Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects the use of Ntdsutil to export the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit). It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because exporting NTDS.dit can be a precursor to offline password cracking, posing a severe security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain access to sensitive credentials, potentially leading to unauthorized access and privilege escalation within the network.
The following analytic detects a process loading the credui.dll or wincredui.dll module. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify instances where these DLLs are loaded by processes outside typical system directories. This activity is significant because adversaries often abuse these modules to create fake credential prompts or dump credentials, posing a risk of credential theft. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to harvest user credentials, leading to unauthorized access and potential lateral movement within the network.
Detects unauthorized access to sensitive browser credential and session data files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, Local State, key4.db) by non-browser processes. This behavior is a common indicator of information-stealing malware attempting to extract saved credentials and session cookies to facilitate account takeover and bypass multi-factor authentication.
Detects network activity associated with the TA419 threat group's 'Frameless' Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing campaign. The rules identify unauthorized OAuth2 authorization requests to non-Microsoft hosts that match known malicious client IDs, the delivery of BitB overlay scripts, and the subsequent execution of malicious scripts correlated with OneDrive-themed lookalike redirects, indicating a credential theft attempt.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious use of the DsGetNCChanges (opnum 3) function on the DRSUAPI interface. This RPC method is commonly abused in DCSync attacks to replicate domain controller data, including sensitive password hashes, from an Active Directory environment.
Unsigned LDAP Bind
Cortex XDR
Detects Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) binds that are performed without signing or encryption. Attack tools such as NetExec, ldapdomaindump, and Impacket frequently use simple, unencrypted LDAP binds over port 389, which can result in the transmission of credentials in cleartext. This rule monitors Windows Event ID 2889 on Domain Controllers, which logs cleartext LDAP bind attempts.
Detects network activity associated with the TA419 threat group's 'Frameless' Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) phishing campaign. The rules identify unauthorized OAuth2 authorization requests to non-Microsoft hosts that match known malicious client IDs, the delivery of BitB overlay scripts, and the subsequent execution of malicious scripts correlated with OneDrive-themed lookalike redirects, indicating a credential theft attempt.
Detects credential stuffing in Entra ID sign-in logs: one source IP failing against many distinct accounts within an hour, then succeeding on a small number of them.
This rule detects unauthorized directory replication requests (DRSUAPI) using Active Directory Event ID 4662. It specifically monitors for access requests to sensitive directory replication object GUIDs (Get-Changes / Get-Changes-All) where the requesting user account is not a domain controller computer account. This behavior is a common indicator of DCSync credential dumping attacks performed by tools like Mimikatz or Impacket.
The following analytic detects the creation of shadow copies using "wmic" or "Powershell" commands. It leverages the Endpoint.Processes data model in Splunk to identify processes where the command includes "shadowcopy" and "create". This activity is significant because it may indicate an attacker attempting to manipulate or access data in an unauthorized manner, potentially leading to data theft or manipulation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to backup and exfiltrate sensitive data or hide their tracks by restoring files to a previous state after an attack.
The following analytic detects an Eventvwr UAC bypass by identifying suspicious registry modifications in the path that Eventvwr.msc references upon execution. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on registry changes and process execution details. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, persistence, and further compromise of the affected system.
The following analytic detects the use of the Linux 'xclip' command to copy data from the clipboard. It leverages Linux Auditd telemetry, focusing on process names and command-line arguments related to clipboard operations. This activity is significant because adversaries can exploit clipboard data to capture sensitive information such as passwords or IP addresses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially aiding further attacks within the environment.
The following analytic detects the use of the Linux 'xclip' command to copy data from the clipboard. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and command-line arguments related to clipboard operations. This activity is significant because adversaries can exploit clipboard data to capture sensitive information such as passwords or IP addresses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially aiding further attacks within the environment.
Detects command-line attempts to access or dump macOS Keychain data using native utilities or direct file access.
This includes credential dumping via the `security` utility (e.g. `dump-keychain -d`), bulk certificate export using `security find-certificate`, and direct file copying of Keychain database files using utilities such as `cat`.
Keychain files are located in `~/Library/Keychains/`, `/Library/Keychains/`, and `/Network/Library/Keychains/`.
This technique is commonly associated with post-exploitation credential harvesting, where an attacker with local access seeks to escalate privileges or move laterally by obtaining stored credentials for applications, Wi-Fi networks, system services, and certificates.
This includes credential dumping via the `security` utility (e.g. `dump-keychain -d`), bulk certificate export using `security find-certificate`, and direct file copying of Keychain database files using utilities such as `cat`.
Keychain files are located in `~/Library/Keychains/`, `/Library/Keychains/`, and `/Network/Library/Keychains/`.
This technique is commonly associated with post-exploitation credential harvesting, where an attacker with local access seeks to escalate privileges or move laterally by obtaining stored credentials for applications, Wi-Fi networks, system services, and certificates.
The following analytic detects the use of `setspn.exe` to query the domain for Service Principal Names (SPNs). This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on specific command-line arguments associated with `setspn.exe`. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it often precedes Kerberoasting or Silver Ticket attacks, which can lead to credential theft. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use the gathered SPNs to escalate privileges or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
The following analytic identifies potential threats related to the theft or forgery of authentication certificates. It detects when five or more analytics from the Windows Certificate Services story trigger within a specified timeframe. This detection leverages aggregated risk scores and event counts from the Risk data model. This activity is significant as it may indicate an ongoing attack aimed at compromising authentication mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data, potentially leading to severe security breaches.
The following analytic identifies system information discovery techniques, such as the execution of commands like `wmic qfe`, `systeminfo`, and `hostname`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant because attackers often use these commands to gather system configuration details, which can aid in further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to tailor their attacks based on the discovered system information, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or data exfiltration.
The following analytic detects the execution of wbadmin.exe with flags that delete backup files, specifically targeting catalog or system state backups. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by ransomware to prevent recovery by deleting system backups. If confirmed malicious, this action could severely hinder recovery efforts, leading to prolonged downtime and potential data loss.
The following analytic identifies non-SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs to monitor access attempts to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) by non-SYSTEM users. This activity is significant as it may indicate credential dumping attempts or unauthorized access to sensitive credentials. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could potentially extract credentials from memory, leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the access request and to mitigate any potential threats.
The following analytic detects the extraction of authentication certificates using Windows Event Log - CAPI2 (CryptoAPI 2). It leverages EventID 70, which is generated when a certificate's private key is acquired. This detection is significant because it can identify potential misuse of certificates, such as those extracted by tools like Mimikatz or Cobalt Strike. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to impersonate users, escalate privileges, or access sensitive information, posing a severe risk to the organization's security.
ShadowCoerce NTLM Coercion via FssAgent
Cortex XDR
Detects unauthorized attempts to coerce the File Server VSS Agent (FssAgent) into authenticating to an attacker-controlled host. This is achieved by invoking the IsPathSupported (opnum 8) or IsPathShadowCopied (opnum 9) functions on the FssAgent RPC interface, which can be leveraged to capture NTLM hashes.
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