Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IOC sweep for ARTEX campaign indicators: C2 host, nine proxy IPs, xcai.pro and its subdomains, and the CLAUDE.md URL across Defender, CEF/firewall, DNS and Entra sign-in telemetry. Domains match on exact host or subdomain only, connection types are limited to real connection events, and sign-ins are limited to successes and credential failures.
Unsigned LDAP Bind
Cortex XDR
Detects Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) binds that are performed without signing or encryption. Attack tools such as NetExec, ldapdomaindump, and Impacket frequently use simple, unencrypted LDAP binds over port 389, which can result in the transmission of credentials in cleartext. This rule monitors Windows Event ID 2889 on Domain Controllers, which logs cleartext LDAP bind attempts.
Detects Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) sign-in attempts that use the specific, hardcoded User-Agent string associated with the TeamFiltration tool. This tool is frequently used for mass credential testing against Microsoft 365 environments. The detection looks for a suspicious and outdated combination of Teams, Electron, and Chrome versions that would not be present in legitimate, modern Microsoft Teams client traffic.
Detects Active Directory DCSync replication requests by monitoring for Event ID 4662 associated with DS-Replication-Get-Changes or DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All extended rights. The rule triggers when these rights are requested by an entity (subject) originating from a host that is not recognized as a Domain Controller.
Detects potential AiTM or credential harvesting campaigns where a device visits known lure or redirect paths (such as specific domains or workers.dev paths) and subsequently accesses the Microsoft device code authentication page within a 15-minute window.
Detects potential AiTM or credential harvesting campaigns where a device visits known lure or redirect paths (such as specific domains or workers.dev paths) and subsequently accesses the Microsoft device code authentication page within a 15-minute window.
Detects anomalous device-authorization-grant (RFC 8628) activity indicative of device-code phishing attacks (e.g., Tycoon2FA). The rule identifies user accounts exhibiting a rapid succession of 'authorization_pending' (70016) status polling attempts followed by a successful token issuance (0), constrained to a short time window and excluding known first-party Microsoft CLI/dev-tool applications.
This rule detects a password-spraying attack pattern directed at privileged or manager-titled accounts. It monitors for multiple failed sign-in attempts from a single source IP address against a large volume of distinct user accounts identified as managers or senior staff. The detection logic filters for low-frequency attempts per account, which is indicative of a distributed spray attack designed to evade account lockout thresholds while focusing on high-value targets.
Detects potential AiTM or credential harvesting campaigns where a device visits known lure or redirect paths (such as specific domains or workers.dev paths) and subsequently accesses the Microsoft device code authentication page within a 15-minute window.
Detects potential AiTM or credential harvesting campaigns where a device visits known lure or redirect paths (such as specific domains or workers.dev paths) and subsequently accesses the Microsoft device code authentication page within a 15-minute window.
Detects sign-in attempts originating from IP address ranges known to be utilized by the TeamFiltration tool for password spraying operations against Azure environments.
This rule identifies potential brute force or password spraying attacks against network edge devices, such as firewalls and VPN gateways. It aggregates authentication failures and denied connection attempts by source IP address. The rule differentiates between brute force attacks, characterized by a high volume of failed attempts against one or more users from a single source, and password spraying, indicated by multiple unique usernames failing authentication from the same source.
This rule detects potential brute-force activity against remote access services (OpenVPN, StrongSwan, WireGuard, and SSH) on Linux hosts by monitoring Syslog for patterns indicating repeated failed authentication attempts. It further highlights instances where a burst of failed attempts is followed by a successful authentication for the same source IP, indicating a potential successful compromise.
Detects Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) sign-in attempts that use the specific, hardcoded User-Agent string associated with the TeamFiltration tool. This tool is frequently used for mass credential testing against Microsoft 365 environments. The detection looks for a suspicious and outdated combination of Teams, Electron, and Chrome versions that would not be present in legitimate, modern Microsoft Teams client traffic.
Detects MFA fatigue attacks (MFA prompt-bombing) characterized by repeated denied MFA attempts for a single user, or successful MFA logins that occur under high-risk sign-in conditions, which are characteristic of activity associated with Lapsus$ (DEV-0537/Strawberry Tempest).
Detects a sequence of events indicative of an account takeover (ATO) attack, starting with a help-desk initiated password reset, followed immediately by new MFA factor or device enrollment, and concluding with an application login from an unrecognized device or location.
Detects anomalous NetScaler session activity potentially indicative of session hijacking or token forgery. This includes identifying session tokens reused across different source IP addresses or user-agents within a short timeframe, as well as detecting session tokens utilized in traffic without a preceding recorded authentication or logon event.
This rule detects potential credential stuffing attacks by monitoring high-volume authentication attempts against web application login endpoints. It specifically flags scenarios where a high number of unique source IP addresses interact with a login endpoint (e.g., /login, /signin) within a short window, which is characteristic of automated, distributed credential stuffing tools using proxy networks to rotate IPs.
Detects potential exploitation attempts of the Zerologon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) by monitoring for Domain Controller machine account password resets (Event 4742) targeting DC computer accounts, and insecure Netlogon RPC channel events (Event 5829) triggered when vulnerable clients or tools attempt connections.
This rule hunts for indicators associated with the TrustSink technique, which involves using rogue External Authentication Methods (EAM) or malicious OIDC providers to bypass authentication or maintain persistence within a cloud environment. It monitors Azure AD sign-in and audit logs, alongside DNS and network events, for references to known malicious domains and URLs used for EAM-based attacks.
Detects anomalous, high-volume account enumeration against the Microsoft Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) endpoint from a single source IP. The rule identifies a pattern of mixed response codes, specifically interleaving '50034' (Account does not exist) with successful or other outcomes, which indicates the use of automated tools to validate the existence of corporate accounts via response differentiation.
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