Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
6,221 detections
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Detects outbound IPv4 and IPv6 connections from endpoints to public addresses on ports other than DNS (53), HTTP (80), HTTPS (443), 8000.
Command-and-control tools and tunnels often use uncommon ports to avoid web-focused filtering. Private, loopback, link-local, multicast and documentation ranges are excluded, and repeated connections are grouped by endpoint, process, remote IP and port. Custom apps and admin tools also use these ports, so triage by process, destination reputation and how rare the destination is.
Command-and-control tools and tunnels often use uncommon ports to avoid web-focused filtering. Private, loopback, link-local, multicast and documentation ranges are excluded, and repeated connections are grouped by endpoint, process, remote IP and port. Custom apps and admin tools also use these ports, so triage by process, destination reputation and how rare the destination is.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
Detects Tor client execution on Windows endpoints, including the tor.exe binary and the Tor client bundled with Brave Browser (Private Window with Tor). Tor can hide command-and-control or exfiltration traffic, and some malware ships or drops a Tor client. To triage, check the parent process, image path, command line and SHA-256 hash, and confirm whether the user is authorized to use Tor.
Detects the execution of unauthorized Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools shortly after either Microsoft Teams activity or a surge of inbound emails (email bombing) targeting the same user, a common precursor pattern used by threat actors for social engineering and initial access.
Detects web servers, PHP processes, or shell processes spawning fetch utilities such as wget or curl to communicate with a specific malicious payload IP address (162.35.99.94), often indicative of web shell exploitation or post-exploitation file download activity.
Detects DLL files written to user-writable profile folders (Desktop, Downloads, Documents and similar) on Windows endpoints. Attackers use these folders to stage a malicious DLL next to a legitimate executable, often from a phishing archive, so the executable loads it via DLL side-loading. Events are grouped by endpoint and path with DLL names, vendor, SHA-256 and the writing process. Installers and portable apps also match, so triage by hash, vendor, writing process and download source.
Detects Portable Executable (PE) files written to a user's Downloads folder on Windows endpoints. CrowdStrike identifies PE files by file signature, so renamed or extensionless executables are caught as well as .exe files. Downloads is a common landing spot for payloads from phishing links and drive-by downloads. Most hits are legitimate installers, so use the rule for hunting or as a pivot. To triage, review the file name, company name, hash, writing process and download source.
Detects the installation or execution of unauthorized Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools such as MeshCentral, Atera, Teramind, AnyDesk, or AdaptixC2 artifacts on endpoints. It flags devices running multiple distinct RMM tools or featuring AdaptixC2.
Identifies Node.js processes that spawn potentially suspicious child processes, including operating system shells, command interpreters, scripting runtimes, and download utilities. This behaviour may indicate exploitation of a Node.js application resulting in arbitrary command execution, followed by payload retrieval or additional post-exploitation activity.
Detects the Tensorlake npm compromise (tensorlake@0.5.144, Shai-Hulud) through the two payload hashes, gh-token-monitor persistence, node or bun running lib/setup.mjs or Math_Symbol.js and node or bun connections to iseekaigogo.com or public Ethereum RPC hosts. It needs Defender for Endpoint events from developer machines and does not see lockfile or package cache contents. The query ran without errors in a live tenant
Detects malicious file hashes, suspicious process executions involving Node.js/Bun running setup scripts, schtasks/powershell persistence monitoring tasks, and connections to known domains/RPC endpoints associated with threat activity. The query ran without errors in a live tenant.
Detects reconnaissance commands (whoami, systeminfo) and PowerShell execution spawned as children of remote-access tools (such as AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, TeamViewer/QuickAssist variants, etc.), followed shortly by an outbound network connection to a .top domain from the same device.
Detects correlation between an external Microsoft Teams chat creation and the subsequent launch of a remote access or monitoring (RMM) tool on the same user's device within a 30-minute window, which is indicative of potential social engineering or tech support scam initial access campaigns.
Detects cmd.exe launching curl.exe with TLS verification disabled, redirect following, an output file, and forced hostname-to-IP resolution, or the PowerShell Invoke-WebRequest with a certificate-check bypass switch, often associated with malicious trojan droppers.
Detects Kerberos service ticket principal name (SPN) enumeration or exposure events occurring shortly after the execution of common remote access tools (such as Quick Assist, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Atera, Zoho Assist, NetSupport, or LogMeIn) on the same device.
Detects AnyDesk being silently installed with the --install and --silent flags or having an unattended-access password configured via the --set-password and _unattended_access parameters, typically piped via stdin from a batch dropper using cmd.exe.
Detects attempts to download the cache_base file using various command-line utilities (wget, curl, node fetch) on a single device, correlating multiple download methods within a 10-minute window or matching known malicious mirror IOCs.
Detects process command lines containing Magento database audit strings (cms_block, cms_page) alongside specific loader domains, or network events communicating with these known loader domains.
Detects command-line execution of script interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, MSHTA) spawned via Windows Explorer containing download primitives and URLs, followed by immediate external network connections.
Detects the sequence where a private key file is written to the host followed by the execution of ssh.exe with parameters indicating a reverse port forwarding tunnel (-R), an identity file (-i), and background execution (-N or -f) within a 30-minute window.
Detects the execution of tooling routed through a reverse SOCKS5 pivot via wrappers such as via_socks.sh, proxychains4 with a SOCKS5 configuration, or LD_PRELOAD injection of libproxychains.so.
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