process injection into dllhost, WerFault, svchost, OpenWith and AtBroker is not covered. The USB spread, the DLL write itself and DNS lookups without a network connection record are not covered. The published request path (/payload?md5=) is not covered because network events usually carry only the host name. Connections recorded by IP only are not covered, and the research published no IP indicators. Run values written before the lookback window or before a device was onboarded produce no event. Other autorun locations (RunOnceEx, RunServices, Policies\Explorer\Run) and renamed copies of rundll32.exe are not covered. The domain list only holds what the original research published.