Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects successful device code authentication flows involving applications that are not part of a known list of standard Microsoft and Azure client applications. Device code flows are frequently abused in phishing attacks to bypass traditional credential-based authentication.
This rule detects potential OAuth token theft resulting from device code phishing (e.g., N0va phishkit). It monitors for a successful OAuth device-code authentication followed within 5 minutes by a secondary successful sign-in for the same user from a different IP address, different browser client, or different user agent, which is a common indicator of an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) session hijacking attempt.
Detects anomalous non-interactive sign-ins that bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) requirements from a geographical location not previously seen in the user's historical sign-in baseline. This pattern is indicative of attackers using stolen OAuth access or refresh tokens to maintain persistence and bypass standard authentication controls.
Detects anomalous activity associated with OAuth 2.0 device code phishing campaigns. The rule identifies accounts showing frequent device code authentication attempts, including successful logins from potentially unmanaged or unrecognized devices, which is consistent with the behavior of phishing kits targeting OAuth device grant flows.
Detects instances where a user account experiences multiple failed sign-in attempts followed by a successful sign-in from a different, geographically distant location within a short timeframe, indicating impossible travel and potential credential compromise.
This rule identifies successful user sign-ins (ResultType 0) originating from specific Autonomous System Numbers (197540, 216154) where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was not required or not recorded, and where Conditional Access policies either did not apply or succeeded without enforcing MFA.
Detects sign-in activity using pre-existing durable session tokens (e.g., PRT, broker-based tokens) that occur shortly after a password reset, suggesting that the adversary has maintained persistent access despite the credential change.
This rule detects successful logon events (Event ID 4624) or special logon events (Event ID 4648) with specific logon types (7: NetworkCleartext, 8: NewCredentials, 9: Network, 11: CachedInteractive) that occur within 24 hours of a user registration event on the same host. This pattern may indicate suspicious account usage shortly after account creation or registration on a device.
This rule detects authentication events using the Device Code OAuth flow where the user account name contains keywords associated with sensitive or privileged roles (such as 'finance', 'admin', 'accounts'), originating from non-private (external) IP addresses. This activity is indicative of potential device code phishing attacks targeting sensitive user accounts.
Detects rapid, successive successful interactive sign-ins for the same user account that each satisfy MFA requirements, but originate from geographically and technically distinct environments (different IP locations, ASNs, and device IDs) within a 2-minute window. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking via Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) or Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) frameworks.
Detects login attempts to source code repositories and developer tooling (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure DevOps, Slack, Visual Studio Code) originating from unmanaged or non-compliant devices, excluding traffic originating from known corporate network ranges.
This rule detects a user account performing its first-ever GitHub OAuth or repository access within a short timeframe (30 minutes) after authenticating to a designated low-trust OpenAI community forum. This pattern is designed to identify potential adversary activity where a compromised or newly created account is used to pivot from a low-trust environment to corporate repository access.
This rule detects a user account performing its first-ever GitHub OAuth or repository access within a short timeframe (30 minutes) after authenticating to a designated low-trust OpenAI community forum. This pattern is designed to identify potential adversary activity where a compromised or newly created account is used to pivot from a low-trust environment to corporate repository access.
Detects potential cross-application SSO session or token reuse by identifying users transitioning from a low-trust application (forum) to a high-trust application (ChatGPT/Codex) within a short window (15 minutes), especially when the sign-in is non-interactive (lacking MFA) or occurs from a different IP address or user agent, suggesting a possible token replay attack.
Detects potential cross-application SSO session or token reuse by identifying users transitioning from a low-trust application (forum) to a high-trust application (ChatGPT/Codex) within a short window (15 minutes), especially when the sign-in is non-interactive (lacking MFA) or occurs from a different IP address or user agent, suggesting a possible token replay attack.
This rule monitors cloud and identity logs to detect a single user identity exhibiting multiple stages of suspicious activity (authentication, reconnaissance, and exfiltration) within a 24-hour period while utilizing distinct, non-overlapping source IP addresses for each stage. This behavior is indicative of an account compromise where different stages of the attack chain originate from different infrastructure.
Detects instances where a user successfully authenticates using the OAuth 2.0 device code flow, and the resulting token is subsequently used from a different IP address or by a different client application, indicating potential token theft or session hijacking.
Detects successful API requests to sensitive administrative endpoints on WSO2 systems that lack a corresponding legitimate authentication event (session) from the same SourceIP and user pair, which may indicate the use of forged JWTs or authentication bypass exploitation (e.g., CVE-2026-5430).
Detects successful API requests to sensitive administrative endpoints on WSO2 systems that lack a corresponding legitimate authentication event (session) from the same SourceIP and user pair, which may indicate the use of forged JWTs or authentication bypass exploitation (e.g., CVE-2026-5430).
Detects the creation of a new user account in Nacos, followed immediately by an authentication failure and then a successful authentication, which may indicate an attacker using automated tools to create and test a backdoored administrative account.
Detects unauthorized cloud authentication attempts in Azure AD where a session token appears to have been replayed. The rule identifies sign-ins flagged by Identity Protection as anomalous or involving token/issuer irregularities, particularly when these occur without a fresh MFA challenge, suggesting a bypass of standard authentication controls.
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