Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous device-authorization-grant (RFC 8628) activity indicative of device-code phishing attacks (e.g., Tycoon2FA). The rule identifies user accounts exhibiting a rapid succession of 'authorization_pending' (70016) status polling attempts followed by a successful token issuance (0), constrained to a short time window and excluding known first-party Microsoft CLI/dev-tool applications.
Detects anomalous device-authorization-grant (RFC 8628) activity indicative of device-code phishing attacks (e.g., Tycoon2FA). The rule identifies user accounts exhibiting a rapid succession of 'authorization_pending' (70016) status polling attempts followed by a successful token issuance (0), constrained to a short time window and excluding known first-party Microsoft CLI/dev-tool applications.
Detects anomalous lateral movement behavior by monitoring Windows Event 4624 (Logon Type 3) using NTLM authentication. The rule triggers when a single user account authenticates to five or more distinct hosts within a five-minute window, a pattern frequently associated with Pass-the-Hash attacks where captured credentials are used to spread across a network.
This rule identifies potential lateral movement or account compromise by detecting accounts that have performed NTLM network logons or authentication (Events 4624/4776) without corresponding Kerberos pre-authentication or interactive logon events within a 15-minute window. This pattern often indicates the use of stolen credentials (e.g., Pass-the-Hash) to access network resources rather than standard interactive user activity.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user exhibits signs of account compromise—either through impossible travel patterns or the use of OAuth tokens on a new device—followed within one hour by the modification of mailbox settings, such as creating new inbox rules or modifying mailbox permissions, which is a common indicator of persistence and email exfiltration.
Detects a suspected device-code phishing attack where a user visits a known malicious lure domain and shortly thereafter completes a successful Microsoft 365 device-code authentication. This rule correlates network events with sign-in logs within a 10-minute window to identify session hijacking attempts that bypass traditional MFA.
Detects instances where a single Kerberos logon session (TargetLogonId) is utilized to authenticate from multiple distinct source hosts or IP addresses within a one-hour window. This behavior is inconsistent with normal Kerberos authentication patterns and is a strong indicator of Pass-the-Ticket (PtT) activity, commonly associated with tools like Mimikatz or Rubeus where a stolen ticket is injected into multiple sessions or systems.
Detects instances where a single Kerberos logon session (TargetLogonId) is utilized to authenticate from multiple distinct source hosts or IP addresses within a one-hour window. This behavior is inconsistent with normal Kerberos authentication patterns and is a strong indicator of Pass-the-Ticket (PtT) activity, commonly associated with tools like Mimikatz or Rubeus where a stolen ticket is injected into multiple sessions or systems.
Detects successful authentication events for accounts that have been dormant for at least 90 days, correlated with suspicious activity markers such as recent failed sign-in attempts, access from an unfamiliar geographic location or ASN, or a complete absence of historical sign-in activity.
Detects patterns associated with the TeamFiltration backdoor module, specifically unauthorized OneDrive/SharePoint file modifications occurring shortly after an authentication from a previously unseen device/IP. The rule flags file changes (modifications, deletions, or renames) involving potential executable or script extensions, or those performed by the OneDrive SyncEngine app from a new source.
Detects a suspected account compromise sequence where an account first authenticates to a Microsoft Teams application from infrastructure associated with TeamFiltration (e.g., specific AWS ranges), followed by a rapid (within 2 minutes) authentication to a VPN or SAML service provider from a different IP address, indicative of an account pivot.
Detects a suspected account compromise sequence where an account first authenticates to a Microsoft Teams application from infrastructure associated with TeamFiltration (e.g., specific AWS ranges), followed by a rapid (within 2 minutes) authentication to a VPN or SAML service provider from a different IP address, indicative of an account pivot.
Detects a multi-stage attack pattern involving a non-MFA login to a Citrix portal, followed by lateral movement, and concluding with ransomware deployment behaviors such as shadow copy deletion, recovery disablement, or the dropping of ransom notes associated with ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware.
Detects a multi-stage attack pattern involving a non-MFA login to a Citrix portal, followed by lateral movement, and concluding with ransomware deployment behaviors such as shadow copy deletion, recovery disablement, or the dropping of ransom notes associated with ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware.
Detects a multi-stage attack pattern involving a non-MFA login to a Citrix portal, followed by lateral movement, and concluding with ransomware deployment behaviors such as shadow copy deletion, recovery disablement, or the dropping of ransom notes associated with ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware.
Detects a multi-stage attack pattern involving a non-MFA login to a Citrix portal, followed by lateral movement, and concluding with ransomware deployment behaviors such as shadow copy deletion, recovery disablement, or the dropping of ransom notes associated with ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware.
Detects an authentication pattern characteristic of credential compromise, consisting of a burst of failed authentication attempts against an account within a short window, followed immediately by a successful sign-in from an anomalous or new device/location. This pattern is indicative of brute-force or credential spraying followed by successful validation and potential lateral movement.
Detects potential lateral movement or compromised account use where a single user identity authenticates to multiple distinct cloud or administrative resources within a short time window (15 minutes). The rule uses a threshold of six or more unique applications or resources to identify anomalous patterns typical of reconnaissance or mass resource access often associated with stolen credentials. Administrative, service, and automation-related accounts are excluded to minimize noise.
Detects potential lateral movement or compromised account use where a single user identity authenticates to multiple distinct cloud or administrative resources within a short time window (15 minutes). The rule uses a threshold of six or more unique applications or resources to identify anomalous patterns typical of reconnaissance or mass resource access often associated with stolen credentials. Administrative, service, and automation-related accounts are excluded to minimize noise.
Detects potential lateral movement or compromised account use where a single user identity authenticates to multiple distinct cloud or administrative resources within a short time window (15 minutes). The rule uses a threshold of six or more unique applications or resources to identify anomalous patterns typical of reconnaissance or mass resource access often associated with stolen credentials. Administrative, service, and automation-related accounts are excluded to minimize noise.
Detects potential lateral movement or compromised account use where a single user identity authenticates to multiple distinct cloud or administrative resources within a short time window (15 minutes). The rule uses a threshold of six or more unique applications or resources to identify anomalous patterns typical of reconnaissance or mass resource access often associated with stolen credentials. Administrative, service, and automation-related accounts are excluded to minimize noise.
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