Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects potential token impersonation and theft on Windows systems. This rule specifically looks for successful logon events (EventID 4624) with a LogonType of 9 (NewCredentials), where the LogonProcessName is 'Advapi' and the AuthenticationPackageName is 'Negotiate', combined with an ImpersonationLevel indicating impersonation. This combination of events is indicative of an attempt to duplicate and impersonate an existing access token, often used for privilege escalation or defense evasion.
This rule detects the execution of well-known credential dumping tools by monitoring Windows Security Event ID 4697, which signifies a service creation event. The rule specifically looks for service filenames containing keywords associated with common credential dumping utilities such as 'cachedump', 'dumpsvc', 'fgexec', 'gsecdump', 'mimidrv', 'pwdump', and 'servpw'. This indicates an adversary attempting to install and run a service that can extract credentials from the system.
Detects the execution of a PowerShell script designed to dump stored credentials from Veeam Backup servers. The script specifically targets the "Veeam.Backup" class and uses `Invoke-Sqlcmd` to extract sensitive information, likely from the Veeam configuration database.
Detects when an end user's consent to an application is blocked by Azure AD due to risk-based consent policies. This indicates that Azure AD has identified a risky application or a risky consent request, preventing the user from granting permissions to it. This can be a proactive measure against consent phishing or malicious applications attempting to gain access to user data.
This rule detects attempts to harvest Wi-Fi credentials using the `netsh.exe` utility. Specifically, it looks for `netsh.exe` execution with command-line arguments that indicate an attempt to display WLAN profiles and their keys in clear text, which is a common technique used by malware like Agent Tesla to steal Wi-Fi passwords.
Detects the use of the 'spoolss' named pipe over SMB, which can be leveraged to trigger NTLM authentication from a target machine with the print spooler service enabled. This technique is often used in NTLM relay attacks or other forms of printer spooler abuse to gain unauthorized access or escalate privileges.
Detects when a user account's User Account Control (UAC) flags are modified to enable weak encryption (DES) or disable Kerberos pre-authentication. This configuration can make the account vulnerable to Kerberoasting attacks, where an attacker can request a service ticket for the user and then offline crack the NTLM hash of the user's password if DES encryption is allowed, or if pre-authentication is disabled.
This rule detects attempts to exploit the Zerologon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) using tools like Mimikatz or other exploits originating from a machine with 'kali' in its hostname. It specifically looks for Windows System event IDs 5805 or 5723 in conjunction with the keywords 'kali' or 'mimikatz'.
This rule detects the use of Mimikatz by looking for specific keywords associated with its modules and functionalities within Windows Event Logs. These keywords cover various Mimikatz features, including credential dumping (LSASS, SAM, LSA secrets), Kerberos ticket manipulation (golden ticket, pass-the-ticket), DPAPI masterkey extraction, and other miscellaneous functions. Some keywords may be more prevalent in older Mimikatz versions but are still used by threat actors.
Detects the creation, modification, or deletion of Kubernetes RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBindings in Google Cloud. These actions can indicate an adversary attempting to escalate privileges or maintain persistence within a Kubernetes cluster by granting themselves or other accounts additional roles and permissions.
This rule detects attempts to extract passwords from files on Linux systems using the 'grep' command. It specifically looks for executions of 'grep' in conjunction with the keyword 'password', indicating a potential search for credentials.
This rule detects attempts to copy the 'passwd' or 'shadow' files from the '/tmp/' directory using the 'cp' command. This activity is highly suspicious as these files contain sensitive user account information, including password hashes (in the case of 'shadow'), and should not typically be copied to temporary directories. An adversary might do this to exfiltrate credentials for offline cracking or to move them to a location accessible for further exploitation.
This rule detects command-line operations that interact with common shell history files on macOS systems. Adversaries often target these files (e.g., .bash_history, .zsh_history) to extract sensitive information such as credentials or commands executed by users, which can aid in further compromise or understanding the environment.
This rule detects commands executed on Cisco network devices related to the export of private keys or the import/management of PKI certificates. Specifically, it looks for the commands 'crypto pki export', 'crypto pki import', and 'crypto pki trustpoint'. These actions can indicate an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive cryptographic material (private keys) or to establish new trusted certificates, which could be used for defense evasion or to facilitate man-in-the-middle attacks.
This rule detects NTLM brute force attempts by identifying specific workstation names commonly used by NTLM brute-forcing tools. It looks for Event ID 8004 in the Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational log, specifically when the 'WorkstationName' field matches a list of known tool-related or generic Windows names.
This rule detects attempts to coerce authentication using the PetitPotam technique. It specifically looks for Windows Security Event ID 5145, which indicates a network share access, where the ShareName starts with '\\' and ends with '\IPC$', the RelativeTargetName is 'lsarpc', and the SubjectUserName is 'ANONYMOUS LOGON'. This combination of events is indicative of a PetitPotam attack attempting to force a domain controller to authenticate to a malicious server.
This rule detects the execution of the 'sqlite' or 'sqlite3' binary specifically when it is used to query sensitive data from Chromium-based browser profiles. The detection logic looks for command-line arguments that indicate access to common Chromium user data paths and specific database files containing login data, cookies, web data (credit cards, autofill), history, or bookmarks. This activity is highly indicative of an attempt to steal sensitive user information stored by web browsers.
This rule detects potential exploitation attempts of CVE-2021-42287, a vulnerability related to Active Directory's SAM Account Name Spoofing. The exploit involves an attacker creating a computer object with known credentials, then clearing its ServicePrincipalName attribute. This manipulation grants the attacker additional permissions on the object, enabling further changes. The detection specifically looks for Event IDs 16990 (Object class and UserAccountControl validation failure) and 16991 (SAM Account Name validation failure) from the Microsoft-Windows-Directory-Services-SAM provider, which indicate issues during the creation or modification of Active Directory objects that are characteristic of this attack.
This rule detects the use of `System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken` within PowerShell script blocks. This specific class is used to request Kerberos service tickets (TGS) for a given Service Principal Name (SPN). This behavior is commonly observed in Kerberoasting attacks (T1558.003) where an attacker requests service tickets to crack their hashes offline, or in some cases, during the initial stages of a silver ticket attack (T1558.002) to gather SPNs. A successful execution of such a script would typically output the SPNs for the targeted endpoint.
Detects PowerShell scripts that contain references to the .NET `[System.Windows.Input.Keyboard]::IsKeyDown` function, which can be used for keystroke capturing. This function checks if a specified key is pressed, making it a common indicator of potential keylogger activity within PowerShell scripts.
This rule detects potential password spraying attempts that leverage the built-in Windows utility `dsacls.exe`. Specifically, it looks for executions of `dsacls.exe` where the command line includes both the `/user:` and `/passwd:` arguments, indicating an attempt to bind to an LDAP session with specified credentials. This technique can be used by attackers to test a single password against multiple user accounts to avoid account lockouts.
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