Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
779 detections
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Detects two distinct behaviors indicative of potential credential theft or lateral movement: DCSync-style Active Directory replication requests identified via Event ID 4662 with specific replication GUIDs, and high-volume SMB traffic originating from Domain Controllers or DC-adjacent hosts, which may indicate unauthorized data access or credential dumping activities.
Detects two distinct behaviors indicative of potential credential theft or lateral movement: DCSync-style Active Directory replication requests identified via Event ID 4662 with specific replication GUIDs, and high-volume SMB traffic originating from Domain Controllers or DC-adjacent hosts, which may indicate unauthorized data access or credential dumping activities.
Detects the creation of a Volume Shadow Copy followed by an attempt to access or copy sensitive files, specifically the NTDS.dit database or the SYSTEM registry hive, from that shadow copy. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to perform offline credential theft.
Detects the creation of a Volume Shadow Copy followed by an attempt to access or copy sensitive files, specifically the NTDS.dit database or the SYSTEM registry hive, from that shadow copy. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to perform offline credential theft.
Detects the creation of a Volume Shadow Copy followed by an attempt to access or copy sensitive files, specifically the NTDS.dit database or the SYSTEM registry hive, from that shadow copy. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to perform offline credential theft.
Detects attempts to exploit CVE-2021-36934 (HiveNightmare/SeriousSAM) by monitoring for unauthorized access to SAM, SYSTEM, or SECURITY hive files within Volume Shadow Copies, or the use of icacls/vssadmin to facilitate this credential access.
Detects attempts to exploit CVE-2021-36934 (HiveNightmare/SeriousSAM) by monitoring for unauthorized access to SAM, SYSTEM, or SECURITY hive files within Volume Shadow Copies, or the use of icacls/vssadmin to facilitate this credential access.
Detects unauthorized access to the Directory Replication Service (DRS) using Event ID 4662. The rule looks for access requests to sensitive Active Directory replication objects (GUIDs 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 and 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2) initiated by accounts other than Domain Controller machine accounts, which is a signature behavior of tools like Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync or Impacket's secretsdump.py.
Detects techniques associated with LSASS process credential dumping, including direct handle access to the LSASS process with specific access masks (common in tools like Mimikatz), the use of rundll32.exe to invoke comsvcs.dll for memory dumping, and the creation of LSASS dump files on disk.
Detects unauthorized directory service access requests (Event ID 4662) utilizing the 'DS-Replication-Get-Changes' or 'DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All' extended rights GUIDs. These rights are required for the DCSync technique used by tools like Mimikatz or Impacket to replicate Active Directory data. The rule specifically flags when such requests originate from a non-domain controller host, which is a strong indicator of credential theft or unauthorized replication attempts.
Detects suspicious execution patterns of rundll32.exe, including usage for JavaScript execution, control panel file abuse, potential credential dumping using comsvcs.dll, and execution from common user-writable temporary directories.
Detects the execution of diskshadow.exe with the /s (scripted) flag, followed by file access to sensitive Windows credential files (ntds.dit or SAM). This behavior indicates the abuse of the Windows Diskshadow utility to create a volume shadow copy for the purpose of offline credential exfiltration.
Detects the execution of diskshadow.exe with the /s (scripted) flag, followed by file access to sensitive Windows credential files (ntds.dit or SAM). This behavior indicates the abuse of the Windows Diskshadow utility to create a volume shadow copy for the purpose of offline credential exfiltration.
Detects sensitive access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, commonly associated with credential dumping attempts. This rule monitors Windows Security Event 4663, specifically flagging processes attempting to gain specific access levels (e.g., Read, Query, or Full Control) to the lsass.exe process.
Detects batch scripts that execute renamed Mimikatz-style binaries (e.g., g.com, hs.com) for credential dumping purposes. The rule looks for the combination of command-line arguments to redirect output to text files, the subsequent deletion of the renamed binaries and associated artifacts (mimidrv.sys, temp files), and the execution of 'gpupdate /force', which is a common technique used to trigger or finalize credential dumping operations.
Detects the execution of known credential harvesting tools such as Mimikatz, LaZagne, and pypykatz, or the use of their specific command-line arguments. The rule includes exclusions for common security software processes and authorized testing paths.
Detects the execution of known credential harvesting tools such as Mimikatz, LaZagne, and pypykatz, or the use of their specific command-line arguments. The rule includes exclusions for common security software processes and authorized testing paths.
Detects the execution of known credential harvesting tools such as Mimikatz, LaZagne, and pypykatz, or the use of their specific command-line arguments. The rule includes exclusions for common security software processes and authorized testing paths.
Detects the use of ntdsutil.exe to create an Install From Media (IFM) set, which copies the NTDS.dit file and registry hives to a specified folder. Adversaries often use this technique to stage Active Directory credentials for exfiltration, frequently using the C:\Windows\Temp directory as a staging area. The rule includes exclusions for common legitimate system management and backup agents.
Detects the use of ntdsutil.exe to create an Install From Media (IFM) set, which copies the NTDS.dit file and registry hives to a specified folder. Adversaries often use this technique to stage Active Directory credentials for exfiltration, frequently using the C:\Windows\Temp directory as a staging area. The rule includes exclusions for common legitimate system management and backup agents.
Detects the use of ntdsutil.exe to create an Install From Media (IFM) set, which copies the NTDS.dit file and registry hives to a specified folder. Adversaries often use this technique to stage Active Directory credentials for exfiltration, frequently using the C:\Windows\Temp directory as a staging area. The rule includes exclusions for common legitimate system management and backup agents.
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