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Sergio Albea

@Sergio_Albea
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75 detections

If you are in a country where there is more than one local language, like me in Switzerland, it is challenging to create detections based on subjects because you can have them in multiple languages. Therefore, focusing on the value odspnotify inside of InternetMessageId - which does not change based on the language - helps to detect cases.

This one is related to OneTimePassCode and is useful to identify if the code is sent to other domains, which could mean that a forwarding rule has been configured or some other suspicious activity.
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
7 months ago
181666
The are some cases where InternetMessageIds contain a date integrated, sometimes encoded, sometimes not. Therefore, we have two timestamps to compare:

- InternetMessageId date → usually when the sending system generated the message.
- Timestamp (EmailEvents) → when Microsoft received/processed the email.

So if we compare “when it was created” vs “when it arrived”, we can detect cases such as emails created by the system but, due to local configuration, email campaigns that deliver slowly, or messages that were postponed compared to when they were received by Microsoft.
The ratio of true positive was really high and multiple emails were not detected as a Threat so good case to add as a detection.
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
7 months ago
200664
I don't know how many time I suffered malicious actors sharing links via Microsoft services such as SharePoint or other sites manipulating them for phishing, malware, or other malicious purposes.

I have seen multiple detections to detect phishing campaigns based on subjects, such as detecting when an email subject ends with “with you” or contains “shared.” However, if the original mailbox is configured in another language, these rules become useless.

This change specifying the InternetMessageID value odspnotify and, in addition, specifying the first part of the InternetMessageId, which tells us the action requested or performed by the email—in this case, share.

For this detection, I recommend adding your trusted domains, but it is incredibly useful to detect when links from Microsoft systems are shared with your users from unexpected domains.
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
7 months ago
241591
Just reading about a fake Boeing RFQ was enough to trigger a full attack chain — starting from a DOCX and moving through RTF, JavaScript, PowerShell and even a full Python runtime, ending with Cobalt Strike running in memory.

Nothing particularly new in terms of techniques, but the way everything is chained together makes it effective and easy to miss. It relies on tools and formats we see daily.

Being focus on catch the IoA Pattern, I created the KQL Detection below. PowerShell disabling TLS validation before downloading the payload, it’s a small step, but a very useful one from a detection point of view.
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
8 months ago
171229
AI is becoming a key part of detection and response, but it’s important not to overlook simpler techniques that are still effective.
In this article, I share a practical example of how Powershell clipboard commands can be abused, based on a real scenario. It covers how basic activities related to Get/Set-Clipboard can be leveraged in ways that may go unnoticed.
The following KQL (which can be configured as Detection Rule) help s to identify this type of activity in your environment.
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
8 months ago
200158
Attackers take advantage of the emojis because they help the content stand out and gets more attention than plain text. It not apply just to Email Subject if not that it also applies to Attachment Files which based on my experience, legitime file not use to have icons in their file names.For example:

📄Invoice.pdf
🔐Reset_Password.html
📦Delivery_Document.zip

This can help find:

- Suspicious files dropped on emails
- Files downloaded from phishing emails
- User-downloaded /opening scam files
- Payloads with social engineering names
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
8 months ago
160153
Marketing emails use Emojis all the time… but attackers use them too because they catch attention and increase the chance someone clicks:
- ⚠️ Urgent messages
- 📦 Delivery notifications
- 📄 Fake invoices
- 🔐 Password resets

Identify and classify cases on Email Subjects can be converted in useful detections. It query identify:
- Emails received with icons in the subject
- Where the URL was clicked
- Excluding cases where the sender is added as allowed either in the organization or user level
- Summarise by number of Emails, number of distinct recipients and also identify if the messages were delivered into Inbox Folders
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
8 months ago
70112
Attackers do not only use emojis in the subject. Sometimes they also use them in the file name itself to make the file look more attractive or legitimate. Based on my experience, I am not expecting legitimate files names with icons so it can be an interesting case to easily convert the hunting into a detection. For example:

📄Invoice.pdf
🔐Reset_Password.html
📦Delivery_Document.zip

This can help find:

- Suspicious files dropped on disk
- Files downloaded from phishing emails
- User-downloaded scam files
- Payloads with social engineering names
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
8 months ago
10099
was reading this article today on cybersecuritynews (🔗 ⬇️ ) about attackers abusing Windows File Explorer + WebDAV to deliver malware, and it made me think about how to monitor this threat.
The attack makes File Explorer connect to an external location that looks like a normal folder. From the user side nothing feels strange… but in reality explorer.exe is establishing an internet connection to attacker infrastructure.
As I usually say, it’s often better to focus on IOAs (how the activity happens) rather than only URLs or domains, because those are trivial for attackers to change. The behaviour is what tends to stay consistent.
The following KQL Query filter identify external connections initiated by Explorer + option to exclude False Positives based on URLs + option to specify connections to specific countries
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
9 months ago
240180
Domains that introduce substitutions, extra characters, or randomness (e.g., micr0soft, paypa1-secure) tend to have higher entropy than the original brand name. This increase in entropy is a useful signal for detecting typosquatting and brand impersonation attempts in phishing campaigns.
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Sergio Albea@Sergio_Albea
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01 | 🇨🇭 Swiss Cyber Hunters
9 months ago
130118
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