Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects mailbox configuration changes in Exchange Online where email forwarding (ForwardingSmtpAddress, ForwardingAddress, or DeliverToMailboxAndForward) is enabled to an external, non-tenant domain. This technique is commonly used for persistence and data exfiltration following account compromise, allowing attackers to redirect incoming communications to an external mailbox even after the original account credentials have been reset.
Detects the addition of new credentials (certificates, secrets, or keys) to Azure AD Service Principals or Applications, occurring outside of standard business hours (6 AM to 8 PM). This pattern is often indicative of an adversary establishing or maintaining persistent access to an enterprise cloud environment.
Detects the addition of new credentials (certificates, secrets, or keys) to Azure AD Service Principals or Applications, occurring outside of standard business hours (6 AM to 8 PM). This pattern is often indicative of an adversary establishing or maintaining persistent access to an enterprise cloud environment.
This rule detects when a user is assigned a highly privileged role in Azure AD (e.g., Global Administrator, Security Administrator) shortly after that user has performed a sign-in event flagged as risky. This behavior is a strong indicator of account takeover or malicious privilege escalation within the cloud environment.
Detects anomalous OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant sign-in activity within Microsoft 365. The rule identifies suspicious token redemption behavior where the initial device code request and the subsequent token redemption occur from disparate IP addresses or utilize different user-agent strings, which is indicative of EvilTokens or similar adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) device-code phishing frameworks.
Detects high-privilege OAuth application consent grants (such as Mail.Read or Files.ReadWrite.All) occurring within four hours of a risky or anomalous user sign-in. This sequence indicates a potential compromise where an attacker uses a compromised account to authorize a malicious OAuth application for persistent access and data exfiltration.
Detects the assignment of a highly privileged administrative or directory role to a user or service principal following a high-risk or anomalous sign-in event. This pattern is indicative of potential session hijacking where an adversary attempts to escalate privileges within a cloud environment after gaining initial access to a compromised account.
Detects when a user account that has exhibited anomalous or risky sign-in behavior subsequently grants mailbox delegation, full-access, or Send-As permissions to another user (who is not the mailbox owner). This activity is indicative of a compromised account being used to establish persistence or facilitate email exfiltration and spoofing by expanding access to sensitive mailboxes.
This rule detects anomalous Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or Just-in-Time (JIT) role activation events. It identifies when a user activates a privileged role following suspicious activity such as a risky sign-in, during unusual (off-hours) time windows, or from an unfamiliar source IP address, potentially indicating session hijacking or credential abuse.
Detects sign-in events to high-privileged cloud management consoles (e.g., Azure Portal, Microsoft Entra, Intune, Okta, AWS, GCP) originating from sessions with elevated risk or anomalous characteristics. The detection monitors for factors such as the use of anonymized IP addresses, unmanaged devices, sessions marked as 'atRisk' by identity providers, or non-interactive service-based access to management APIs that deviate from standard administrative workflow patterns.
Detects 'Add member to role' operations in Entra ID where high-privileged directory roles are assigned to a user or service principal. This pattern is often a critical indicator of privilege escalation in account compromise scenarios where an attacker attempts to elevate their own or a secondary account's permissions within the tenant.
Detects the addition of new client secrets or certificates to existing applications or service principals in Azure AD. This activity is a common method for adversaries to establish persistence in a cloud environment by ensuring they maintain MFA-exempt application-level access even if compromised user accounts or session cookies expire.
Detects modifications to AWS CloudTrail logging configurations, specifically changes to trails or subscription filters that could be used to suppress, redirect, or disrupt the collection of audit logs, potentially masking malicious activity.
Detects the creation of an AWS Lambda function that is assigned an excessively privileged execution role (e.g., AdministratorAccess). Attackers often leverage this technique to establish persistence or facilitate privilege escalation by creating backdoored functions that run with broad administrative permissions.
Detects the modification or attachment of IAM policies to users or roles that contain wildcard 'Allow' permissions for all actions and resources. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation where an identity is granted full administrative control over the AWS account.
This rule detects the initialization of an AWS CloudShell environment or session where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was not explicitly recorded in the event data. Unauthorized access to CloudShell can provide an adversary with a command-line interface to interact with AWS APIs, potentially facilitating further malicious activities.
Detects potential privilege escalation where an identity with iam:PassRole permissions deploys or updates compute resources (CloudFormation, EC2, or Lambda) to assume a more privileged IAM role than the user currently holds.
Detects the use of sts:AssumeRole or sts:GetFederationToken to request temporary security credentials in a different AWS account than the one initiating the request. This can indicate cross-account privilege escalation or lateral movement using identity federation or assumed roles.
Detects modifications to AWS S3 bucket Access Control Lists (ACLs) using the 'PutBucketAcl' API call that grant public read or write permissions. This could indicate an attempt to make sensitive data stored in S3 publicly accessible, potentially leading to data exfiltration.
Detects potential privilege escalation where an identity with iam:PassRole permissions deploys or updates compute resources (CloudFormation, EC2, or Lambda) to assume a more privileged IAM role than the user currently holds.
Detects the use of sts:AssumeRole or sts:GetFederationToken to request temporary security credentials in a different AWS account than the one initiating the request. This can indicate cross-account privilege escalation or lateral movement using identity federation or assumed roles.
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