Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,252 detections
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Detects outbound IPv4 and IPv6 connections from endpoints to public addresses on ports other than DNS (53), HTTP (80), HTTPS (443), 8000.
Command-and-control tools and tunnels often use uncommon ports to avoid web-focused filtering. Private, loopback, link-local, multicast and documentation ranges are excluded, and repeated connections are grouped by endpoint, process, remote IP and port. Custom apps and admin tools also use these ports, so triage by process, destination reputation and how rare the destination is.
Command-and-control tools and tunnels often use uncommon ports to avoid web-focused filtering. Private, loopback, link-local, multicast and documentation ranges are excluded, and repeated connections are grouped by endpoint, process, remote IP and port. Custom apps and admin tools also use these ports, so triage by process, destination reputation and how rare the destination is.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
Detects the Tensorlake npm compromise (tensorlake@0.5.144, Shai-Hulud) through the two payload hashes, gh-token-monitor persistence, node or bun running lib/setup.mjs or Math_Symbol.js and node or bun connections to iseekaigogo.com or public Ethereum RPC hosts. It needs Defender for Endpoint events from developer machines and does not see lockfile or package cache contents. The query ran without errors in a live tenant
Detects malicious file hashes, suspicious process executions involving Node.js/Bun running setup scripts, schtasks/powershell persistence monitoring tasks, and connections to known domains/RPC endpoints associated with threat activity. The query ran without errors in a live tenant.
Detects reconnaissance commands (whoami, systeminfo) and PowerShell execution spawned as children of remote-access tools (such as AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, TeamViewer/QuickAssist variants, etc.), followed shortly by an outbound network connection to a .top domain from the same device.
Detects the execution of an application named avscan.exe from suspicious writable directories such as Users Public, ProgramData, or AppData Local, followed by an outbound public network connection within a one-hour window.
Detects process command lines containing Magento database audit strings (cms_block, cms_page) alongside specific loader domains, or network events communicating with these known loader domains.
Detects msiexec.exe spawning scripting or programming engines (such as PowerShell or Python) that perform LDAP directory searches and establish outbound external network connections within a specific time window.
Detects outbound network connections from Python processes associated with known indicators of compromise or specific suspicious command line arguments such as cook.py, cook.pth, or privcollect.
Detects Microsoft Edge (msedge.exe) spawned by command shells or script hosts with hidden or headless window parameters, or communicating with webhook.site, which is commonly indicative of malicious browser automation or exfiltration.
Detects network connections to the npm registry (registry.npmjs.org) initiated by AI coding agent processes (such as Claude, Cursor, Copilot, Windsurf, Codeium, Aider) or by unexpected processes that are not standard package managers or browsers.
Detects potential C2 beaconing activity associated with Potassium by correlating a DNS query for a known C2 domain with a subsequent TCP connection to port 50792 from the same device within a short time window.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
Detects outbound network connections from processes targeting a known hard-coded Potassium campaign C2 IP address (134.199.154.64), followed by fallback DNS resolver queries using standard public DNS servers by the same process.
Detects googleupdate.exe loading an unsigned DLL from a non-standard path, followed by network communication to a known Command and Control (C2) domain or IP address.
Detects non-browser processes contacting multiple distinct cloud storage APIs within a one-hour timeframe, a pattern indicative of potential multi-service command and control or data exfiltration.
Detects sandbox or training hosts performing DNS resolution followed shortly by outbound connections to public IP addresses on ports 80 or 443, which may indicate a firewall misconfiguration or unauthorized egress from isolated environments.
Detects a process with no prior AI API activity in the past 14 days suddenly generating a high volume (200+ calls) of network connections to public AI inference endpoints (OpenAI, Anthropic, Grok, OpenRouter). This behavior is consistent with stolen API keys being used to drain resources or exfiltrate data from a newly compromised host.
Detects newly seen devices (no Tailscale process activity in the prior 30 days) executing Tailscale enrollment or login commands followed by outbound network connections to Tailscale control infrastructure within 10 minutes, potentially indicating unauthorized VPN tunneling.
Detects host-side telemetry indicating Cairn agent worker artifacts, including specific process command line terms, tsec skill files and environment variables, combined with network connections to OpenRouter from the same host.
Sweeps endpoint telemetry for known IOCs from the trojanized anthropic.claude-code (Open-VSX v2.1.313) SSH backdoor: C2 IP 134.209.82.225, beacon URL, extension.js and tunnel key SHA-256 hashes, and ifconfig.me lookups from VS Code-family/extension-host processes. Results are summarized per device and IOC.
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