Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects potential misuse of SSH credentials by identifying successful SSH logins from source IP addresses that have not been observed in the previous 14 days, or successful SSH logins occurring within one hour of an authorized_keys file modification on the same host. This combination of behaviors is indicative of an adversary establishing or using persistence via SSH key manipulation.
Detects anomalous sign-in activity for service principals (non-interactive accounts) where the same application authenticates from multiple distinct countries within a 24-hour window. This behavior often indicates the unauthorized use of compromised service principal credentials, such as client secrets or certificates, from distributed attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects successful sign-in events in Entra ID where MFA is marked as satisfied, but no interactive MFA challenge (e.g., Push, FIDO2, SMS) was recorded as completed in the authentication details. This behavior, when correlated with a new IP, device, or user-agent relative to a 30-day baseline, is highly indicative of session token replay or AitM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) attacks attempting to bypass MFA requirements.
Detects a suspicious pattern where a user authenticates to a remote access portal (like Citrix or VPN) without multi-factor authentication (MFA) or with an existing risk flag, followed by a surge in file activity (creation, modification, or renaming of >500 files or >200 distinct files) on the same account within a 24-hour window, potentially indicating compromised credential usage for staging data for exfiltration or ransomware.
Detects anomalous authentication behavior where a single session identifier is used to access three or more distinct SaaS applications within a one-hour window. This behavior often indicates the unauthorized use of a stolen session cookie or OAuth token (Pass-the-Cookie) across multiple SSO-integrated platforms.
Detects impossible-travel activity where a single user account authenticates successfully from multiple distinct countries or IP addresses within a short 15-minute window. This behavior is highly indicative of potential session hijacking or the concurrent use of a stolen session token by both an attacker and a legitimate user.
Detects successful user authentication to Microsoft Entra ID or Exchange Online using legacy authentication protocols (e.g., IMAP, POP3, SMTP AUTH, Exchange ActiveSync) that bypass modern MFA enforcement. The rule specifically alerts when these legacy sign-ins originate from a source IP address not previously associated with that specific user account, indicating potential credential abuse.
This rule detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing activity by identifying session token or cookie reuse. It monitors for instances where a valid authentication session is established from one IP address and then immediately used again by the same user with the same session ID from a different IP address and potentially a different User-Agent, indicating that an attacker has hijacked and replayed the MFA-satisfied session.
This rule detects potential session hijacking by correlating endpoint-based detections of known infostealer malware (e.g., Vidar, Lumma, Redline) with a subsequent cloud Identity Provider (IdP) login for the same user. The correlation specifically focuses on instances where the IdP authentication originates from an IP address different from the infected host, suggesting the use of stolen session cookies by an external actor to access corporate resources.
This rule monitors Azure AD sign-in logs for patterns indicative of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks. It triggers when a successful authentication includes MFA and exhibits specific flags associated with proxy-based session hijacking, such as unfamiliar risk details or clear evidence of proxy-based token issuance.
Detects successful Azure AD sign-in events that are flagged with a medium or high risk level and identified as anomalous by Azure AD Identity Protection. The specific combination of successful authentication alongside risk details like unfamiliar features, anonymized IP addresses, or malicious IP addresses is highly indicative of potential cloud account takeover, potentially following session token theft or infostealer activity.
Detects an account performing a mass download or synchronization of files from SharePoint or OneDrive within a 30-minute window, occurring within two hours of a medium or high-risk Azure AD sign-in event. This pattern is indicative of potential account takeover and subsequent data exfiltration by an adversary using harvested credentials.
Detects impossible travel authentication patterns where a user logs in from two geographically distant locations within a short time frame, while specifically filtering for sessions that reuse existing refresh or session tokens instead of performing fresh interactive authentication.
Detects potential account compromise by aggregating multiple high-fidelity indicators of adversary activity for a single user within a 72-hour window. The rule triggers when at least three distinct stages of an attack chain are identified, specifically: credential theft/infostealer activity, anomalous sign-in (token reuse/impossible travel), mailbox or OAuth configuration changes, and mass data exfiltration.
The following analytic identifies instances where users may have mistakenly entered their passwords in the username field during authentication attempts. It detects this by analyzing failed authentication events with usernames longer than 7 characters and high Shannon entropy, followed by a successful authentication from the same source to the same destination. This activity is significant as it can indicate potential security risks, such as password exposure. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit this to gain unauthorized access, leading to potential data breaches or further compromise of the system.
Detects anomalous lateral movement behavior where a single user account authenticates via NTLM (LogonType 3, network logon) to three or more distinct hosts within a 30-minute window, without a preceding interactive logon (LogonType 2). This pattern is a strong indicator of an adversary using captured NTLM hashes to move laterally across a Windows environment.
Detects anomalous lateral movement behavior characterized by an account performing multiple NTLM authentication events (Logon Type 3) across distinct hosts within a short time window, specifically where Kerberos pre-authentication is absent. This pattern is frequently observed in Pass-the-Hash (PtH) attacks where attackers utilize stolen NTLM hashes to move laterally.
Detects potential password spraying activity in Azure Active Directory by identifying a single source IP address that authenticates against multiple distinct user accounts within a short time frame. The rule flags instances where there are numerous authentication attempts across many users, characterized by a low per-user failure count followed by at least one successful authentication, which is indicative of a successful password spray attempt.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting activity by monitoring Kerberos TGS requests (Event ID 4769) that use RC4 encryption (0x17 or 17). It identifies accounts requesting TGS tickets for a large number of unique Service Principal Names (SPNs), excluding requests for host-based services (ending in $). High volumes of such requests from a single user are indicative of an attempt to gather service tickets for offline password cracking.
Detects anomalous device-authorization-grant (RFC 8628) activity indicative of device-code phishing attacks (e.g., Tycoon2FA). The rule identifies user accounts exhibiting a rapid succession of 'authorization_pending' (70016) status polling attempts followed by a successful token issuance (0), constrained to a short time window and excluding known first-party Microsoft CLI/dev-tool applications.
Detects NTLM network logons (LogonType 3 or 9) which often result from a host resolving an attacker-supplied UNC path (e.g., \host
esource) during forced authentication attacks. This rule monitors Windows Security Event ID 4624 to identify incoming NTLM-based network authentication requests, excluding local system logons.
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