Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a process initiating a memory dump of lsass.exe (using --dump arguments) followed within 15 minutes by the creation of a hexadecimal-named .tmp file in the Windows\Temp directory. This behavioral pattern is characteristic of credential dumping using reflected cloning or similar techniques, followed by the staging of obfuscated or encrypted minidump data for exfiltration.
Detects the pidclone-style LSASS credential dumper that clones the target process into a suspended state, mirrors its memory, generates a minidump, and writes an XOR-encrypted copy of the dump to a randomized filename under Windows\Temp
Detects processes spawned by Terraform or Go (e.g., during init, apply, or run) that exhibit suspicious access to local cloud credential files (AWS/Azure/GCP) or Terraform state files. This behavior is indicative of a malicious module attempting to exfiltrate cloud credentials from a developer's workstation or a CI/CD build host.
This rule detects unauthorized attempts to extract credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. It monitors for two distinct techniques: non-standard processes opening handles to lsass.exe with sensitive access rights (credential-dumping) and the use of rundll32.exe to invoke the MiniDump function within comsvcs.dll against lsass.exe.
Detects anomalous Kerberos ticket requests that are characteristic of Golden Ticket attacks. The rule flags the use of weak encryption types (e.g., RC4) commonly used in forged tickets even in AES-enforced environments, and direct requests for the KRBTGT service account outside of legitimate ticket renewal operations.
This rule detects potential Kerberos Golden Ticket activity by monitoring Windows Event IDs 4768 (TGT Request) and 4769 (TGS Request) for indicators of forgery. Specifically, it flags TGT requests that utilize RC4 encryption ('0x17') in environments where AES is expected, excluding standard krbtgt account activity.
Detects attempts to create a memory dump of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process using well-known utilities such as procdump, rundll32 with comsvcs.dll, and taskmgr, which are frequently used by adversaries to perform credential dumping.
This rule detects potential NTLM relay or authentication downgrade attempts by monitoring HTTP POST requests to the Certificate Enrollment Service (CES) endpoint. It specifically flags when an 'Authorization' header contains an NTLM-wrapped 'Negotiate' token, which is often indicative of an attacker attempting to coerce or relay authentication material to the service.
Detects the execution of known NTLM Certificate Enrollment Service (CES) relay tools alongside subsequent outbound network connections to Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) CES enrollment endpoints. This behavioral pattern indicates an adversary attempting to relay NTLM authentication to an AD CS server to request a certificate, typically for privilege escalation or persistence.
Detects network activity associated with ngrok tunnel domains or suspicious lookalike Microsoft SSO domains (microsoft-sso.com) attempting to perform OIDC discovery, JWKS retrieval, or MFA-related EAM endpoint interactions. This behavior is indicative of adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks targeting authentication processes.
Detects potential credential reuse attacks such as Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, or Overpass-the-Hash. The rule identifies a 'NewCredentials' logon (e.g., runas /netonly) followed by a network or remote interactive logon to a target system (such as a domain controller) by the same user, without an interactive logon session occurring between the events, which is indicative of using stolen credentials to move laterally.
Detects AI coding assistants and LLM agent frameworks attempting to access, read, or export sensitive credential files, registry hives, or application secrets. The rule monitors both file system operations on known secret locations and process execution patterns indicative of credential dumping or API token retrieval by these tools.
Detects the creation of a new application secret or credential in a cloud environment followed by an immediate authentication attempt using that credential from an IP address that has not been observed performing successful authentication within the specified lookback window. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized persistence or the use of compromised credentials by an adversary.
Detects the creation of programmatic API credentials or service principal keys by highly privileged cloud identities across AWS, Azure, and GCP. Specifically monitors AWS Root, Azure AD Global/Company Administrators, and GCP Organization Owners, whose roles generally do not require long-term API access.
This rule detects when a new password credential (client secret) is added to an existing Azure AD Service Principal or application. This activity is a common method for adversaries to establish persistence in a cloud environment that survives password resets or MFA enforcement on the original administrative account.
Detects the creation of a new AWS IAM access key by a user for an account other than their own. This is a common persistence technique where an attacker, having obtained sufficient permissions, creates a new credential set for an existing, potentially dormant user account to maintain long-term access while blending in with legitimate activity.
Detects the creation or modification of credentials (access keys or login profiles) for the AWS root account or identities explicitly named to imply high-privilege administrative access. This is a high-fidelity indicator of persistence or unauthorized privilege escalation within an AWS environment.
Detects the creation of an AWS IAM access key followed immediately by the use of that key from a new or anomalous geolocation, which is a strong indicator of credential theft or unauthorized key generation for persistence.
Detects anomalous GCP IAM Service Account Credential API calls where a principal impersonates multiple distinct service accounts within a short time window. This behavior often indicates a credential delegation chain or a multi-stage privilege escalation attempt within a GCP environment.
Detects anomalous or suspicious creation of AWS IAM access keys, particularly those targeting highly privileged accounts (e.g., 'root') or involving cross-user key generation by non-administrative entities. This behavior is indicative of potential account takeover, persistence establishment, or privilege escalation within the AWS environment.
Detects instances where a long-dormant Entra ID (Azure AD) service principal is reactivated shortly after having a new credential added or a new app role assigned. This activity is a potential persistence technique where an attacker repurposes a legitimate, high-privileged, but unused service principal to blend in as legacy automation.
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