Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
782 detections
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Detects unauthorized modification of the Nacos database users table, specifically identifying direct INSERT or UPDATE statements used to plant a backdoor administrative account. The rule correlates database modifications with abnormal authentication patterns, such as a password hash update occurring after a failed login attempt to the Nacos application.
This rule identifies potentially compromised Entra ID accounts by correlating multiple suspicious behaviors within a 14-day window. It aggregates four specific indicators: successful authentication following repeated MFA failures, impossible travel (sign-ins from multiple countries within a short timeframe), unusual hour logons (00:00-05:00), and sign-ins flagged with medium/high risk or reported as compromised. The rule triggers when an account exhibits two or more of these distinct anomalous behaviors.
Detects anomalous SSH authentication patterns characterized by a high volume of failed logon attempts (>= 10) originating from a specific IP address within a short timeframe (30 minutes), followed by a successful authentication to the same target device. This pattern is indicative of a successful credential brute-force or password guessing attack against an exposed SSH service.
Detects successful VPN logins following a burst of failed attempts from multiple IP addresses, where the successful login originates from a known malicious IP or an IP associated with the preceding failed attempts. This rule specifically identifies potential credential stuffing or password spraying activity targeting VPN services, often associated with the BlackSuit ransomware group.
Detects anomalous authentication behavior indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing kit. The rule identifies multiple password submission attempts (failures) followed by a successful authentication within a short period, consistent with an attacker testing multiple harvested credentials against an active session.
Detects anomalous authentication attempts where a single source IP validates a high volume of distinct Service Principal or App Client IDs within a short timeframe with a high failure rate. This pattern is indicative of attackers performing bulk validation of stolen API keys or OAuth credentials, likely harvested through mobile application decompilation (APK/IPA analysis).
Detects anomalous authentication attempts where a single source IP validates a high volume of distinct Service Principal or App Client IDs within a short timeframe with a high failure rate. This pattern is indicative of attackers performing bulk validation of stolen API keys or OAuth credentials, likely harvested through mobile application decompilation (APK/IPA analysis).
Detects instances where a user account experiences multiple failed sign-in attempts followed by a successful sign-in from a different, geographically distant location within a short timeframe, indicating impossible travel and potential credential compromise.
Detects instances where a user account experiences multiple failed sign-in attempts followed by a successful sign-in from a different, geographically distant location within a short timeframe, indicating impossible travel and potential credential compromise.
Detects multiple failed multifactor authentication (MFA) attempts from the same user on an unmanaged device. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass MFA or perform MFA fatigue attacks using stolen credentials.
This rule detects high-frequency account and email address enumeration attempts. It monitors syslog data for SMTP commands such as VRFY, EXPN, or RCPT TO, and analyzes Microsoft Entra ID (SigninLogs) for authentication failures specifically associated with error code 50034 (user not found). Both behaviors are indicative of an adversary attempting to validate user identities within an environment, often as a precursor to targeted phishing or brute-force attacks.
This rule identifies potentially compromised Entra ID accounts by correlating multiple suspicious behaviors within a 14-day window. It aggregates four specific indicators: successful authentication following repeated MFA failures, impossible travel (sign-ins from multiple countries within a short timeframe), unusual hour logons (00:00-05:00), and sign-ins flagged with medium/high risk or reported as compromised. The rule triggers when an account exhibits two or more of these distinct anomalous behaviors.
Detects successful VPN logins following a burst of failed attempts from multiple IP addresses, where the successful login originates from a known malicious IP or an IP associated with the preceding failed attempts. This rule specifically identifies potential credential stuffing or password spraying activity targeting VPN services, often associated with the BlackSuit ransomware group.
Detects anomalous, high-volume authentication failures originating from a single source IP address targeting multiple distinct internal devices within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of a password spraying or brute-force attack.
Detects anomalous, high-volume authentication failures originating from a single source IP address targeting multiple distinct internal devices within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of a password spraying or brute-force attack.
Detects anomalous authentication attempts where a single source IP validates a high volume of distinct Service Principal or App Client IDs within a short timeframe with a high failure rate. This pattern is indicative of attackers performing bulk validation of stolen API keys or OAuth credentials, likely harvested through mobile application decompilation (APK/IPA analysis).
Detects a pattern of multiple failed authentication attempts (brute force) from an external IP address followed by a successful authentication event on remote access services such as RDP, VPN, or NTLM. The rule filters for non-private IP addresses and flags successes occurring outside of standard business hours.
Detects successful VPN logins following a burst of failed attempts from multiple IP addresses, where the successful login originates from a known malicious IP or an IP associated with the preceding failed attempts. This rule specifically identifies potential credential stuffing or password spraying activity targeting VPN services, often associated with the BlackSuit ransomware group.
Detects anomalous authentication attempts where a single source IP validates a high volume of distinct Service Principal or App Client IDs within a short timeframe with a high failure rate. This pattern is indicative of attackers performing bulk validation of stolen API keys or OAuth credentials, likely harvested through mobile application decompilation (APK/IPA analysis).
Detects successful VPN logins following a burst of failed attempts from multiple IP addresses, where the successful login originates from a known malicious IP or an IP associated with the preceding failed attempts. This rule specifically identifies potential credential stuffing or password spraying activity targeting VPN services, often associated with the BlackSuit ransomware group.
Detects successful VPN logins following a burst of failed attempts from multiple IP addresses, where the successful login originates from a known malicious IP or an IP associated with the preceding failed attempts. This rule specifically identifies potential credential stuffing or password spraying activity targeting VPN services, often associated with the BlackSuit ransomware group.
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