Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

1,064 detections

Detects user sign-ins using the OAuth 2.0 Device Code authentication flow in Entra ID. This flow, designed for input-constrained devices, is frequently abused by attackers in 'Device Code Phishing' (or ARToken) campaigns to steal session tokens and bypass MFA by tricking users into authorizing a malicious application via a web portal.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects multiple anomalous sign-in events using the device-code authentication flow within an Entra ID tenant. The rule correlates sign-ins from geographically disparate IP addresses (often associated with known attacker infrastructure or proxies) using device-code flows, which is a technique used in 'ARToken' style phishing campaigns to compromise multiple user accounts in a short timeframe.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects anomalous unauthenticated password reset requests targeting the Keycloak reset-credentials endpoint. The rule monitors for high-volume password reset attempts from single source IP addresses, specifically flagging those that target common administrative usernames or attempt to reset passwords across multiple distinct user accounts, which may indicate exploitation attempts (e.g., CVE-2026-18963).
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
204
Detects the use of the default, hardcoded 'sk-1234' secret key for HS256 JWT signing in LiteLLM proxy logs. This configuration is insecure and allows for the forgery of arbitrary user session tokens.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
004
Detects potential cross-application SSO session or token reuse by identifying users transitioning from a low-trust application (forum) to a high-trust application (ChatGPT/Codex) within a short window (15 minutes), especially when the sign-in is non-interactive (lacking MFA) or occurs from a different IP address or user agent, suggesting a possible token replay attack.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
000
Detects potential cross-application SSO session or token reuse by identifying users transitioning from a low-trust application (forum) to a high-trust application (ChatGPT/Codex) within a short window (15 minutes), especially when the sign-in is non-interactive (lacking MFA) or occurs from a different IP address or user agent, suggesting a possible token replay attack.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
000
Detects potential cross-application SSO session or token reuse by identifying users transitioning from a low-trust application (forum) to a high-trust application (ChatGPT/Codex) within a short window (15 minutes), especially when the sign-in is non-interactive (lacking MFA) or occurs from a different IP address or user agent, suggesting a possible token replay attack.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects inbound traffic, sign-ins, and email activity originating from the Anthropic IP range 160.79.104.0/21.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
004
This rule detects various event types (email, identity authentication, network connections, and cloud audit logs) originating from or interacting with the specific IP address range 160.79.104.0/22 to 160.79.111.0/22, which is associated with known malicious activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
104
Detects evidence of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack where a user sign-in results in specific error codes (50074: MFA required; 50140: Keep-me-signed-in interrupted), followed by rapid enumeration of key M365 applications (OfficeHome, My Apps, My SignIns) using the same session/user-agent, signifying post-authentication reconnaissance via stolen tokens.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
Detects instances of OAuth device code flow authentication from suspicious sources (e.g., unfamiliar devices, non-compliant/unmanaged devices, or unusual geographic locations) that are followed closely by an OAuth application consent event. This behavior is indicative of potential consent phishing or device code phishing attacks attempting to gain persistent access to cloud resources.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
304
This rule detects potential indicators of forged Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets (Golden Tickets). It monitors Kerberos authentication events (4768 and 4769) for specific anomalies, including ticket requests for non-existent accounts (Status 0x6), suspicious service requests (krbtgt with RC4 encryption), and abnormal ticket option usage, which are common artifacts of credential manipulation and forgery.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
2 months ago
19047
Detects unauthenticated execution of sensitive Grafana MCP tools (tools/call, grafana_api_request) by identifying session IDs that lack a corresponding authenticated handshake event. This behavior is indicative of potential session spoofing or abuse of the MCP protocol where an attacker attempts to interact with privileged tools without performing a valid authentication handshake.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
003
Detects high-volume authentication attempts against Fortinet network appliances where multiple distinct source IPs successfully authenticate against multiple distinct accounts matching specific administrative naming patterns. This pattern is indicative of potential credential stuffing or brute-force campaigns targeting edge infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects high-volume authentication attempts against Fortinet network appliances where multiple distinct source IPs successfully authenticate against multiple distinct accounts matching specific administrative naming patterns. This pattern is indicative of potential credential stuffing or brute-force campaigns targeting edge infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
This rule detects various event types (email, identity authentication, network connections, and cloud audit logs) originating from or interacting with the specific IP address range 160.79.104.0/22 to 160.79.111.0/22, which is associated with known malicious activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
003
This rule identifies sign-in events or alerts that are explicitly flagged by security intelligence as originating from IP addresses associated with known malicious or attacker infrastructure.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
This rule detects high-frequency interaction with the Exchange REST API originating from user agents identified as 'One Outlook Web', potentially indicative of automated password spraying or brute force attacks targeting cloud mailboxes. This rule identifies the underlying event pattern and should be paired with a scheduled/aggregation rule to detect the volume threshold (e.g., 500+ events per hour).
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
No description available.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Hunters
2 months ago
404
Detects potential device code authentication phishing attacks by correlating a successful device code authentication event with a subsequent non-interactive sign-in from a suspicious user agent (Python Requests or specific Outlook versions) within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using a device code phishing lure to capture a token or session, followed by automated access via a script or impersonated client.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
Detects anomalous device registration behavior where a user account registers multiple unique devices within a very short timeframe (less than 90 seconds). This behavior is characteristic of device code phishing attacks, where an adversary uses automated scripts to rapidly register devices after obtaining authorization codes from victims.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
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