Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network beaconing activity associated with the SPECTRALVIPER C2 framework. This rule identifies outbound HTTP GET requests targeting known C2 infrastructure domains and IP addresses, while correlating the traffic with specific browser user agents and cookie patterns indicative of this actor.
This rule detects potential exploitation attempts against ServiceNow instances by monitoring network and DNS activity involving a known malicious IP address (51.159.98.241). It identifies high-volume connections or DNS requests related to service-now.com associated with this IP, which may indicate an attacker attempting to leverage unauthenticated Scripted REST resources.
Detects DNS queries for domains ending in '.trycloudflare.com', which are commonly used to establish unauthorized remote access tunnels (Cloudflare Tunnel) by threat actors for C2 communication.
This rule detects network activity involving known suspicious domains and the download of specific, potentially malicious files (archives and installers). The monitoring focuses on HTTP/proxy/DNS traffic where hostnames, URLs, or query parameters match indicators of malicious activity.
Detects network activity associated with the BadBlocker for YouTube browser extension (ID: cmedhionkhpnakcndndgjdbohmhepckk). The rule identifies DNS queries and outbound network connections to known command-and-control (C2) domains (api.adblock-for-youtube.com, get.adblock-for-youtube.com) used by the extension to exfiltrate session cookies and other sensitive browser data.
This rule detects potentially malicious DNS traffic where queries contain exceptionally long, encoded, or randomized subdomains. Attackers often use these patterns to exfiltrate data from a target network, bypassing traditional security controls by encapsulating information within DNS requests (DNS tunneling). The detection looks for DNS queries exceeding 100 bytes in length with specific character patterns indicative of Base64 or similar encoding.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity using DNS by identifying high-frequency, long, and random subdomain queries. It monitors for DNS requests that exceed 40 bytes in size, feature complex alphanumeric subdomains, and exceed a defined threshold of 10 requests within a 60-second window, which is indicative of DNS tunneling or command-and-control exfiltration.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) activity leveraging DNS tunneling. It identifies high-frequency DNS queries that contain unusually long subdomain labels (51 characters or more), which is a common technique used to encode data or commands within DNS protocol traffic to bypass network security controls.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity using DNS tunneling. It monitors for a high frequency of DNS TXT record queries to long subdomains (exceeding 50 characters), which is a common characteristic of tools like DNScat and iodine that encode data within DNS requests.
This rule detects potential DNS exfiltration attempts by identifying DNS queries containing high-entropy subdomains of 51 characters or more, encoded in Base64. Adversaries may use long, encoded subdomains to tunnel data out of a network through the DNS protocol, bypassing traditional security controls.
This rule detects anomalous network connections or DNS queries to known Ethereum RPC infrastructure providers (Infura, Alchemy, Cloudflare-eth) or ports/domains associated with Ethereum mainnet activity. It specifically targets processes other than common browsers or known blockchain clients, as well as Java-based processes performing DNS lookups for these domains. This behavior is indicative of potential 'EtherHiding' techniques where malicious code or data is hidden within blockchain transactions or distributed via blockchain infrastructure.
Detects the use of PowerShell to perform DNS lookups for TXT records followed by immediate command execution, such as using 'Invoke-Expression' or 'Start-Process'. This pattern is frequently indicative of fileless command-and-control (C2) communication where stage-payload commands or scripts are retrieved via DNS TXT records to evade detection.
Detects the use of PowerShell to perform DNS lookups for TXT records followed by immediate command execution, such as using 'Invoke-Expression' or 'Start-Process'. This pattern is frequently indicative of fileless command-and-control (C2) communication where stage-payload commands or scripts are retrieved via DNS TXT records to evade detection.
This rule detects the installation and execution of malicious typosquatted npm packages associated with the Polymarket Trap campaign. It monitors for the creation of specific directory names within node_modules, npm install commands referencing these package names, and network activity or DNS lookups to 'log-taker' infrastructure from Node.js processes.
Detects network connections to common IP lookup services (e.g., ip-api.com, ipify.org) initiated by processes often associated with malware, such as Remcos RAT components or hijacked system processes like iexplore.exe. This activity is frequently used by adversaries for reconnaissance or C2 heartbeats to identify the external IP address of a compromised host.
This rule monitors for the execution and network activity of known data exfiltration tools such as WinSCP, rclone, and MegaSync. It also tracks the creation of configuration files associated with these tools and monitors DNS requests and browser navigation to known cloud storage and file-sharing destinations. This behavior is indicative of data staging and unauthorized exfiltration.
This rule identifies indicators of compromise associated with the DragonReturn malware and DcRAT, including malicious file names, suspicious process execution, DNS resolution of known malicious phishing domains, and network communication with documented C2 infrastructure.
Detects suspicious PowerShell activity characterized by command-line obfuscation (including BigInteger patterns) or network connections to suspicious 'photo-*.cfd' domains often associated with malicious file downloads.
Detects network activity associated with the DcRAT trojan as identified in Operation DragonReturn. This includes outbound network connections to hardcoded C2 port 2671, connections to known malicious IP addresses, and DNS resolutions of identified attacker-controlled C2 domains.
Detects network activity and DNS resolutions related to the tonapi.io domain initiated by unexpected processes. This pattern is indicative of the TONResolver RAT, which abuses TON smart contracts as a mechanism for command and control (C2).
This rule monitors for suspicious activity associated with LegionLoader malware, specifically tracking files and processes interacting with the 'Traiolx Custom Utils' directory. It triggers on the staging of '_socket.pyd', execution of Python interpreters from this directory, and associated C2 communication attempts with the domain 'birdeemusic.com'.
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