Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where a user performs high-risk sign-in activities (such as impossible travel or triggered risk events) followed by the registration of new security information, MFA methods, or rogue OAuth devices within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker establishing persistence on a compromised account by bypassing or hardening MFA requirements.
Detects potential password spraying activity in Azure Active Directory by identifying a single source IP address that authenticates against multiple distinct user accounts within a short time frame. The rule flags instances where there are numerous authentication attempts across many users, characterized by a low per-user failure count followed by at least one successful authentication, which is indicative of a successful password spray attempt.
Detects anomalous device-authorization-grant (RFC 8628) activity indicative of device-code phishing attacks (e.g., Tycoon2FA). The rule identifies user accounts exhibiting a rapid succession of 'authorization_pending' (70016) status polling attempts followed by a successful token issuance (0), constrained to a short time window and excluding known first-party Microsoft CLI/dev-tool applications.
Detects Kerberos ticket requests (AS-REQ/TGS-REQ) that exhibit characteristics of a forged Golden Ticket, specifically the use of legacy RC4 (0x17) encryption in environments where AES is typically preferred, non-standard ticket options (0x40810000), and requests for accounts or services that lack a corresponding legitimate authentication event. This detection aims to identify the post-compromise phase where an adversary uses a forged TGT to impersonate domain accounts.
Detects activity from known Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) campaign IP addresses across Azure control-plane, sign-in, and App Service logs. The rule monitors for malicious indicators in Azure Activity logs, Azure Sign-in logs, and Service Principal sign-ins, as well as specific sensitive URI paths (e.g., shells, admin login paths) within App Service HTTP logs.
Detects activity from known Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) campaign IP addresses across Azure control-plane, sign-in, and App Service logs. The rule monitors for malicious indicators in Azure Activity logs, Azure Sign-in logs, and Service Principal sign-ins, as well as specific sensitive URI paths (e.g., shells, admin login paths) within App Service HTTP logs.
This rule monitors Azure Active Directory service principal sign-in logs to identify authentication attempts from countries or Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) that have not been observed in the entity's 14-day historical baseline. Such anomalous login behavior may indicate potential account compromise, token theft, or unauthorized use of service principal credentials.
Detects high-frequency access requests directed at authentication or API endpoints originating from known Tor exit-node IP addresses. This activity is indicative of credential stuffing or automated scanning patterns that attempt to evade IP-based reputation or rate-limiting filters.
Detects the registration of a new authentication method (e.g., FIDO2 key, authenticator app) shortly after a user account experiences a risky sign-in event. This pattern is indicative of an adversary attempting to establish persistent access and bypass MFA requirements, often following a successful AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) phishing attack.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the TrustSink rogue MFA provider, specifically tracking the domain 'trident-sip-filter.ngrok-free.dev' and its associated OIDC discovery path. It aggregates signals from sign-in logs, audit logs, DNS queries, and network proxy traffic to identify attempts to interact with this malicious infrastructure.
Detects activity from known Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) campaign IP addresses across Azure control-plane, sign-in, and App Service logs. The rule monitors for malicious indicators in Azure Activity logs, Azure Sign-in logs, and Service Principal sign-ins, as well as specific sensitive URI paths (e.g., shells, admin login paths) within App Service HTTP logs.
This rule detects potential brute force or account compromise attempts by identifying user accounts that have successfully authenticated or initiated authentication events from two or more distinct IP addresses within the observed time window. It monitors Windows Event IDs 4624 (Successful Logon), 4648 (Logon attempted using explicit credentials), and 4776 (The domain controller attempted to validate the credentials for an account).
Detects evidence of an argument-injection attack against MikroTik RouterOS (CVE-2026-86060), where the attacker provides the literal username '-2' during the login process. This action allows the attacker to bypass standard credential validation by exploiting a forged privilege mask. This is typically observed in conjunction with unauthorized access attempts following CVE-2026-67279.
Detects anomalous sign-in behavior using the OAuth 2.0 device code authorization flow. The rule identifies sign-ins from previously unseen geographic locations or IP ranges (ASN) for a specific user, or detects a potential tenant-wide phishing campaign where multiple users are performing device-code authentications in a short timeframe, which is characteristic of 'device code phishing' (a form of OAuth consent phishing).
Detects anomalous sign-in behavior using the OAuth 2.0 device code authorization flow. The rule identifies sign-ins from previously unseen geographic locations or IP ranges (ASN) for a specific user, or detects a potential tenant-wide phishing campaign where multiple users are performing device-code authentications in a short timeframe, which is characteristic of 'device code phishing' (a form of OAuth consent phishing).
This rule correlates events across the end-to-end kill chain of an enterprise intrusion, specifically tracking the progression from initial endpoint-based infostealer activity (credential access), through anomalous or non-interactive sign-in activity, into privilege escalation or mailbox delegation within the cloud environment, and finally to mass data exfiltration or mail access. It detects accounts involved in at least three distinct stages of this progression within a 72-hour window.
Detects usage of legacy and inherently less secure authentication protocols (such as IMAP, POP3, SMTP, or Basic Authentication) within Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) sign-in activity. These protocols often bypass modern multi-factor authentication (MFA) requirements and are commonly exploited in credential stuffing and password spraying attacks.
This rule correlates a risky or compromised sign-in event in Entra ID (Azure AD) with a subsequent OAuth consent grant by the same user within 60 minutes. It specifically looks for grants that request sensitive permissions such as Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Files.ReadWrite.All, or offline_access, which are commonly associated with consent phishing and persistence tactics.
Detects a hybrid identity attack sequence where an anomalous or high-risk cloud sign-in (e.g., AD FS, Azure AD Connect) is followed within 24 hours by suspicious on-premise Active Directory activity, specifically DCSync replication requests or Kerberoasting (high volume of TGS requests). This pattern is indicative of an attacker leveraging stolen cloud session tokens to pivot into on-premise infrastructure.
This rule detects a password-spraying attack pattern directed at privileged or manager-titled accounts. It monitors for multiple failed sign-in attempts from a single source IP address against a large volume of distinct user accounts identified as managers or senior staff. The detection logic filters for low-frequency attempts per account, which is indicative of a distributed spray attack designed to evade account lockout thresholds while focusing on high-value targets.
Detects the 'auto-exfil' pattern associated with the TeamFiltration tool. The rule identifies a sequence of SharePoint Online file access immediately followed by a Microsoft Graph token request from the SharePoint Online Web Client Extensibility app. To reduce noise, it mandates a very short time delta between events (<= 60 seconds) combined with either the use of an IP address/ASN not previously seen for the account in the last 14 days, or a preceding failed sign-in attempt for the account.
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