Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network communication with known malicious domains associated with fraudulent or malicious 'Adblock for YouTube' browser extensions, as well as suspicious process command lines related to main world script injection performed by these extensions.
This rule detects anomalous DNS query activity that may indicate command and control (C2) or data exfiltration over the DNS protocol. It monitors for three specific indicators: excessive query volume to a single domain family within a short timeframe, the use of abnormally long DNS subdomain labels, and the transmission of TXT record queries from endpoints not acting as designated DNS servers.
Detects automated scripts or command-line utilities initiating connections to Microsoft authentication endpoints using OAuth device code authorization parameters. This behavior is indicative of PhaaS (Phishing-as-a-Service) tools, such as EvilTokens, attempting to perform device code OAuth flows on behalf of an attacker to gain unauthorized access.
This rule detects network connections or DNS queries related to the TON blockchain ecosystem, specifically targeting domains and API endpoints associated with TON network infrastructure. These communication patterns may indicate interaction with cryptocurrency-related services or potential malware utilizing TON-based infrastructure for command and control or data exfiltration.
This rule detects endpoint DNS queries or network connections to the suspected phishing domain 'gasparinutrition.com' initiated by common web browsers or email clients. This provides visibility into potential user interaction with malicious sites that would otherwise be missed by email security gateways.
This rule detects activity associated with the malicious 'Search for perplexity ai' browser extension (ID: flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd). It specifically identifies DNS queries and network connections to the malicious domain 'perplexity-ai.online' initiated by common web browser processes, as well as file system evidence of the extension's presence.
This rule monitors DNS query events for domains known to be associated with phishing campaigns, specifically those spoofing Microsoft or other common service brands. These domains are frequently used in credential harvesting attacks to lure users to malicious landing pages.
Detects network activity and command line execution associated with known malicious browser extensions, specifically targeting AdBlock for Youtube-related extensions and associated command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects network communication associated with DcRAT, specifically identifying DNS lookups for the known C2 domain kkxqbh.top or network connections to port 2671 originating from suspicious or specific host processes.
Detects suspected command and control (C2) activity leveraging Cloudflare Tunnel or Workers. The rule identifies two patterns: 1) Repeated polling (>5 connections in 10 minutes) to Cloudflare infrastructure by suspicious scripting processes (e.g., PowerShell, WScript), and 2) A 'dead-drop' resolver pattern where a process contacts a Cloudflare domain, followed by a DNS query to an unrelated domain shortly thereafter, suggesting the retrieval of a new C2 address.
Detects HTTP and DNS requests directed towards the .workers.dev domain, which are commonly leveraged by threat actors for command and control (C2) redirection and domain fronting. This activity is frequently associated with the Gamaredon (Shuckworm/ACTINIUM) threat group's infrastructure.
Detects network connections to known ShinyHunters infrastructure, including specific IP addresses and DNS queries for 'azurenetfiles.net', which has been linked to their operations targeting Oracle PeopleSoft servers via gadget chain exploitation.
Detects anomalous behavior associated with msiexec.exe that aligns with activity patterns of infostealer malwares like Lumma Stealer and Amadey Bot. This includes cross-process injection from unsigned processes, spawning of msiexec.exe by LOLBins or script interpreters, suspicious outbound network connectivity, and unauthorized access to browser credential storage files.
This rule detects DNS queries with suspicious characteristics that may indicate DNS tunneling, data exfiltration, or command and control activity. It identifies queries with unusually long names, long first labels combined with high entropy, or a high number of subdomains combined with a long first label. Exclusions are made for common legitimate DNS suffixes and specific service-related domains.
Detects DNS queries for known StegoAd command-and-control infrastructure domains, which are used as proxy relays and exfiltration endpoints.
Detects automated payroll fraud attempts by monitoring for scripting engines initiating HTTP connections to known payroll platforms (e.g., Workday, ADP) or spawning child processes with payroll-related command-line arguments. This behavior is indicative of post-AiTM session abuse, where attackers manipulate financial accounts or automate unauthorized payroll changes via malicious scripts.
Detects network connections originating from common web browsers (msedge.exe or chrome.exe) to a specific set of known malicious or suspicious domains. The rule specifically monitors DNS queries for these domains or any web-based communication (ports 80/443) targeting them, which may indicate command-and-control activity or drive-by-download attempts.
Detects network and process execution activity involving Google or Microsoft OAuth2 token endpoints from non-browser and non-trusted processes. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft or session hijacking attempts, where malicious tools (e.g., curl, python) are used to access authentication endpoints to bypass standard user interaction.
This rule detects anomalous network connections or DNS queries to known Ethereum RPC infrastructure providers (Infura, Alchemy, Cloudflare-eth) or ports/domains associated with Ethereum mainnet activity. It specifically targets processes other than common browsers or known blockchain clients, as well as Java-based processes performing DNS lookups for these domains. This behavior is indicative of potential 'EtherHiding' techniques where malicious code or data is hidden within blockchain transactions or distributed via blockchain infrastructure.
This rule monitors DNS query logs for requests to specific domains associated with malicious activity. It aggregates these requests by endpoint to identify potential command and control (C2) communication or beaconing behavior.
Detects indicators of exploitation attempts targeting the c-ares asynchronous DNS library, specifically focusing on Use-After-Free (UAF) vulnerabilities. The rule monitors for the presence of known proof-of-concept (PoC) file artifacts, execution of processes using specific command-line flags associated with c-ares exploit research, suspicious shell/calculator spawning from common network-enabled applications (curl, node, python), and anomalous high-frequency DNS-over-TCP traffic patterns.
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