Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Correlates a high-risk or compromised Microsoft Entra sign-in event with a subsequent device registration (Add device or Register device) performed by the same user account within a 3-hour window.
Detects the Tensorlake npm compromise (tensorlake@0.5.144, Shai-Hulud) through the two payload hashes, gh-token-monitor persistence, node or bun running lib/setup.mjs or Math_Symbol.js and node or bun connections to iseekaigogo.com or public Ethereum RPC hosts. It needs Defender for Endpoint events from developer machines and does not see lockfile or package cache contents. The query ran without errors in a live tenant
Detects a VS Code-family editor or extension host modifying ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, or shell commands appending the svc-telemetry label / embedded Ed25519 key, as used by the trojanized anthropic.claude-code extension.
Detects Microsoft 365 token replay from the Huntress token spray and replay campaign. Alerts on sign-ins from an IP new to the account (not seen on 3 or more distinct days in the 14d baseline) that match one of three behaviors: a scripted client (node or bare Mozilla/5.0 user agent with Office or Authentication Broker client IDs), Device Registration Service access (Medium-High only when corroborated by a campaign IP, scripted user agent or session IP hop, otherwise Low), or one session moving across IPs within 60 minutes. Rows are raised to High when the same new IP hits 3 or more baseline accounts in the window (token spray pattern) or matches a campaign IOC. Low Signal rows are dropped when AlertOnly = true. Does not cover MFA changes, device registration events or inbox rules.
Detects malicious file hashes, suspicious process executions involving Node.js/Bun running setup scripts, schtasks/powershell persistence monitoring tasks, and connections to known domains/RPC endpoints associated with threat activity. The query ran without errors in a live tenant.
Detects user accounts that have been disabled for an extended period (greater than 100 days), which could potentially be abused or overlooked.
Detects successful Entra ID sign-ins using the device code authentication flow by users who have no prior device code sign-in history within a 30-day baseline window. This behavior can indicate device code phishing or abuse of the device code grant mechanism.
Detects an executable running from the C:\Windows\ directory (excluding known benign applications) that establishes two or more distinct persistence mechanisms within a short timeframe, such as scheduled tasks, registry run keys, or startup folder shortcuts.
Detects Microsoft 365 session token replay as described in the Huntress token spray research: sign-ins from the campaign addresses, scripted clients (node or a bare Mozilla/5.0 user agent) using the Office, Authentication Broker or OfficeHome app IDs from an address new to the account, Device Registration Service access from a new address and one session seen from different operating systems and addresses. The campaign address list is short lived and serves as enrichment.
Detects a sequence of events on Linux hosts involving a remote interactive or network logon from an external IP, followed within 5 minutes by root-level process execution, and subsequently within 2 hours by an outbound SSH connection to a private or known attacker IP. Also includes a separate branch for direct logons from known malicious IPs.
Detects when a user authenticates via device code flow or performs device registration/ownership addition, followed by a bulk download of SharePoint or OneDrive files (25 or more distinct files) within a 60-minute window. This behavior can indicate session hijacking or unauthorized access where an attacker uses device code phishing to gain access and quickly exfiltrate cloud documents.
Detects PHP SAPI processes accessing /proc/self/mem (or equivalent memory mapping) and subsequently spawning a Unix shell, which is characteristic of web shell activity or exploitation of PHP memory corruption/injection vulnerabilities like zif_system.
Detects AWS OIDC role assumption by a GitHub workflow running on a ci-sync-<6 chars> branch followed within an hour by Secrets Manager reads using the same session credentials, as seen in the Gheist campaign.
Hunting query for the ConnectWise Cloud Backup (SkyKick) application credential abuse reported in October 2026. It returns three signals, sorted by a Priority column. First, sign-ins by the seven ConnectWise and SkyKick application IDs from a public IP address. ConnectWise states the Cloud Backup app normally signs in from Azure private IPv6 addresses. Second, service principals that sign in from a public IP address in a country not seen in their 14-day baseline. This signal evaluates apps with at least 20 prior sign-ins. Third, Entra audit events initiated by applications. These include an application adding itself or another non-user identity to a directory role, an application adding or changing credentials for the first time in the baseline window and any credential change by an application named ConnectWise or SkyKick. Role additions with an unidentified target appear with Review priority. Audit events initiated by applications carry no source IP, so the IP indicator applies to the sign-in signals only. Routine credential changes by Azure services can still appear with Review priority. The query follows the Microsoft Defender advanced hunting schemas and runs without errors in Advanced Hunting. The audit signal was exercised against live Entra audit events in a Microsoft 365 tenant. Indicator columns are short-lived and used for enrichment only.
The detection targets these behaviours:
- Attempts to take ownership of or replace explorer.exe and gpedit.msc.
- Changes to Microsoft Edge's Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debugger.
- Changes to HTTP, HTTPS, HTML, and Microsoft Edge protocol handlers.
- Disabling Explorer's Run command and changing keyboard scancode mappings.
- Creation of temporary VBScript files used for relaunching, elevation prompts, or deceptive messages
- Attempts to take ownership of or replace explorer.exe and gpedit.msc.
- Changes to Microsoft Edge's Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debugger.
- Changes to HTTP, HTTPS, HTML, and Microsoft Edge protocol handlers.
- Disabling Explorer's Run command and changing keyboard scancode mappings.
- Creation of temporary VBScript files used for relaunching, elevation prompts, or deceptive messages
Detects the execution of Salat Stealer C2-pushed scripts involving the disabling of recovery environment via reagentc.exe and UAC disabling via registry modification on the same device within one hour.
Detects an inbound public network or remote interactive logon to a device, followed within 24 hours by credential-dumping activity, and subsequently within 7 days by email data staging (creation or modification of PST, OST, EML, or MBOX files) on the same device.
Detects process injection activities (such as remote thread creation, memory allocation, and writing to virtual memory) targeting common Windows background processes where the injecting process runs directly from the C:\Windows\ directory with a random or suspicious executable name.
Detects the correlation of Registry Run key values for known utilities (Lightshot, Procmon, RuntimeBroker) pointing to paths in Program Files with a scheduled task creation of the same name on the same device within a 1-hour window.
Detects execution of a Python script named SysMon.py via a scheduled task, correlated with a subsequent network connection to ipinfo.io initiated by the same Python interpreter within a 10-minute window.
Detects PowerShell registering a logon scheduled task that executes a Trays.exe binary from an AppData Yandex Trays path with the -tray argument, or a scheduled task specifically named 'Microsoft apdate'. Associated with the RareWolf AnyDesk dropper batch script.
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