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Sergio Albea

@Sergio_Albea
Trusted contributorCompletionist
15 followers237 downloads2,277 copies102 likes17,550 views

75 detections

This week, I'm sharing a new article inspired by a recent investigation published by Todyl about attackers abusing stolen application credentials to authenticate as legitimate applications in Microsoft Entra ID. The interesting part? Attackers don't necessarily need to compromise a user account. A stolen client secret could be enough to access sensitive cloud resources, depending on the application's permissions. As usual, rather than focusing on IP-based IOCs that attackers can easily rotate, I prefer looking for Indicators of Attack (IOAs). For this hunt, I'm focusing on two Entra ID authentication errors:

AADSTS7000215 – Invalid client secret
AADSTS7000222 – Expired client secret
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
12 days ago
32139
Node.js has announced upcoming security updates addressing multiple vulnerabilities, including high-severity issues. Organizations should start identifying installed Node.js versions across their environments, especially outdated or End-of-Life (EOL) releases that may no longer receive security patches. I created the following Query to quickly identify devices running Node.js, review their installed versions, and prioritize those requiring attention before the security updates become available
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
11 days ago
419
With a reported CVSS score of 9.2 and security updates scheduled for today, October 21, these vulnerabilities deserve attention, especially if you're still running legacy PHP versions.

𝗪𝗵𝗶𝗹𝗲 𝘄𝗮𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗼𝗳𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝗽𝗮𝘁𝗰𝗵𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗲𝗰𝗵𝗻𝗶𝗰𝗮𝗹 𝗱𝗲𝘁𝗮𝗶𝗹𝘀, 𝘂𝗽𝗱𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗮𝗹𝗹 𝗣𝗛𝗣 𝗩𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗮𝘁 𝗹𝗲𝗮𝘀𝘁 𝟴.𝟮 𝘁𝗼 𝗯𝗲 𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝘁𝗼 𝗵𝗮𝘃𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘀𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝘂𝗽𝗱𝗮𝘁𝗲𝘀. I decided to spend some time exploring what we can already hunt for using Microsoft Defender XDR and KQL. I've put together a short technical article covering six hunting scenarios:

- PHP installations and outdated versions
- Suspicious child processes and command execution
- Reconnaissance activity
- Unexpected PHP file creation
- Unusual outbound network connections
- New process relationships compared to historical activity

These are not PHP2Shell-specific detections, but they can help identify suspicious activity on PHP servers without relying on published IoCs.
Sharing the queries in case they're useful for your own investigations.
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
27 days ago
3736611
Further than have the PHP software updated with the supported versions and take actions over the Exposed Devices,having the latest PHP version installed doesn't mean your web applications are actually using it. I would recommend a double check over IIS, Apache or other process that could be executing old PHP Versions even if the server has installed the newest ones, see example : https://lnkd.in/esrKn-FK
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
26 days ago
893130
Another small hunting idea using CallActivityEvents Table. The query extracts the Top-Level Domain (TLD) from the person performing the action in a Microsoft Teams call and enriches it with an external country list. In this example, I exclude .CH to quickly surface activity where the originator is using a domain associated with another country. A different hunting angle to spot unexpected external participants, unusual call activity, or simply identify interactions that deserve a closer look. Of course, a foreign TLD is not malicious by itself — it is just another piece of context for the hunter. 🔎
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
2 months ago
46057
For years, when hunting phishing emails, I have mainly focused on what the user sees inside of it. But I think AI agents are going to change this.
An email may soon have two audiences: Human + AI Agent. And they may not always see exactly the same thing.
In this new KQL, I explore a simple example: invisible Unicode characters. Microsoft and Micro<U+200B>soft may look the same to us, but not necessarily to a detection, filter, parser or AI agent. For attackers, this difference can be interesting as a way to obfuscate content and potentially evade keyword-based detections or other systems processing the text.

I hunt these patterns in email and add context around them. Because attackers will not only write emails for us. They will(are) start writing emails for our agents too.
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
2 months ago
8114
The EntraIdSignInEvents table exposes the JA4 fingerprint in the GatewayJA4 field. But looking at the complete fingerprint alone does not tell us much. The interesting part starts when we break it down. With a simple KQL query, we can separate the TLS version, SNI, number of cipher suites, extensions and ALPN, together with the cipher and extension hashes. Then we can see how many sign-ins, users, IPs and countries are behind each JA4. The idea is simple: understand what is normal first, then look for what is different.
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
2 months ago
12026
In DeviceNetworkEvents, we can find both JA4 and JA4S inside AdditionalFields for some TLS connections. This is interesting because we can look at both sides of the same TLS communication. We can compare clients, servers and JA4/JA4S combinations, and look for patterns or connections that behave differently from what we normally see. The following KQL extracts and decodes both fingerprints from the same network event.
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
2 months ago
5120
This is something I have seen many times during my years working in cybersecurity: users download software with a filename they recognize and trust, but the file behind that name can be something completely different.

Monitoring the filename is not enough. Monitoring the hash is better, but legitimate software changes constantly: new version, new SHA256, another hash to validate and maintain. So I started thinking about how AI agents could help us here — not by deciding what is malicious, but by doing the repetitive work for us.

For this research, I built an AI-maintained baseline of legitimate software and used it from KQL to hunt two different scenarios:

🎯 Known filename + Unknown hash + Untrusted download source
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
3 months ago
18132
CVE-2026-65400 affects the macOS Screen Sharing service and can allow an attacker on the network to authenticate without valid credentials. Huntress' research goes further, describing the pre-authentication path and opportunities to obtain root-level file access and ultimately code execution. First thing first: patch. Update affected devices to macOS Tahoe 26.6.1, Sequoia 15.7.9, or Sonoma 14.8.9. Apple released these versions on August 6 to address CVE-2026-65400. If patching is not immediately possible, disable Screen Sharing. After patching, we still need to answer the hunter's question: was any of this activity already happening before the update? The KQL below hunts across Microsoft Defender XDR telemetry for activity around the observed attack path: Screen Sharing file activity, SSH sessions, privileged file writes, LaunchDaemon persistence, process masquerading, Packet Filter changes, XMRig artefacts and related network activity. One process particularly worth reviewing is SSFileCopyReceiver / SSFileCopySender. Huntress notes that these are privileged Screen Sharing helpers, and their research highlights root-context activity and filesystem operations as useful hunting opportunities.
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
3 months ago
44074
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