Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,064 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
597
173
103
71
51
Contributors
184
155
139
90
73
Categories
20,439
11,829
5,873
5,151
4,864
1,064
Platforms
575
266
228
223
118
Products / Services
498
220
130
118
86
MITRE Techniques
488
451
363
349
341
CVEs
10
5
4
3
2
IDS Classtypes
34
3
2
2
1
IDS Protocols
29
9
1
Detects the 'auto-exfil' pattern associated with the TeamFiltration tool. The rule identifies a sequence of SharePoint Online file access immediately followed by a Microsoft Graph token request from the SharePoint Online Web Client Extensibility app. To reduce noise, it mandates a very short time delta between events (<= 60 seconds) combined with either the use of an IP address/ASN not previously seen for the account in the last 14 days, or a preceding failed sign-in attempt for the account.
Detects anomalous sign-in behavior, including impossible travel (geo-velocity) and non-interactive authentication without MFA, specifically targeting patterns indicative of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session token theft.
Detects potential Golden Ticket forgery or malicious Kerberos activity by monitoring Windows Security Event IDs 4768 (TGT) and 4769 (TGS). The rule identifies suspicious characteristics including the use of weak encryption (RC4) where AES is preferred, specific ticket option flags commonly associated with Mimikatz, and unusually long ticket lifetimes that deviate from standard domain policies.
This rule detects potential AS-REP Roasting attempts by identifying an unusually high volume of Kerberos AS-REQ requests (Event ID 4768) where the preauthentication type is set to 0. These requests are grouped by source IP or client address, and alerts are triggered when the number of unique accounts targeted or the total request count exceeds defined thresholds. AS-REP Roasting is an attack technique that attempts to retrieve a TGT for user accounts that have Kerberos preauthentication disabled, making them susceptible to offline brute-force password cracking.
This rule detects potential AS-REP Roasting attempts by identifying an unusually high volume of Kerberos AS-REQ requests (Event ID 4768) where the preauthentication type is set to 0. These requests are grouped by source IP or client address, and alerts are triggered when the number of unique accounts targeted or the total request count exceeds defined thresholds. AS-REP Roasting is an attack technique that attempts to retrieve a TGT for user accounts that have Kerberos preauthentication disabled, making them susceptible to offline brute-force password cracking.
Detects OAuth2 authorization code flow attempts in Entra ID (Azure AD) sign-in logs where the redirect URI is external to the Microsoft ecosystem, followed by an immediate token issuance event to that same suspicious endpoint. This behavior is indicative of 'ClickFix' or 'ConsentFix' phishing attacks, where users are manipulated into copying an authorization code from a legitimate Microsoft sign-in prompt and pasting it into an attacker-controlled application.
Detects a multi-stage attack chain originating with a healthcare-themed phishing email (e.g., billing or patient coordination lures) that leads to a link click, followed by a subsequent suspicious user sign-in from a non-managed/non-compliant device for the same recipient. This correlates email threat data, URL click telemetry, and sign-in logs to identify potential credential harvesting.
Detects a multi-stage attack chain originating with a healthcare-themed phishing email (e.g., billing or patient coordination lures) that leads to a link click, followed by a subsequent suspicious user sign-in from a non-managed/non-compliant device for the same recipient. This correlates email threat data, URL click telemetry, and sign-in logs to identify potential credential harvesting.
Detects a multi-stage attack chain originating with a healthcare-themed phishing email (e.g., billing or patient coordination lures) that leads to a link click, followed by a subsequent suspicious user sign-in from a non-managed/non-compliant device for the same recipient. This correlates email threat data, URL click telemetry, and sign-in logs to identify potential credential harvesting.
Detects activity from known Storm-3168 (JADEPUFFER) campaign IP addresses across Azure control-plane, sign-in, and App Service logs. The rule monitors for malicious indicators in Azure Activity logs, Azure Sign-in logs, and Service Principal sign-ins, as well as specific sensitive URI paths (e.g., shells, admin login paths) within App Service HTTP logs.
Detects anomalous SMB network logon events (Logon Type 3) that are characteristic of NTLM relay attacks. This includes logons involving NTLM V1, anonymous logins, or logons lacking workstation information, which are often indicative of tools like Responder or other relaying utilities.
Detects potential pass-the-hash activity through NTLM network logons (Type 3). The rule identifies anomalies such as mismatched workstation names relative to the source computer or NTLM authentication using zero key length material, which is often indicative of automated lateral movement attempts bypassing standard authentication processes.
This rule detects potential password spraying attacks against PeopleSoft or PeopleTools applications. It monitors for a pattern where a single source IP address generates multiple failed authentication attempts against a variety of distinct user accounts, followed by at least one successful login from the same source IP. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to gain unauthorized access by iterating through a list of usernames with common or guessed passwords.
Detects user authentication events where the MFA redirect URL points to an unrecognized or potentially malicious domain. This behavior is indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack, such as the TrustSink credential capture technique, where the user is diverted from the legitimate identity provider to an attacker-controlled OIDC endpoint to capture credentials or session tokens.
This rule identifies enterprise resource access from OnePlus or OxygenOS devices that lack proper management or compliance. It calculates an exposure score based on factors including device management status, compliance state, device trust type, and whether the device is newly observed. The rule flags high and medium priority exposure incidents, specifically targeting non-managed or non-compliant BYOD devices, which could represent an increased risk profile for corporate data access.
Detects anomalous SSH login attempts using the username '-2', which exploits a known argument-injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-86060) in MikroTik RouterOS. This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass authentication and obtain unauthorized administrative privileges by forcing the login process to read privilege levels from the terminal file descriptor.
Detects anomalous activity on Dahua camera management interfaces (port 37777) where multiple failed authentication attempts are followed by administrative configuration actions without a corresponding successful credentialed login, suggesting exploitation of authentication-bypass vulnerabilities such as CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045.
This rule detects large-scale, non-interactive password-spraying campaigns targeting Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) accounts. It specifically identifies anomalous login behavior originating from Azure CLI or similar non-interactive clients, where a single source IP attempts to authenticate against a large number of distinct user accounts with a low number of failures per user within a short timeframe, characteristic of 'low-and-slow' password spraying.
Detects the 'auto-exfil' pattern associated with the TeamFiltration tool. The rule identifies a sequence of SharePoint Online file access immediately followed by a Microsoft Graph token request from the SharePoint Online Web Client Extensibility app. To reduce noise, it mandates a very short time delta between events (<= 60 seconds) combined with either the use of an IP address/ASN not previously seen for the account in the last 14 days, or a preceding failed sign-in attempt for the account.
Detects the TeamFiltration/UNK_CondorFiltration spray signature: a large
number of distinct target UserPrincipalNames within a single tenant, each
receiving only a handful of sign-in attempts, spread across many distinct
AWS EC2-hosted source IPs/regions within a short time window. Individual
sign-ins from AWS-hosted IP ranges (VPN gateways, corporate cloud proxies,
remote contractors) are not flagged on their own; the rule requires both
the account-fanout and the IP-rotation dimensions to co-occur for the same
tenant in the same window.
number of distinct target UserPrincipalNames within a single tenant, each
receiving only a handful of sign-in attempts, spread across many distinct
AWS EC2-hosted source IPs/regions within a short time window. Individual
sign-ins from AWS-hosted IP ranges (VPN gateways, corporate cloud proxies,
remote contractors) are not flagged on their own; the rule requires both
the account-fanout and the IP-rotation dimensions to co-occur for the same
tenant in the same window.
This rule normalizes common Azure AD sign-in fields such as user principal names, source IP addresses, application display names, and authentication requirements for consistent monitoring and analysis.
Page 4 of 51