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Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This analytic detects the execution of PowerView PowerShell cmdlets `Get-ObjectAcl` or `Get-DomainObjectAcl`, which are used to enumerate Access Control List (ACL) permissions for Active Directory objects. It leverages Event ID 4104 from PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to discover weak permissions in Active Directory, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these permissions to gain unauthorized access or escalate their privileges within the network.
This analytic detects the execution of the PowerView PowerShell cmdlet `Get-NetComputer` when it is used to query Active Directory for specific user account details such as "samaccountname," "accountexpires," "lastlogon," "lastlogoff," "pwdlastset," or "logoncount." It leverages Event ID 4104 from PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to gather user account information, which is often a precursor to further malicious actions like unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network.
The analytic detects the execution of the PowerView PowerShell cmdlet Get-NetUser with the -PreauthNotRequire parameter, leveraging Event ID 4104. This method identifies attempts to query Active Directory user accounts that do not require Kerberos preauthentication. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate reconnaissance efforts by an attacker to identify potentially vulnerable accounts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further exploitation, such as unauthorized access or privilege escalation within the network.
'A service principal name (SPN) is used to uniquely identify a service instance in a Windows environment.
Each SPN is usually associated with a service account. Organizations may have used service accounts with weak passwords in their environment.
An attacker can try requesting Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC) which contains a hash of the Service account. This can then be used for offline cracking.
This hunting query looks for accounts that are generating excessive requests to different resources within the last hour compared with the previous 24 hours. Normal users would not make an unusually large number of request within a small time window. This is based on 4769 events which can be very noisy so environment based tweaking might be needed.'
Each SPN is usually associated with a service account. Organizations may have used service accounts with weak passwords in their environment.
An attacker can try requesting Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC) which contains a hash of the Service account. This can then be used for offline cracking.
This hunting query looks for accounts that are generating excessive requests to different resources within the last hour compared with the previous 24 hours. Normal users would not make an unusually large number of request within a small time window. This is based on 4769 events which can be very noisy so environment based tweaking might be needed.'
Detects suspicious Kerberos TGT requests with pre-authentication disabled (Pre-Authentication Type = 0) and Ticket Encryption Type (0x17) i.e, RC4-HMAC.
This may indicate an AS-REP Roasting attack, where attackers request AS-REP messages for accounts without pre-authentication and attempt to crack the encrypted ticket offline to recover user passwords.
This may indicate an AS-REP Roasting attack, where attackers request AS-REP messages for accounts without pre-authentication and attempt to crack the encrypted ticket offline to recover user passwords.
Roasting
KQL
Detect Active Directory LDAP queries that search for Kerberoasting (SPNs) or accounts with Kerberos preauthentication not required from Azure ATP, and try to get the process initiated the LDAP query from MDATP.
Replace 389 on line 5 with LDAP port in your environment
Replace true on line 6 to false if you want to include Nt Authority process
This LDAP query cover Rubeus, Kerberoast, BloodHound tools
Replace 389 on line 5 with LDAP port in your environment
Replace true on line 6 to false if you want to include Nt Authority process
This LDAP query cover Rubeus, Kerberoast, BloodHound tools
This query helps hunting for possible device code Phishing attempts
'This hunting query will alert on any Impossible travel activity in correlation with mailbox permission tampering followed by account being added to a PIM managed privileged group.
Ensure this impossible travel incident with increase of privileges is legitimate in your environment.'
Ensure this impossible travel incident with increase of privileges is legitimate in your environment.'
'This query identifies attackers trying to enumerate the Storage keys as well as updating roles using AzureActivity,SigninLogs
and AuditLogs'
and AuditLogs'
// Detect multiple sensitive Active Directory LDAP queries made in bin time
// Sensitive queries defined as Roasting or sensitive objects queries
// Replace 10 on line 6 with your desired thershold
// Replace 1m on line 7 with your desired bin time
// This LDAP query cover Rubeus, Kerberoast, BloodHound tools
// Sensitive queries defined as Roasting or sensitive objects queries
// Replace 10 on line 6 with your desired thershold
// Replace 1m on line 7 with your desired bin time
// This LDAP query cover Rubeus, Kerberoast, BloodHound tools
'Detects when there is a Service Principal login attempt from a country that has not seen a successful login in the previous 14 days.
Threat actors may attempt to authenticate with credentials from compromised accounts - monitoring attempts from anomalous locations may help identify these attempts.
Authentication attempts should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate and if there is other similar activity.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins'
Threat actors may attempt to authenticate with credentials from compromised accounts - monitoring attempts from anomalous locations may help identify these attempts.
Authentication attempts should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate and if there is other similar activity.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins'
This query creates a list of IP addresses with the number of failed login attempts to Entra ID
above a set threshold ( default of 5 ). It then looks for any successful Palo Alto VPN logins from any of these IPs within the same timeframe.
above a set threshold ( default of 5 ). It then looks for any successful Palo Alto VPN logins from any of these IPs within the same timeframe.
'This query will determine multiple password resets by user across multiple data sources.
Account manipulation including password reset may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment.'
Account manipulation including password reset may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment.'
Detect Active Directory LDAP queries that search for sensitive objects in the organization
This LDAP query cover BloodHound tool
This LDAP query cover BloodHound tool
'Identifies a list of IP addresses with a minimum number (default of 5) of failed logon attempts to Microsoft Entra ID.
Uses that list to identify any successful remote logons to hosts from these IPs within the same timeframe.'
Uses that list to identify any successful remote logons to hosts from these IPs within the same timeframe.'
'This query look for Service Principal accounts that are no longer used where a user has added or updated credentials for them before logging in with the Service Principal.
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed.'
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed.'
RDP Nesting
KQL
'Query detects potential lateral movement within a network by identifying when an RDP connection (EventID 4624, LogonType 10) is made to an initial system, followed by a subsequent RDP connection from that system to another, using the same account within a 60-minute window.
To reduce false positives, it excludes scenarios where the same account has made 5 or more connections to the same set of computers in the previous 7 days. This approach focuses on highlighting unusual RDP behaviour that suggests lateral movement, which is often associated with attacker tactics during a network breach.'
To reduce false positives, it excludes scenarios where the same account has made 5 or more connections to the same set of computers in the previous 7 days. This approach focuses on highlighting unusual RDP behaviour that suggests lateral movement, which is often associated with attacker tactics during a network breach.'
'It is possible that a disabled user account is compromised and another account on the same IP is used to perform operations that are not typical for that user.
The query filters the SigninLogs for entries where ResultType is indicates a disabled account and the TimeGenerated is within a defined time range.
It then summarizes these entries by IPAddress and AppId, calculating various statistics such as number of login attempts, distinct UPNs, App IDs etc and joins these results with another set of results from SigninLogs, filtering for entries with less than normal number of successful sign-ins.
It then filters out entries where there were no successful sign-ins or where successful sign-ins did not occur within the same lookback period as the failed sign-ins, later projecting relevant fields by the count of login attempts, and expands the set of successful sign-ins into individual events.
Finally, it joins these results with entries from OfficeActivity where certain operations deemed rare and high risk have been performed, ensuring their occurrance within a certain time range of the successful sign-ins.'
The query filters the SigninLogs for entries where ResultType is indicates a disabled account and the TimeGenerated is within a defined time range.
It then summarizes these entries by IPAddress and AppId, calculating various statistics such as number of login attempts, distinct UPNs, App IDs etc and joins these results with another set of results from SigninLogs, filtering for entries with less than normal number of successful sign-ins.
It then filters out entries where there were no successful sign-ins or where successful sign-ins did not occur within the same lookback period as the failed sign-ins, later projecting relevant fields by the count of login attempts, and expands the set of successful sign-ins into individual events.
Finally, it joins these results with entries from OfficeActivity where certain operations deemed rare and high risk have been performed, ensuring their occurrance within a certain time range of the successful sign-ins.'
'Identifies an export of the ADFS DKM Master Key from Active Directory.
References: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/,
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html?1
To understand further the details behind this detection, please review the details in the original PR and subequent PR update to this:
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/1562#issue-551542469
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/1512#issue-543053339
'
References: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/,
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html?1
To understand further the details behind this detection, please review the details in the original PR and subequent PR update to this:
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/1562#issue-551542469
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/1512#issue-543053339
'
'This query detects all authentication attempts of non administrator accounts that their RID is ending in *-500.
Ref: https://stealthbits.com/blog/rid-hijacking-when-guests-become-admins/'
Ref: https://stealthbits.com/blog/rid-hijacking-when-guests-become-admins/'
The query finds attempts to list users or groups using Net commands.
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