Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the provisioning of high-performance compute instances (GPU or high-CPU) in AWS regions that fall outside of an established organizational baseline. This behavior is often associated with unauthorized resource hijacking (cryptomining) by adversaries leveraging compromised IAM principals to deploy infrastructure in regions with lower visibility or monitoring coverage.
This rule detects modifications to AWS IAM policies via PutUserPolicy, PutRolePolicy, AttachUserPolicy, or AttachRolePolicy where the policy grants excessive permissions (wildcard Actions and Resources) or attaches an AdministratorAccess policy. The rule also flags rapid escalations occurring within 15 minutes of new user, role, or access key creation to identify potential self-escalation or unauthorized privilege escalation attempts by existing identities.
Detects modifications to AWS S3 bucket policies, access control lists (ACLs), or public access block configurations that result in public bucket exposure. The rule specifically flags broad permissions such as 'AllUsers' or wildcard principal entities, and correlates these findings with AWS Config or Access Analyzer data to confirm public reachability.
Detects unauthorized sharing of AWS EBS snapshots or RDS snapshots to external, unapproved AWS accounts. This activity is often a precursor to data exfiltration, where an adversary creates a snapshot of a production resource and shares it with an account under their control to bypass existing identity-based access controls.
Detects the creation of new AWS IAM access keys, with specific filtering for cross-principal creation, creation for sensitive accounts (e.g., service, admin), or excessive key creation activity. This pattern is often used by adversaries for persistence or privilege escalation in cloud environments.
This rule detects suspicious activities targeting cloud management hierarchy, specifically identifying attempts to remove AWS accounts from organizations, disable policy enforcement, create rogue accounts, or hijack Azure subscriptions through unauthorized transfers or tenant changes. Such actions are often used by adversaries to bypass security guardrails, remove organizational visibility, or establish persistent unauthorized access within a cloud environment.
Detects high-privilege IAM role assignments in Google Cloud Platform and Microsoft Azure environments. The rule specifically monitors for assignments of overly permissive roles (e.g., Owner, Global Administrator, or wildcard actions) that could allow for full environment compromise or persistence.
Detects the deployment of virtual machines with public IP addresses (in Azure) or compute instances with external IP addresses (in GCP) by a single principal within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a newly-privileged identity or an compromised account establishing externally-accessible infrastructure for further malicious activity.
Detects potential abuse of Cloud Shell to persist access in cloud environments. For GCP, it monitors the injection of SSH keys into instance or project metadata from a Cloud Shell session. For Azure, it detects a pattern involving Cloud Shell storage provisioning followed by a subsequent VM run-command or SSH public key update, indicating potential unauthorized management of virtual machines.
Detects the creation of new service principal credentials in Azure AD or GCP service account keys targeting identities holding highly privileged administrative roles. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism where an adversary establishes long-term access to a cloud environment by creating new, controlled credentials for an existing privileged identity.
Detects instances where a user has consented to an OAuth application that requests high-privilege Microsoft Graph scopes (Directory.Read.All, User.Read.All, Mail.Read). This pattern is indicative of consent phishing attacks where adversaries trick users into granting applications excessive permissions, bypassing administrative consent workflows when tenant configurations allow user-level consent.
Detects the assignment of high-privilege application permissions (e.g., Mail.ReadWrite, full_access_as_app, Files.ReadWrite.All, Sites.FullControl.All) to a service principal. This pattern is indicative of an attacker who has compromised an Application Administrator account and is attempting to establish long-term, unattended access to cloud resources such as mailboxes and SharePoint sites via OAuth client-credential flows.
Detects when a user is added as an owner to an Azure AD Application or Service Principal, specifically highlighting instances where the new owner does not currently hold a privileged directory role. This pattern is often used as a persistence mechanism to maintain long-term access to an environment without requiring high-level administrative credentials.
Detects when a Service Principal is assigned to a highly privileged administrative role in Azure Active Directory (Entra ID). This activity can be an indicator of an adversary establishing persistence or escalating privileges by leveraging non-human identities.
This rule detects unscheduled modifications to federation, application, or service principal credentials, including ADFS token-signing certificates, in both Azure AD (via O365 management activity logs) and local Windows environments (via Security Event Logs). It filters these events against a known rotation schedule to highlight suspicious, non-routine changes that may indicate persistence establishment or identity provider tampering.
This rule detects when new credentials (secrets or certificates) are added to an Azure Active Directory Service Principal. It flags this activity as suspicious if it occurs outside of typical business hours or if it exhibits signs of 'rapid re-keying', where multiple credentials are added to the same service principal within a 24-hour window. This behavior is a common indicator of persistence maintenance or credential rotation to support unauthorized access.
Detects a sequence where an OAuth application is granted 'Mail.ReadWrite' or 'MailboxSettings.ReadWrite' permissions, followed shortly thereafter (within 4 hours) by the creation or modification of an Inbox Rule by that same application within the same mailbox. This pattern is indicative of a persistence mechanism where an adversary uses elevated OAuth permissions to manipulate mailbox mail flow rules for stealth or exfiltration.
This rule monitors Office 365 management logs for device registration or join events in Azure Active Directory where the resulting device state is flagged as both non-compliant and unmanaged, despite having a 'Workplace' or 'AzureAd' trust type. It further aggregates these events by user to identify potential suspicious patterns, such as bulk registrations or rapid activity within a 30-minute window, which may indicate account compromise or unauthorized device enrollment.
Detects mass-phishing consent campaigns by monitoring non-admin users consenting to multi-tenant or unverified-publisher applications requesting non-basic-profile OAuth scopes. The rule aggregates multiple consent events for the same application over a 1-hour window to identify potentially malicious consent-phishing activity.
Detects OAuth2 permission consent events where a user grants a third-party or newly registered application access to high-risk scopes (such as Mail, Files, or Directory). This technique is commonly used to establish persistence and bypass MFA by gaining access to user accounts via malicious or compromised OAuth applications.
Detects OAuth2 permission consent events where a user grants a third-party or newly registered application access to high-risk scopes (such as Mail, Files, or Directory). This technique is commonly used to establish persistence and bypass MFA by gaining access to user accounts via malicious or compromised OAuth applications.
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