Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects DNS zone transfer attempts over TCP. It specifically looks for the byte sequence "|00 FC|" in TCP traffic destined for port 53, which is indicative of a DNS AXFR (zone transfer) request. This activity is often associated with reconnaissance by attackers to gather information about a network's DNS infrastructure.
This rule detects potential DNS tunneling activity by identifying unusually large DNS queries. Specifically, it looks for UDP packets on port 53 (DNS) that contain the DNS query header (01 00 00 01) and have a data size greater than 100 bytes. A threshold of 10 such queries from the same source within 60 seconds is set to reduce false positives.
This rule detects attempts by a device to resolve specific domain names known to be associated with ransomware killswitches. Successful resolution of these domains could indicate a ransomware infection attempting to halt its encryption process.
This rule detects suspicious outbound DNS queries originating from a device that are not directed to common public DNS servers (Google DNS, Cloudflare DNS). The rule specifically flags queries where the remote DNS name contains keywords like 'malware', 'c2', or 'c&c', and where at least 5 such queries occur within an hour from the same device. This pattern can indicate potential malware communication or command and control (C2) activity.
Detects anomalous DNS responses from compromised resolvers indicating DNS hijacking
Detects AXFR DNS zone transfer requests for network reconnaissance
This rule detects DNS queries for TXT records that contain specific patterns indicative of DNS calculation C2 (Command and Control) activity. The pattern searched for is a PCRE regex matching two alphanumeric strings, each 4 to 8 characters long, separated by a dot (e.g., 'abcd.efgh.'). This type of activity is often associated with malware using DNS TXT records to encode C2 instructions or data, potentially involving IP math for dynamic C2 server resolution. The rule includes a threshold to prevent excessive alerts, triggering if 5 such queries are observed from the same source within 60 seconds.
Detects DNS requests to domains matching known UNC3753 data leak sites or phishing domains masquerading as IT helpdesks. Identifying connections to these domains can serve as an early warning of an ongoing vishing campaign or active extortion scenario.
Detects DNS queries resolving privnote.com. This self-destructing message service is actively abused by threat actors like UNC3753 to transmit malicious installation links and commands to compromised users while bypassing traditional chat and email filtering.
UNC3753 Infrastructure Connection
Cortex XDR
Detects DNS requests to domains matching known UNC3753 data leak sites or helpdesk impersonation patterns utilized during vishing campaigns. This rule specifically looks for the domain "business-data-leaks.com" and domains ending with "-itdesk.com", "-helpdesk.com", or "-it.com".
Detects non-browser processes making DNS queries to the Telegram Bot API. This activity is indicative of malware using Telegram for Command and Control (C2) communications or data exfiltration, such as Amnesia RAT.
This rule detects DNS queries for typosquatted domains related to npmjs. Specifically, it looks for queries to domains ending in 'npmjs.net', 'npmjs.org', 'npmjs.io', or 'npmjs.co'. This is indicative of potential supply chain attacks or attempts to trick users into downloading malicious packages from fake registries.
This rule detects DNS queries to 'discord.com' with a high frequency (20 queries within 60 seconds from the same source IP). This behavior is indicative of Command and Control (C2) activity leveraging Discord webhooks, as described in MITRE ATT&CK technique T1102. Attackers often use legitimate services like Discord for C2 to blend in with normal network traffic and evade detection.
This rule detects a high volume of DNS TXT queries originating from the home network to any destination on port 53. This behavior is indicative of potential DNS exfiltration, where data is encoded and transmitted via DNS TXT records. The rule triggers an alert if 30 or more TXT queries are observed from a single source within a 60-second window.
Detects DNS over HTTPS (DoH) traffic originating directly from edge appliances (e.g., to 8.8.8.8 on port 443), which VerdantBamboo uses to obscure BRICKSTORM C2 resolution.
This rule detects DNS queries for domains that resemble update servers used in the SolarWinds supply chain attack. Specifically, it looks for DNS queries containing 'update' followed by 'solarwinds', 'orion', 'avupdate', or 'antivirus' in the domain name. This pattern was associated with the SUNBURST backdoor's communication with its command and control infrastructure.
Detects browser processes making DNS queries or network connections to BNB Smart Chain RPC endpoints (and related EVM-compatible chain RPCs). This technique is a signal for EtherHiding-style attacks where malicious JavaScript injected into compromised websites queries smart contracts for payload retrieval. This generalizes beyond ClearFake to catch UNC5342 (North Korean DPRK) and other EtherHiding adopters documented since October 2025.
This rule detects network connections to suspicious domains or IP addresses associated with potentially compromised or malicious VPN infrastructure. Specifically, it looks for connections to 'vpn-fortinet.com', 'ivanti-vpn.org', 'forticlient-vpn.de', or the IP address '194.76.226.93'. These indicators may suggest attempts to establish command and control, exfiltrate data, or engage in other malicious activities via compromised VPN services.
This rule detects unusually long DNS queries (40 characters or more) which can be indicative of DNS tunneling. DNS tunneling is a technique used by adversaries for command and control (C2) communication or data exfiltration, where data is encoded within DNS queries and responses to bypass network security controls.
Detects DNS resolutions for domains associated with the Kali365 affiliate panel, which is heavily abused in device code phishing campaigns. This rule specifically identifies DNS queries to known malicious domains used by this PhaaS (Phishing-as-a-Service) infrastructure.
This rule detects Fast Flux DNS activity, characterized by rapid changes in IP addresses associated with the same domain within a short period. Specifically, it triggers an alert if 30 or more distinct IP addresses are observed for a single domain within a 10-second window, based on DNS queries. This behavior is often indicative of malware using fast flux techniques to evade detection and make takedowns more difficult.
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