Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
361 detections
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Detects the creation of Kubernetes pods where the 'hostPID' or 'hostNetwork' settings are enabled. These configurations allow a pod to share the host's process namespace or network stack, respectively, which are common vectors for container escapes and host-level privilege escalation.
Detects attempts to perform container escapes by abusing the 'docker cp' command. The rule identifies path traversal sequences in 'docker cp' arguments, as well as unauthorized shell or script execution spawned by container daemon processes (e.g., dockerd, containerd) following a file copy operation, and specific file creation patterns indicative of a container escape attempt.
This rule detects the execution of Docker containers or related CI/CD runner processes (like Gitea act_runner) with insecure configuration options. These options, such as --privileged, --pid=host, or mounting the Docker socket, can facilitate container escapes or unauthorized host-level access.
Detects potential container escape attempts via 'docker cp' path traversal attacks or suspicious shell execution spawned from the Docker daemon. The rule monitors for directory traversal sequences in 'docker cp' commands, the use of PoC tooling strings, file modifications outside expected container paths, and shell process spawning originating from Docker-related parent processes.
Detects Gitea act_runner processes spawning Docker containers with dangerous configurations, such as privileged mode, host namespace mounts, or security-opt bypasses, followed by the execution of 'nsenter' or shell processes, which are indicative of a container escape attempt to the host.
Detects Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts exploiting URL parser differentials. Attackers append a double-slash sequence to a legitimate github.com blob URL to trick the backend into resolving an absolute local filesystem path. The rule specifically targets sensitive paths such as /proc/self/environ, /var/task/, and application source files to perform Local File Read (LFR) or access internal cloud metadata services.
Detects suspicious execution patterns originating from Gitea act_runner that indicate potential container escape attempts or host namespace manipulation. The rule flags the use of sensitive docker flags such as --pid=host, --ipc=host, --cap-add=ALL, and security profile unconfining, alongside the execution of 'nsenter' or the existence of specific proof-of-concept markers related to container escape vulnerabilities.
Detects the use of 'docker cp' to copy files out of a container to the host filesystem. This rule identifies suspicious patterns that may exploit the path traversal vulnerability CVE-2026-43503, which allows an attacker to escape the intended destination directory on the host.
Detects network connections attempting to access Kubernetes API endpoints related to secrets. This could indicate an adversary trying to enumerate or exfiltrate sensitive credentials from a Kubernetes cluster.
Detects the initialization of unprivileged user and network namespaces combined with specific IPsec tunnel configurations (xfrm/esp/veth). This sequence of operations is a known prerequisite for exploiting the DirtyClone (CVE-2026-43503) vulnerability, a Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) in the Linux kernel.
Detects the creation of Kubernetes pods with dangerous security settings that could lead to container escape or privilege escalation. This includes pods configured with hostNetwork enabled, allowing privilege escalation, running as root (UID 0), or abusing capabilities.
Detects various techniques used by an attacker to escape a container environment or gain unauthorized access to host-level resources. This includes the execution of namespace manipulation tools (nsenter, unshare, chroot), unauthorized access to the docker.sock Unix socket, mounting of host filesystems from within a container, and direct attempts to access the host's /proc/1 namespace files.
Detects attempts to list, read, create, update, or delete Kubernetes secrets through the Kubernetes API server. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to gain access to sensitive credentials or manipulate application configurations.
Detects the creation or deletion of Kubernetes namespaces and nodes via the Kubernetes API server. This activity can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence, expand their control, or disrupt the environment.
Detects activity indicative of container escape attempts, specifically identifying the use of 'docker cp' with path traversal sequences to manipulate host files, or the unauthorized execution of shells and utilities directly spawned by the container runtime daemon (dockerd). It also monitors for execution patterns associated with known container escape proof-of-concept scripts.
Detects potential container breakout or privilege escalation attempts originating from Gitea act-runner processes. The rule monitors for the execution of containers with dangerous security configurations (e.g., host PID/IPC namespace, privileged capabilities, disabled security modules) or the use of nsenter to break out of a container into the host environment.
Detects the use of the 'docker cp' command with suspicious path traversal characters or known PoC artifacts in the destination parameter. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to exploit path traversal vulnerabilities in the Docker daemon (such as those allowing container escape) by writing files outside the container's intended scope onto the host filesystem.
Detects Gitea act_runner spawning Docker containers with dangerous runtime flags (e.g., --pid=host, --privileged, --cap-add=ALL) that facilitate host namespace escape. This activity is indicative of exploitation of CVE-2026-20896, where malicious CI/CD workflow YAML files inject these options to break out of the container sandbox and access the host filesystem.
This rule detects two distinct malicious activities related to Gitea installations: 1) Container escape attempts involving 'act-runner' processes configured with dangerous flags like --pid=host, --cap-add=ALL, or usage of nsenter, and 2) Potential administrative impersonation attempts against a Gitea instance via injection of the X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin HTTP header.
Detects attempts to escape a Docker container to the host filesystem by exploiting directory traversal vulnerabilities within the 'docker cp' command. It identifies suspicious CLI arguments indicating path traversal, the presence of known PoC artifacts, and file write events initiated by the Docker daemon outside of expected container directory paths.
Detects exploitation attempts against Gitea instances where an attacker impersonates an admin user by injecting the 'X-WEBAUTH-USER' header. This vulnerability typically occurs when 'REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES' is misconfigured to trust all proxies ('*'), allowing unauthenticated users to gain administrative access via header manipulation. The rule covers web request headers, container logs for suspicious admin creation, and process execution arguments associated with the exploitation.
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