Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects in-memory modification of the AmsiScanBuffer function within PowerShell processes, specifically targeting the injection of patch instructions (e.g., MOV EAX, 80070057; RET). This technique is characteristic of .NET loaders like PIVOTPIPE attempting to bypass Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) inspection before executing malicious payloads.
Detects the presence of PIVOTPIPE .NET loader components within files by searching for specific magic bytes, debug strings, hardcoded developer file paths, and agent-related operational strings.
Detects the GHAPPIER four-stage loader execution chain initiated during npm postinstall processes. This rule monitors for malicious child process spawning (cmd, powershell, curl, wget) by node or npm, as well as the presence of specific markers like the '.git-checker' string or URLs associated with the PolinRider/FAMOUS CHOLLIMA npm supply chain campaign.
Detects the presence of PIVOTPIPE loader artifacts, specifically the COFF sleep-mask object file (sleepmask.o) and its associated debug log (nb_sleep_dbg.txt), which are written to a randomly named subfolder within the Windows temporary directory as part of a sleep-obfuscation evasion sequence.
Detects the creation of specific named pipes often associated with Cobalt Strike and similar C2 frameworks used for peer-to-peer (P2P) lateral movement. The detection looks for anomalous pipe names created by processes other than standard Windows system processes (svchost, services, lsass), which is a common indicator of beacon communication relaying.
Detects PIVOTPIPE malware beaconing activity indicative of peer-to-peer (P2P) lateral movement between internal hosts. The rule monitors for sustained established TCP traffic with specific small packet size characteristics, suggesting command-and-control heartbeats or tunneled traffic within the internal network.
This rule detects the presence of ZigCryptoStealer malware deployed via a NativeAOT-compiled Windows executable. The detection relies on identifying specific hardcoded infrastructure strings, such as a BNB Smart Chain RPC endpoint and a specific contract address used to resolve C2 domains. It also looks for common sideloading hosts associated with the malware's delivery.
Detects HTTP responses containing keywords associated with ClearFake campaigns hosted on Cloudflare Workers. These pages are typically designed to trick users into downloading malicious files by displaying fake browser verification or captcha pages.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to known PIVOTPIPE-associated infrastructure, including attempts to access open directories for payload distribution and suspected Cobalt Strike command-and-control communications.
This rule detects unauthorized access, creation, or modification of Git credential files (.git-credentials, .netrc) by processes other than standard Git credential management utilities. It also monitors command-line activity that references these credential stores to identify potential attempts to exfiltrate or manipulate stored credentials.
This rule detects suspicious process injection activity directed at explorer.exe. It looks for cases where explorer.exe is initiated by a non-standard parent process and performs remote thread creation, thread context manipulation, or process image mapping, which are common techniques used by malware to hide execution within a legitimate system process.
In DeviceNetworkEvents, we can find both JA4 and JA4S inside AdditionalFields for some TLS connections. This is interesting because we can look at both sides of the same TLS communication. We can compare clients, servers and JA4/JA4S combinations, and look for patterns or connections that behave differently from what we normally see. The following KQL extracts and decodes both fingerprints from the same network event.
Monitors for the publication of specific NPM packages ('@dforge-core/dforge-mcp' or 'dforge-mcp') with a specific version ('0.2.21'). This rule is designed to track software supply chain activity related to this specific package and version.
Detects high-frequency actions including code pushes, branch policy overrides, or workflow completions on the 'main' branch of the 'dforge-core/dforge-mcp' repository within a short time window (under 120 minutes). This may indicate automated interaction, potential rapid CI/CD activity, or unauthorized mass modification of the core repository.
Detects high-frequency calls to the VirtualProtect API where memory protections are changed to read/write (PAGE_READWRITE) or executable read/write (PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE). This behavior is often indicative of process injection techniques or self-modifying code associated with unpacking, loading shellcode, or tampering with process memory.
This rule detects system calls originating from unbacked, private, or unknown memory regions, which is a common indicator of reflective code loading or process injection techniques. It also flags suspicious call stacks where standard processes like PowerShell, rundll32, or .NET execute system calls on ntdll.dll from non-standard module memory.
Detects malicious JavaScript/npm payloads that attempt to evade static analysis and string-based detection signatures by dynamically reconstructing sensitive strings at runtime using V8 string-object construction or obfuscated string tables.
Detects network traffic associated with PIVOTPIPE Cobalt Strike beacon activity communicating with a known suspicious external IP address on port 8088. This includes generic TCP, HTTP-based beaconing, and TLS-encrypted C2 sessions.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (e.g., WebClient, hidden flags, or WebDAV paths) spawned directly from browser processes like chrome.exe or msedge.exe. This pattern is commonly associated with fileless delivery techniques where an attacker attempts to download and execute scripts directly from an internet-facing source.
Detects instances of explorer.exe being launched by a parent process other than expected system processes (explorer.exe, userinit.exe, or winlogon.exe). This behavior is highly irregular for Windows desktop environments and may indicate process injection or malicious process masquerading.
Aggregates password/MFA reset actions by the performing helpdesk identity, alerting on abnormal reset volume or resets outside a normal ticket pattern — a proxy for a support agent being repeatedly socially engineered or a fraudulent-ticket abuse pattern.
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