Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a pattern of MFA fatigue or 'push-bombing' where a user receives 5 or more MFA challenge requests within 10 minutes, immediately followed by a successful authentication event. This pattern is characteristic of attackers who have obtained user credentials and are attempting to bypass MFA by repeatedly triggering push notifications until the user grants access.
Detects high-privileged Entra ID accounts successfully reaching the verification stage of the Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) process. While SSPR is automatically enabled for administrative accounts, this activity is anomalous and potentially indicates an attacker focusing on discovered privileged accounts after performing broader enumeration.
Detects successful authentication events using the OAuth 2.0 device code flow. While a legitimate authentication method for devices without web browsers, this protocol is frequently abused by attackers in 'device code phishing' attacks to harvest access tokens and gain unauthorized access to cloud and SaaS applications.
This rule detects successful user logins that utilize the 'deviceCode' authentication protocol in conjunction with suspicious network indicators, specifically traffic originating from residential proxies. This combination is highly indicative of potential phishing or unauthorized access attempts using stolen session tokens or bypassed MFA mechanisms.
This rule detects successful user logins utilizing the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was bypassed, not applied, or not performed. The device code flow is a common vector for phishing attacks where users are tricked into entering a device code on a malicious site, potentially leading to unauthorized token acquisition.
This rule monitors for suspicious credential-related activity targeting ONVIF interfaces on network devices (such as IP cameras). It detects a pattern where a successful 'global.login' RPC authentication is quickly followed (within 300 seconds) by commands or RPC methods related to credential dumping or user enumeration (e.g., OnvifUser, GetUsers). This sequence is indicative of an adversary using legitimate access to gain unauthorized information from a device.
This rule detects potential unauthorized access to the 'My Sign-Ins' portal in Azure AD by monitoring for logins associated with multiple unique source IP addresses or Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) for a single user account. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking or account compromise where an adversary is accessing the account from a different network than the legitimate user.
This rule detects non-interactive authentication attempts to key development and collaboration platforms (e.g., GitHub, GitLab, Slack, Azure DevOps) from IP addresses or locations that have not been observed in the user's interactive sign-in history over the past 14 days. This behavior is indicative of potential session or refresh token theft, where an adversary replays stolen browser cookies from a different infrastructure to bypass traditional authentication.
Detects successful device code authentication flows involving applications that are not part of a known list of standard Microsoft and Azure client applications. Device code flows are frequently abused in phishing attacks to bypass traditional credential-based authentication.
Detects when a user registers a new MFA or authentication method, such as a software token or authenticator app, within one hour of a suspicious sign-in event. This pattern is commonly indicative of an adversary establishing persistence or bypassing authentication controls following account compromise via phishing or credential harvesting.
This rule detects successful or attempted sign-ins to Microsoft Entra ID using the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow. This specific authentication flow is increasingly leveraged by adversaries in passkey-themed phishing campaigns to obtain valid access and refresh tokens without requiring direct credential or cookie theft. By monitoring for this protocol usage, security teams can identify potential attempts to bypass traditional authentication mechanisms.
Detects instances where a user account registers the PhoneAppOTP MFA method and subsequently performs a successful authentication using that method within a defined window, followed by authentication attempts originating from non-browser, likely automated, UserAgents (e.g., node, python, axios). This pattern may indicate an adversary who has registered their own MFA device to gain persistent, automated access to the account.
This rule monitors successful sign-in activity specifically targeting identified critical banking applications. It aggregates login counts, the number of unique users, and the unique IP addresses accessing these applications over the last 24 hours to provide visibility into usage patterns.
Detects successful API requests to sensitive administrative endpoints on WSO2 systems that lack a corresponding legitimate authentication event (session) from the same SourceIP and user pair, which may indicate the use of forged JWTs or authentication bypass exploitation (e.g., CVE-2026-5430).
Detects successful Azure AD sign-in events where the session is marked as compliant or trusted by Conditional Access policies, but simultaneously flagged by Identity Protection as originating from an anonymized IP (e.g., residential proxy, VPN). This indicates an adversary has bypassed location-based Conditional Access controls, likely in the context of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack.
Detects Microsoft Intune MDM enrollment events occurring shortly after an OAuth 2.0 device code authentication for the same user. This pattern is indicative of an adversary using stolen OAuth tokens or Primary Refresh Tokens (PRT) to perform rogue MDM enrollment, a technique used to maintain persistence and bypass standard security controls such as password resets.
Detects rapid succession of a successful device code authentication followed by the acquisition of a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) within 80 seconds for the same user. This pattern is indicative of device code phishing (or 'quishing'), where an adversary tricks a user into entering an authorization code into a malicious application to steal their session.
Detects anomalous remote access or VPN login activity for a user account, characterized by either logins from multiple distinct countries or logins occurring during off-hours (between 8:01 PM and 5:59 AM). This rule helps identify potential credential abuse where valid accounts are being leveraged from unexpected locations or times.
Detects a sequence of suspicious identity activities indicative of a post-account-takeover pivot. The rule identifies a user profile engaging in corporate VPN SAML SSO probing, triggering a MFA enrollment interrupt in Azure, and subsequently accessing multiple Microsoft 365 applications (Azure Portal, OfficeHome, SharePoint) within a 30-minute window.
Detects a sequence of suspicious identity activities indicative of a post-account-takeover pivot. The rule identifies a user profile engaging in corporate VPN SAML SSO probing, triggering a MFA enrollment interrupt in Azure, and subsequently accessing multiple Microsoft 365 applications (Azure Portal, OfficeHome, SharePoint) within a 30-minute window.
Detects anomalous sign-in patterns from a single IP address that target multiple accounts with a high success rate within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of targeted credential guessing or password spraying informed by reconnaissance, as it deviates from the typical low-success-rate patterns of broad brute-force attacks.
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