Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
177 detections
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Detects the unauthorized access of sensitive files (browser data, SSH keys, AWS credentials) followed by the creation of archives using common utilities (7zip, tar, zip) by processes spawned within npm/node.exe/powershell/wscript/chost.exe postinstall execution chains. This behavior is associated with credential theft and data staging for exfiltration, notably seen in campaigns like Operation Friday Harvest.
This rule detects the outbound transmission of email attachments via SMTP (ports 25 and 587) that contain archived file formats (zip, 7z, tar.gz, tgz). Attackers often compress collected data into archives to facilitate exfiltration and minimize the time required for data transfer.
This rule detects the outbound transmission of email attachments via SMTP (ports 25 and 587) that contain archived file formats (zip, 7z, tar.gz, tgz). Attackers often compress collected data into archives to facilitate exfiltration and minimize the time required for data transfer.
Detects the creation of ZIP/RAR/7z archives by processes residing within the Turla STOCKSTAY installation directory (%LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\SMN\) or by known STOCKSTAY malicious components. This behavior is associated with the STOCKSTAY 'Get' command, which gathers files and archives them in-memory for base64-encoded exfiltration.
Detects the use of 7-Zip (7z.exe) to archive files named 'data.dat' or files within the 'Traiolx Custom Utils' directory, when initiated by command-line interpreters like cmd.exe or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of data staging or collection activities prior to exfiltration.
This rule detects potential data exfiltration activity where PowerShell is used to compress files followed by an outbound network connection to a known C2 IP address and port. It also monitors for direct outbound connections from PowerShell involving suspicious keywords indicative of data staging and exfiltration such as 'Compress-Archive', 'client.zip', and 'UPLOAD'.
Detects the use of common archive utilities (7-Zip, WinRAR) to perform file archiving operations within sensitive user-profile directories (Desktop, Documents, Downloads, etc.). This pattern is often used by adversaries to stage or bundle sensitive data prior to exfiltration.
Detects the execution of known archive utilities (e.g., 7-Zip, WinRAR) when interacting with sensitive user or system directories. This behavior is often indicative of data staging prior to potential exfiltration, especially when the originating process is not a recognized installer or backup application.
Detects archiving utilities (WinRAR, 7z, zip) executing via command line to recursively compress sensitive user directories (Desktop, Documents, Downloads) into staging folders, which is a common technique for data exfiltration.
Detects the execution of common archival utilities (7zip, WinRAR) with command-line arguments specifying password protection. Attackers often use these utilities to compress and encrypt data prior to exfiltration to evade detection and prevent unauthorized access to sensitive files.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events indicative of ransomware activity, specifically the Prinz Eugen ransomware. It looks for the execution of common file compression utilities (7z.exe, rar.exe, WinRAR.exe, winzip.exe) followed by the execution of known ransomware encryption executables (servertool.exe, encrypt.exe) on the same device within a 30-minute window. This pattern suggests that an attacker is compressing files before encrypting them, a common tactic to reduce the size of data for faster encryption or exfiltration.
Detects the execution of BloodHound or SharpHound Active Directory enumeration tools followed by the creation of a 'bloodhound.zip' archive, which is commonly used to exfiltrate collected Active Directory mapping data.
Detects the use of PowerShell to archive files (using Compress-Archive) followed by an HTTP network connection to a suspicious external IP address (91.196.32.232) within a short time window. This sequence is often indicative of data staging followed by exfiltration.
Detects macOS.Gaslight malware activity through two branches: direct hash matches of known binaries and the spawning of Python subprocesses with specific command-line arguments indicative of data collection or archiving. The Python subprocess detection looks for Python scripts being executed from '/tmp/' or '/Library/' directories with arguments related to browser data collection, keychain access, or archiving operations.
Detects execution of 7za.exe with specific command line arguments containing 'Avast', 'data2.bin', and a specific numeric password string, which indicates potential staging or archiving of data, possibly related to malware behavior.
Correlates the exploited Bomgar service gathering and compressing large amounts of internal data into an archive file prior to egress. This rule specifically looks for Bomgar processes initiating archive creation using common archiving utilities like tar, zip, or 7z, with the command line indicating the creation of a .zip or .tar.gz file.
Detects the use of common archive utilities (tar, zip, 7z) by the Bomgar remote support service process (bomgar-rep.exe or bomgar-scc.exe). This pattern is often associated with post-exploitation data staging where an attacker compresses internal files prior to exfiltration.
Detects the creation of multiple archive files (ZIP, 7Z, RAR, TAR) by common utilities (7z, WinRAR, tar) in sensitive temporary directories (Temp, tmp). The rule aggregates activity over a 10-minute window to identify suspicious staging behaviors often associated with ransomware data preparation.
This rule detects the execution of common archival utilities (7-Zip, WinRAR, RAR, ZIP) with parameters indicative of password-protected archive creation. It specifically flags instances where a user account, with no recorded prior history of running these utilities in the last 30 days, creates a large archive (exceeding 1GB) spanning multiple directories. This pattern is commonly used for data staging and preparation prior to exfiltration.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests where the Content-Length is at least 10MB and the Content-Type header indicates the transfer of archived data (zip or x-tar). This pattern is often associated with the staging and exfiltration of compressed sensitive data from an internal host to an external network destination.
Detects the execution of the WinRAR archival utility ('rar.exe') using specific command-line flags associated with creating password-protected or encrypted archives. This behavior is often indicative of data staging and collection for exfiltration purposes.
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