Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances of OAuth device code flow authentication from suspicious sources (e.g., unfamiliar devices, non-compliant/unmanaged devices, or unusual geographic locations) that are followed closely by an OAuth application consent event. This behavior is indicative of potential consent phishing or device code phishing attacks attempting to gain persistent access to cloud resources.
Detects high-risk account modifications, such as adding MFA methods or OAuth consent grants, occurring shortly after a user sign-in. This pattern is indicative of post-AiTM session theft (e.g., NovaCookies) where an adversary uses a stolen session token to modify account settings for persistence or MFA bypass.
This rule detects administrative changes (create, update, delete) to Cloudflare DNS records, load balancer pools, or origin pools specifically associated with 'registry.coder.com', as well as anomalous login and API token activity on the Cloudflare account. Such activity may indicate unauthorized configuration tampering, potential account compromise, or malicious modifications to critical infrastructure endpoints.
Detects GitLab's personal_access_tokens/self endpoint being queried via GET, the reconnaissance step a leaked token uses to confirm its own scopes and privilege level.
Detects a single GitLab token/account holding Owner-level access across an unusually large number of projects (50+), the standing-privilege condition that turned one leaked token into a 55-project supply-chain exposure.
Detects high-frequency S3 object upload activity (PutObject/CompleteMultipartUpload) originating from the Rclone tool, a common indicator of potential data exfiltration to cloud storage.
This rule monitors for high-volume, suspicious activity involving the enumeration of sensitive cloud resources across multiple Azure services (e.g., Kubernetes cluster secrets, KeyVault secrets, Backup vault items, and DataFactory/Web connections). An alert is triggered when a single identity performs a high number of operations across multiple distinct resource types within a one-hour window, which is indicative of credential harvesting or cloud reconnaissance.
Detects anomalous, large-scale cloning or mirroring of code repositories combined with targeted access to infrastructure-as-code configuration files (e.g., .tfvars, .tfstate) or automated exfiltration of CI/CD build artifacts. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to exfiltrate proprietary source code or sensitive secrets stored within repositories.
Detects the creation of a new AWS S3 bucket followed by a large volume of data uploads (more than 200 objects) within a 2-hour window. The detection focuses on activity attributed to a single identity with limited source IP diversity, which is highly indicative of scripted data staging and potential exfiltration preparation by an unauthorized actor.
Detects interaction with known infrastructure associated with the PREY-0058 campaign, which utilizes Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing lures mimicking passkey or MFA registration pages to target Microsoft 365 and other SaaS applications.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events within JFrog Artifactory where an account accesses sensitive code-signing material (rubygems/gemspec/signing keys) and subsequently performs administrative actions (user addition/role assignment/privilege escalation) within a one-hour window, indicating potential account takeover or exploitation.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events within JFrog Artifactory where an account accesses sensitive code-signing material (rubygems/gemspec/signing keys) and subsequently performs administrative actions (user addition/role assignment/privilege escalation) within a one-hour window, indicating potential account takeover or exploitation.
No description available.
No description available.
This rule detects potentially malicious OAuth application consent grants in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). It monitors for consent events involving high-risk scopes by non-verified publishers, instances of admins attempting to bypass consent requirements, and follows up by checking for unusually high activity (sign-ins or resource access) from the newly consented application within a short timeframe.
This rule monitors for Exchange administration operations where mailbox permissions ('FullAccess', 'SendAs', or 'SendOnBehalf') are granted to a user. It specifically flags instances where the account performing the action is neither the owner of the target mailbox nor the grantee, identifying suspicious, potentially unauthorized delegation patterns.
Detects the creation or modification of Power Automate flows that involve potentially sensitive external services or personal email providers, which may indicate data exfiltration or unauthorized integration setup.
This rule monitors for various types of events (user logons, network connections, API audits, cloud app events, and email traffic) originating from a specific CIDR block (160.79.104.0/21), which is flagged as suspicious or unauthorized.
This rule correlates email sender activity with network, cloud, and identity logs by matching traffic against a specific IP range (160.79.104.0/21) identified as malicious or suspicious. The rule flags instances where this range appears as an email sender IP or as a remote/source IP address across various infrastructure indices, potentially indicating adversary communication or exfiltration.
This rule correlates email sender activity with network, cloud, and identity logs by matching traffic against a specific IP range (160.79.104.0/21) identified as malicious or suspicious. The rule flags instances where this range appears as an email sender IP or as a remote/source IP address across various infrastructure indices, potentially indicating adversary communication or exfiltration.
This rule detects various event types (email, identity authentication, network connections, and cloud audit logs) originating from or interacting with the specific IP address range 160.79.104.0/22 to 160.79.111.0/22, which is associated with known malicious activity.
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