Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
782 detections
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Detects a high volume of failed SSH password authentication attempts from a single source IP address against one or more target hosts within a short time window, which is indicative of an SSH brute-force attack.
Detects a sequence of events characteristic of exploitation against RouterOS (CVE-2026-67276/CVE-2026-86060), involving a failed SSH login attempt with the username '-2', followed by the creation of a new user account within the same SSH session, and a successful login with that newly created account.
Detects suspicious AI inference API activity indicative of credential compromise or misuse. The rule identifies three main signals: rapid authentication failures (credential stuffing), anomalous geolocation/ASN usage for successful requests, and successful API calls occurring after a key rotation event.
Detects high-frequency failed RDP authentication attempts (Windows Event ID 4625 with LogonType 10) originating from the same source. This pattern is indicative of brute-force or credential guessing attacks against Remote Desktop Services.
Detects potential lateral movement or pivot attempts by correlating repeated failed RDP logons (RemoteInteractive) against sensitive targets (Domain Controllers, File Servers, Backup Servers) with concurrent security tool blocks (e.g., Microsoft Defender Antivirus, Exploit Guard) on the originating beachhead device within a 4-hour window.
Detects potential lateral movement or pivot attempts by correlating repeated failed RDP logons (RemoteInteractive) against sensitive targets (Domain Controllers, File Servers, Backup Servers) with concurrent security tool blocks (e.g., Microsoft Defender Antivirus, Exploit Guard) on the originating beachhead device within a 4-hour window.
Detects instances where a user experiences an interrupted sign-in event (Azure AD error code 50199) followed closely by a successful sign-in from the same user account. This pattern is often indicative of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing, where an attacker intercepts an authentication request, prompts the user, and replays the captured session material.
Detects potential password spraying activity in Azure Active Directory by identifying a single source IP address that authenticates against multiple distinct user accounts within a short time frame. The rule flags instances where there are numerous authentication attempts across many users, characterized by a low per-user failure count followed by at least one successful authentication, which is indicative of a successful password spray attempt.
Detects potential password spraying activity in Azure Active Directory by identifying a single source IP address that authenticates against multiple distinct user accounts within a short time frame. The rule flags instances where there are numerous authentication attempts across many users, characterized by a low per-user failure count followed by at least one successful authentication, which is indicative of a successful password spray attempt.
Detects MFA fatigue or push-bombing attacks where a user account experiences an abnormally high volume of MFA request denials in a short duration (10 minutes), followed by a successful authentication event. The rule specifically looks for evidence where the successful authentication potentially originates from a different IP address than the failed attempts.
Detects high-velocity, automated authentication failures originating from a single IP against internet-exposed management interfaces. The rule monitors for a rapid sequence of distinct user accounts being targeted in a short time window, indicating AI-driven or automated credential stuffing/brute force activity targeting VPNs or firewalls.
Detects a suspicious pattern of activity where a single source IP performs network reconnaissance followed by rapid-fire failed authentication attempts against multiple distinct hosts within a short time window. This behavior is indicative of automated, agentic AI-driven offensive tooling rather than manual activity.
Detects high-velocity, automated authentication failures originating from a single IP against internet-exposed management interfaces. The rule monitors for a rapid sequence of distinct user accounts being targeted in a short time window, indicating AI-driven or automated credential stuffing/brute force activity targeting VPNs or firewalls.
Detects a suspicious pattern of activity where a single source IP performs network reconnaissance followed by rapid-fire failed authentication attempts against multiple distinct hosts within a short time window. This behavior is indicative of automated, agentic AI-driven offensive tooling rather than manual activity.
Detects high-velocity, automated authentication failures originating from a single IP against internet-exposed management interfaces. The rule monitors for a rapid sequence of distinct user accounts being targeted in a short time window, indicating AI-driven or automated credential stuffing/brute force activity targeting VPNs or firewalls.
This rule monitors for successful sign-in events that follow a threshold of failed authentication attempts within a one-hour window, specifically flagging cases where the successful login originated from a new location or a previously unseen device, which is often indicative of successful brute force or password spraying attacks.
Detects high-frequency authentication failures (Event ID 4625) originating from a single IP address against multiple different user accounts, indicating potential automated brute force or credential spraying activity.
Detects a suspicious authentication pattern involving 3 or more MFA failures within 15 minutes, immediately followed by an MFA success for the same user. This pattern is characteristic of potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity, where an attacker intercepts a session or MFA token and relays it through separate infrastructure, while the legitimate user's own MFA attempts fail or time out.
Detects anomalous sign-in attempts to the OfficeHome application that result in OAuth error 90014 (frequently associated with application access issues or invalid consent) combined with an implausible mismatch between the reported Windows 10 operating system and mobile-specific browser user agents (e.g., Mobile Safari, Chrome Mobile). This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to mimic legitimate device traffic to bypass conditional access policies or facilitate OAuth-based token manipulation.
This rule detects a password-spraying attack pattern directed at privileged or manager-titled accounts. It monitors for multiple failed sign-in attempts from a single source IP address against a large volume of distinct user accounts identified as managers or senior staff. The detection logic filters for low-frequency attempts per account, which is indicative of a distributed spray attack designed to evade account lockout thresholds while focusing on high-value targets.
This rule detects a password-spraying attack pattern directed at privileged or manager-titled accounts. It monitors for multiple failed sign-in attempts from a single source IP address against a large volume of distinct user accounts identified as managers or senior staff. The detection logic filters for low-frequency attempts per account, which is indicative of a distributed spray attack designed to evade account lockout thresholds while focusing on high-value targets.
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