Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

779 detections

Detects the use of ntdsutil.exe to create an Install From Media (IFM) set, which copies the NTDS.dit file and registry hives to a specified folder. Adversaries often use this technique to stage Active Directory credentials for exfiltration, frequently using the C:\Windows\Temp directory as a staging area. The rule includes exclusions for common legitimate system management and backup agents.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
001
Detects the use of ntdsutil.exe to create an Install From Media (IFM) set, which copies the NTDS.dit file and registry hives to a specified folder. Adversaries often use this technique to stage Active Directory credentials for exfiltration, frequently using the C:\Windows\Temp directory as a staging area. The rule includes exclusions for common legitimate system management and backup agents.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
Detects the execution of BTR_CLI.exe with command line arguments indicative of installing or interacting with the Mimikatz driver (mimidrv.sys). This behavior is associated with loading the malicious driver to facilitate credential dumping from kernel memory.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
003
Detects the execution of BTR_CLI.exe with command line arguments indicative of installing or interacting with the Mimikatz driver (mimidrv.sys). This behavior is associated with loading the malicious driver to facilitate credential dumping from kernel memory.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
003
Detects the use of rundll32.exe to execute comsvcs.dll's MiniDump functionality against the LSASS process, a common technique for dumping credentials. The rule includes behavioral correlation by identifying the same user account executing this pattern on multiple devices within a one-hour window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
002
Detects the use of rundll32.exe to execute comsvcs.dll's MiniDump functionality against the LSASS process, a common technique for dumping credentials. The rule includes behavioral correlation by identifying the same user account executing this pattern on multiple devices within a one-hour window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
002
Detects attempts to dump credentials from the LSASS process memory, either by executing known credential dumping tools like Mimikatz, using command-line arguments indicative of credential harvesting, or performing suspicious memory access/dumping operations on the lsass.exe process.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
1010
Detects a sequence of activity characteristic of lateral movement and credential theft: the deployment or execution of PsExec service followed by the use of Windows utilities (vssadmin, ntdsutil, esentutl) to perform Volume Shadow Copy-based extraction of the NTDS.dit database or SYSTEM hive on the same host.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
102
Detects a sequence of activity characteristic of lateral movement and credential theft: the deployment or execution of PsExec service followed by the use of Windows utilities (vssadmin, ntdsutil, esentutl) to perform Volume Shadow Copy-based extraction of the NTDS.dit database or SYSTEM hive on the same host.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
002
Detects two distinct behaviors indicative of potential credential theft or lateral movement: DCSync-style Active Directory replication requests identified via Event ID 4662 with specific replication GUIDs, and high-volume SMB traffic originating from Domain Controllers or DC-adjacent hosts, which may indicate unauthorized data access or credential dumping activities.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
002
Detects two distinct behaviors indicative of potential credential theft or lateral movement: DCSync-style Active Directory replication requests identified via Event ID 4662 with specific replication GUIDs, and high-volume SMB traffic originating from Domain Controllers or DC-adjacent hosts, which may indicate unauthorized data access or credential dumping activities.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
002
Detects processes attempting to open a handle to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process with access rights commonly associated with credential dumping. This detection focuses on identifying suspicious cross-process access requests originating from non-standard or non-authorized processes, such as those used by C2 frameworks like OnyxC2 for extracting cached Windows credentials.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects sensitive access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, commonly associated with credential dumping attempts. This rule monitors Windows Security Event 4663, specifically flagging processes attempting to gain specific access levels (e.g., Read, Query, or Full Control) to the lsass.exe process.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
003
Detects attempts to exploit CVE-2021-36934 (HiveNightmare/SeriousSAM) by monitoring for unauthorized access to SAM, SYSTEM, or SECURITY hive files within Volume Shadow Copies, or the use of icacls/vssadmin to facilitate this credential access.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Hunters
1 month ago
001
Detects attempts to exploit CVE-2021-36934 (HiveNightmare/SeriousSAM) by monitoring for unauthorized access to SAM, SYSTEM, or SECURITY hive files within Volume Shadow Copies, or the use of icacls/vssadmin to facilitate this credential access.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
This rule detects attempts to perform a DCSync attack by monitoring for Windows Event ID 4662 (Object Access) with specific Directory Replication Service (DRS) GUIDs. These GUIDs are used by attackers to request the replication of sensitive data, such as password hashes, from a Domain Controller without having direct access to it. This technique is commonly used by tools like Mimikatz and Impacket's secretsdump to extract credentials from Active Directory.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
This rule detects the use of specific tools associated with credential dumping and memory forensics, including Dokan driver installations for file system mounting, the use of DumpIt for creating memory dumps, and the subsequent analysis of these dumps using MemProcFS to access sensitive process memory information such as LSASS minidumps.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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SlimKQL
1 month ago
206
Detects a specific attack chain attributed to ClosedQuorum, involving LSASS memory dumping, subsequent access to browser-based credential stores or cryptocurrency wallet files, and finally staging the stolen data in C:\Windows\Temp\ within a short time window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
001
Detects a specific attack chain attributed to ClosedQuorum, involving LSASS memory dumping, subsequent access to browser-based credential stores or cryptocurrency wallet files, and finally staging the stolen data in C:\Windows\Temp\ within a short time window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
001
Detects a specific attack chain attributed to ClosedQuorum, involving LSASS memory dumping, subsequent access to browser-based credential stores or cryptocurrency wallet files, and finally staging the stolen data in C:\Windows\Temp\ within a short time window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
001
Detects the use of rundll32.exe to execute comsvcs.dll's MiniDump functionality against the LSASS process, a common technique for dumping credentials. The rule includes behavioral correlation by identifying the same user account executing this pattern on multiple devices within a one-hour window.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
001
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