Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user exhibits signs of account compromise—either through impossible travel patterns or the use of OAuth tokens on a new device—followed within one hour by the modification of mailbox settings, such as creating new inbox rules or modifying mailbox permissions, which is a common indicator of persistence and email exfiltration.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID applications or service principals involving the addition or configuration of 'externalauthprovider' redirect URIs or properties. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to establish a malicious federated identity or persistence mechanism by manipulating application configuration to use an adversary-controlled authentication provider.
Detects unauthorized configuration or content changes (e.g., login or portal pages) performed outside of standard business hours by user accounts that have recently exhibited high-risk or compromised authentication behavior. This pattern aligns with tactics observed in the ShinyHunters playbook where compromised accounts are used to deface public-facing applications.
Detects successful OAuth token grant events for specific third-party SaaS integrations (Salesloft, Drift, Gainsight) where requested scopes include broad permissions such as 'api', 'refresh_token', or 'full'. This pattern is indicative of potential consent phishing or the abuse of a compromised OAuth application to maintain persistent, high-privileged access to SaaS resources.
This rule detects modifications to critical AI agent configurations—such as system prompts, tool allowlists, permission scopes, or model parameters—by users who are not part of the authorized 'agent-ops' group. It flags potentially high-risk changes, particularly when those changes fall outside established maintenance windows or involve an expansion of agent permissions.
Detects suspicious modifications or registrations of AI agent tools within the registry. The rule identifies three core indicators of compromise: usage of an unverified or external registry source, unauthorized tool definition modifications (hash mismatch against baseline), and a suspicious 'update chain' where a non-standard maintainer pushes a tool update that simultaneously increases requested operational scopes.
Detects unauthorized modification or deletion of AWS Bedrock guardrails. Adversaries may delete or degrade these guardrails (lowering sensitivity to 'NONE' or 'LOW') to bypass content filters, PII redaction, and safety controls, enabling toxic output generation or data exfiltration via LLM applications.
Detects unauthorized modifications to AWS Bedrock Agent configurations, specifically identifying high-risk activities such as rewriting system prompts for potential prompt injection or attaching cross-account Lambda functions. The rule monitors for UpdateAgent, CreateAgentActionGroup, UpdateAgentActionGroup, and PrepareAgent events.
This rule monitors network device audit logs for suspicious activities that indicate potential persistence or defense evasion on edge/VPN/router appliances. It specifically flags configuration changes, creation of new administrative accounts, addition of unauthorized SSH keys, and the disabling of logging/syslog export, which are common tactics for maintainig unauthorized access on network infrastructure.
Detects extension code implementing Caesar-shift-over-base64 decoding of a remote proxy server list fetched from dead-drop hosts, feeding a PAC-based proxy configuration
Detects unauthorized modifications to AI agent configuration files, including system prompts, tool allow-lists, and MCP server registration files. Such changes are often performed by processes outside of approved configuration management or infrastructure-as-code pipelines, potentially allowing for persistent manipulation of AI model behavior and capabilities.
Detects the addition or modification of federated identity credentials within Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD). Adversaries may add these credentials to service principals or applications to achieve persistent access and potentially bypass traditional password-based authentication mechanisms.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious configuration changes on Cisco IOS XR devices, specifically targeting the creation of SPAN/mirroring sessions, ACL modifications to bypass traffic filtering, and changes to AAA or local user authentication settings. These patterns are consistent with post-compromise activities by adversaries seeking persistence and traffic interception.
Detects tenant-level enablement of Microsoft Teams external/federated access or addition of an unfamiliar external domain shortly before a spike in inbound Teams calls to helpdesk/IT-support-tagged users — models CrowdStrike's 2026 Financial Services Threat Landscape Report on 'Mutant Spider,' the most active threat to financial services, whose primary technique is voice phishing over Microsoft Teams impersonating internal IT.
Detects the creation of suspicious O365 inbox rules designed to hide (via mark-as-read, move, or delete actions) or forward/redirect email messages containing keywords associated with financial transactions such as payment, wire, or invoice. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise activity, specifically targeted at invoice fraud or email thread hijacking.
This rule detects when a user or admin grants consent to an unverified OAuth application that simultaneously requests sensitive delegated permissions across multiple categories (Mail, Files, Directory, and Contacts). This pattern is a strong indicator of consent phishing attacks, where adversaries trick users into granting broad permissions to a malicious application to harvest sensitive data or gain persistent access to a Microsoft 365 environment.
Detects the registration of a new multi-tenant OAuth application in an enterprise cloud environment that requests high-risk scopes (e.g., mail access or directory write permissions). This behavior is often associated with OAuth-based consent phishing or the establishment of persistent backdoors in cloud environments.
Detects the registration of a new multi-tenant OAuth application in an enterprise cloud environment that requests high-risk scopes (e.g., mail access or directory write permissions). This behavior is often associated with OAuth-based consent phishing or the establishment of persistent backdoors in cloud environments.
Detects a mass influx of OAuth consent grant events for a single application from multiple users within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a consent phishing campaign, where attackers lure users into granting excessive permissions to a malicious application to steal access tokens.
Detects the addition or update of federated identity credentials (FIC) on Entra ID applications or service principals that do not match an approved list of OIDC issuers. This technique, known as Workload Identity Federation, can be abused by adversaries for stealthy, token-less, secret-free persistence.
This rule detects when an OAuth application is granted sensitive Exchange Online permissions, such as 'full_access_as_app', 'Mail.Read', 'Mail.ReadWrite', or 'Mail.Send'. Granting these permissions allows an application to access mailboxes across the tenant without requiring a signed-in user context, which is a common persistence and data exfiltration technique used in Business Email Compromise (BEC) and espionage campaigns.
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