Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
2,111 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,010
659
132
77
68
Contributors
432
407
369
241
166
Categories
20,439
11,829
5,873
5,151
4,864
2,111
Platforms
2,105
5
4
3
1
Products / Services
588
467
342
116
93
MITRE Techniques
1,578
817
813
730
463
CVEs
5
4
3
2
2
IDS Classtypes
4
IDS Protocols
5
Detects an executable running from the C:\Windows\ directory (excluding known benign applications) that establishes two or more distinct persistence mechanisms within a short timeframe, such as scheduled tasks, registry run keys, or startup folder shortcuts.
Detects the execution of Salat Stealer C2-pushed scripts involving the disabling of recovery environment via reagentc.exe and UAC disabling via registry modification on the same device within one hour.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with Windows Defender settings, services, or registry keys via command-line execution (such as reg.exe, PowerShell, or sc.exe) or direct registry modifications.
Detects the correlation of Registry Run key values for known utilities (Lightshot, Procmon, RuntimeBroker) pointing to paths in Program Files with a scheduled task creation of the same name on the same device within a 1-hour window.
Detects the addition of Microsoft Defender exclusions targeting the C:\Windows directory or SystemHealth\Update paths via PowerShell commands (Add-MpPreference/Set-MpPreference) or direct Registry modifications, which may indicate an attempt to evade security detection.
Detects the setting of the TS_SERVE_ALLOW_ALL_INTERFACES environment variable or registry key combined with the execution of Tailscale serve or funnel commands on the same device within a 24-hour window, potentially indicating unauthorized exposure of local services.
Detects potential cryptocurrency clipper malware by monitoring the staging of multiple attacker wallet addresses (BTC, ETH, TRC) under the HKCU\Software\Clipper registry path by a non-system process.
Detects when a process modifies the Windows Registry to disable zone checks (SEE_MASK_NOZONECHECKS) in the Environment key and alters settings to show hidden files (ShowSuerHidden) within 30 minutes on the same device. This behavior is commonly associated with malware attempting to execute downloaded payloads without security prompts while concealing artifacts.
Correlates the modification of the Explorer Policies Run registry key (specifically the 'Loader' value) with the creation or modification of a .url shortcut file in the user Startup folder on the same device within a 1-hour window, using the same initiating process.
Detects registry-based User Account Control (UAC) bypass activity where command keys for ms-settings or mscfile are created or modified under HKCU Software\Classes, correlated with a privilege adjustment (SeDebugPrivilege or SeLoadDriverPrivilege) by the same process within a 30-minute window.
Detects an executable running from the C:\Windows\ directory (excluding known benign applications) that establishes two or more distinct persistence mechanisms within a short timeframe, such as scheduled tasks, registry run keys, or startup folder shortcuts.
Detects potential persistence establishment where an AOMEI-related process writes a DLL file to disk, followed by the creation or modification of a Windows service pointing to that same DLL within a 15-minute window.
Detects AppInit DLL registry modifications referencing DLLs located in user-writable directories (such as AppData, Temp, Users\Public, or Downloads), which may indicate adversary persistence or process injection configuration.
Detects persistence mechanisms established via Registry Run/RunOnce keys, Startup folder modifications, or scheduled task creation using specific tool names such as client32 or pcictlui.
Detects potential debugger detection evasion attempts via command line arguments associated with debugging checks or process execution of debugging utilities, as well as persistence configuration using Image File Execution Options (IFEO) or AeDebug registry keys targeting debuggers.
Generic rule content from file: Iranian APT - Blinder Tunnel - MicrosoftRuntime Run Key Persistence.cql
The following analytic detects when a known remote access software is added to common persistence locations on a device within the environment. Adversaries use these utilities to retain remote access capabilities to the environment. Utilities in the lookup include AnyDesk, GoToMyPC, LogMeIn, TeamViewer and much more. Review the lookup for the entire list and add any others.
Detects modification of the Microsoft Security Center AV registry keys, particularly those related with DisplayName, ProductEXE, or ReportingExe.
These keys typically store information about antivirus products installed on the system, which is Windows Defender or third-party antivirus software.
But, if these keys holds unexpected values or are modified in a suspicious manner, it could indicate an attempt to tamper with the security settings of the system.
These keys typically store information about antivirus products installed on the system, which is Windows Defender or third-party antivirus software.
But, if these keys holds unexpected values or are modified in a suspicious manner, it could indicate an attempt to tamper with the security settings of the system.
Detects the degradation of the system firewall security by the DoNotAllowExceptions policy value being
set to 0 (DWORD 0x00000000), which re-enables application and port exceptions in the Microsoft
Defender Firewall and can restore network paths that a hardened profile would block.
set to 0 (DWORD 0x00000000), which re-enables application and port exceptions in the Microsoft
Defender Firewall and can restore network paths that a hardened profile would block.
Detects registry modifications that change features of internal Windows tools (malware like Agent Tesla uses this technique)
Detects Sysmon registry events (EventCode 12, 13, 14) writing Run/RunOnce keys or Service ImagePath values that reference esetservice.exe from a user-writable path (AppData, ProgramData, Temp, Public, Downloads), excluding the legitimate Program Files\ESET install location.
Page 1 of 101