Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potentially malicious activity within Linux environments or containers where a single user context concurrently performs credential hunting (via environment variable dumping or accessing .env files) and terminates processes associated with known cryptocurrency miners or competing malicious actors. This behavior is highly indicative of a cryptojacking infection or a malicious actor clearing out existing resource-hijacking threats.
Detects various techniques used by an attacker to escape a container environment or gain unauthorized access to host-level resources. This includes the execution of namespace manipulation tools (nsenter, unshare, chroot), unauthorized access to the docker.sock Unix socket, mounting of host filesystems from within a container, and direct attempts to access the host's /proc/1 namespace files.
Detects repeated restarts of vLLM pods (due to OOMKilled, CrashLoopBackOff, or other failure reasons) that are correlated with a burst of multimodal requests. This pattern can indicate a denial-of-service attack, resource exhaustion, or exploitation of vulnerabilities (such as CVE-2026-22778) targeting the vLLM service, potentially leading to service instability or compromise.
Detects the creation or deletion of Kubernetes namespaces and nodes via the API server. This activity can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence, expand their control, or disrupt the environment within a Kubernetes cluster.
Detects attempts to list, read, create, update, or delete Kubernetes secrets via the Kubernetes API server. This activity can indicate an adversary attempting to gain access to sensitive information or manipulate the environment.
This rule detects the creation of user namespaces on Linux systems by unprivileged users. The 'unshare' command with '--user' or '-U' flags allows a process to move into a new user namespace, which can be abused for privilege escalation or container escape. The rule specifically excludes common container runtimes and processes running as 'root' to reduce false positives.
This rule detects suspicious activity patterns on Linux systems that may indicate privilege escalation or container escape attempts. It monitors three main behaviors: the execution of network configuration tools (tc, insmod, modprobe) for kernel-level manipulations (pedit/actions), the use of 'unshare' to create isolated namespaces, and typical privilege escalation commands (su, id, whoami, bash) executed by non-root users. The rule correlates these events and alerts based on the combination and intensity of these behaviors, flagging high-severity activity when kernel-level tools are combined with namespace manipulation or privilege elevation.
This rule detects suspicious manipulation of Linux namespaces using the 'unshare' utility or manual modification of user ID mapping files ('uid_map', 'gid_map', 'setgroups') in '/proc/self/'. Such activities are characteristic of container escape attempts or privilege escalation, where an attacker seeks to gain root access on the host or map unprivileged users to privileged IDs within a new namespace.
Detects potential container breakout attempts on Windows systems by monitoring for the launch of privileged containers with sensitive host paths mounted, the execution of host-level processes directly spawned by container runtime binaries (docker.exe, containerd.exe), and direct access to sensitive host filesystems (e.g., C:\windows, C:\etc, C:\programdata) by container runtimes.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving Docker containers, specifically focusing on path traversal attempts via the 'docker cp' command, execution of potential proof-of-concept scripts, or the creation of specific marker files indicating attempts to interact with or escape from the containerized environment to the underlying host.
This rule detects potentially malicious activities within or involving Docker containers on Linux systems. It specifically monitors for the use of 'docker cp' with archive flags, the execution of custom scripts ('poc.sh') involving docker-related commands, or the use of 'docker-cp-copyout' strings, which may indicate data staging, exfiltration, or container-based persistence and lateral movement.
This rule detects potentially malicious attempts to escape a container or manipulate the host filesystem using the 'docker cp' command. It identifies commands that contain directory traversal patterns (e.g., '../', '..\') or direct references to the host filesystem via '/proc/self/root'.
Detects attempts to perform a container escape using the 'docker cp' command, where a maliciously crafted source path with traversal sequences allows the container daemon to write files outside of the container boundary. The rule monitors for suspicious 'docker cp' command executions and the creation of artifacts associated with known path traversal escape techniques in the host filesystem by the Docker daemon.
Detects the use of 'docker cp' to copy files to or from sensitive host paths, such as cron, password files, SSH keys, or system directories, which often indicates attempts to escape container isolation or establish persistence on the host.
Detects the execution of 'docker pull' or 'docker run' commands, excluding common base images like Microsoft, Ubuntu, Debian, and Alpine. This rule aims to identify potentially unauthorized container deployments or image pulls that could indicate malicious activity within a containerized environment.
Detects kubectl exec and port-forward operations via the Kubernetes API server. 'Exec' provides interactive shell access to a running container, while 'Port-forward' allows tunneling into the pod network, potentially bypassing network policies. This rule also detects 'attach' operations.
Detects attempts to modify or bypass AppArmor security profiles using utilities such as aa-complain, aa-disable, or apparmor_parser, correlated with process execution involving user namespace unsharing (e.g., via unshare or CLONE_NEWUSER/CLONE_NEWNET). This combination suggests an attacker attempting to weaken host security controls or perform a container breakout or privilege escalation by manipulating kernel-level namespaces and security policies.
Detects the use of the 'unshare' utility to create new namespaces on Linux systems. Adversaries often use 'unshare' to perform container escapes, escalate privileges, or isolate processes from host-level monitoring. This rule specifically filters out legitimate administrative or container management processes such as systemd, containerd, and runc to reduce noise.
This rule detects processes making a high number of successful network connections (10 or more within an hour) to known public container registries such as docker.io or quay.io. This activity could indicate legitimate containerization operations, but also potential malicious activity like downloading malicious container images as part of a supply chain attack, or ingress of tools.
Detects the creation of Kubernetes pods where the 'hostPID' or 'hostNetwork' settings are enabled. These configurations allow a pod to share the host's process namespace or network stack, respectively, which are common vectors for container escapes and host-level privilege escalation.
Detects the use of 'docker cp' commands containing path traversal sequences (e.g., '..') in the destination argument. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to escape the container environment and write files to the host filesystem, potentially exploiting the 'docker-cp-copyout' vulnerability.
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