Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects activities associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) malware family by monitoring for known malicious file hashes on endpoints and network communication with domains linked to its command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule detects activities associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) malware family by monitoring for known malicious file hashes on endpoints and network communication with domains linked to its command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule monitors network connections and DNS query responses for activity associated with known suspicious domains: 'getmacouscloud.com', 'ferncore13.com', and 'grove-89.com'. It identifies communication attempts (successes, failures, or DNS lookups) between endpoints and these domains, which is indicative of potential command and control (C2) activity.
This rule detects activities associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) malware family by monitoring for known malicious file hashes on endpoints and network communication with domains linked to its command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule detects activities associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) malware family by monitoring for known malicious file hashes on endpoints and network communication with domains linked to its command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule monitors network connections and DNS query responses for activity associated with known suspicious domains: 'getmacouscloud.com', 'ferncore13.com', and 'grove-89.com'. It identifies communication attempts (successes, failures, or DNS lookups) between endpoints and these domains, which is indicative of potential command and control (C2) activity.
This rule monitors network connections and DNS query responses for activity associated with known suspicious domains: 'getmacouscloud.com', 'ferncore13.com', and 'grove-89.com'. It identifies communication attempts (successes, failures, or DNS lookups) between endpoints and these domains, which is indicative of potential command and control (C2) activity.
This rule monitors network connections and DNS query responses for activity associated with known suspicious domains: 'getmacouscloud.com', 'ferncore13.com', and 'grove-89.com'. It identifies communication attempts (successes, failures, or DNS lookups) between endpoints and these domains, which is indicative of potential command and control (C2) activity.
This rule monitors network connections and DNS query responses for activity associated with known suspicious domains: 'getmacouscloud.com', 'ferncore13.com', and 'grove-89.com'. It identifies communication attempts (successes, failures, or DNS lookups) between endpoints and these domains, which is indicative of potential command and control (C2) activity.
Detects high-frequency DNS query responses for domains ending in '.shop' from external sources within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of domain churn often associated with 'DoppelCart'-style fake e-commerce shop infrastructure.
Detects high-frequency DNS query responses for domains ending in '.shop' from external sources within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of domain churn often associated with 'DoppelCart'-style fake e-commerce shop infrastructure.
Detects high-frequency DNS query responses for domains ending in '.shop' from external sources within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of domain churn often associated with 'DoppelCart'-style fake e-commerce shop infrastructure.
Detects a specific DNS AAAA record response containing a hardcoded sentinel value (2001:4998:44:3507::8000) associated with the CAV3RN framework, which signals a failed configuration recovery process.
Detects DNS TXT query responses containing anomalously large RDATA payloads (exceeding 100 bytes). Large TXT records are frequently used in DNS tunneling or data exfiltration scenarios to smuggle data out of a network while bypassing traditional network security controls. The rule applies a threshold limit to identify persistent, potentially malicious exfiltration activity from a specific source over a 60-second window.
This rule detects potential DNS hijacking or redirection by comparing the returned IP address from a DNS query against a known list of authoritative IP addresses for specific domains. If an internal DNS resolver returns an IP address that does not match the authoritative record, it flags the event as a potential DNS response mismatch. It includes risk scoring based on the number of distinct affected hosts.
This rule detects potential DNS exfiltration attempts by monitoring DNS query responses for specific keywords ('exfil', 'data', 'c2') in the remote DNS name. It flags devices that make 20 or more such suspicious DNS queries within an hour, indicating a high volume of potentially malicious DNS activity often associated with DNS tunneling or data exfiltration.
Detects DNS TXT query responses containing anomalously large RDATA payloads (exceeding 100 bytes). Large TXT records are frequently used in DNS tunneling or data exfiltration scenarios to smuggle data out of a network while bypassing traditional network security controls. The rule applies a threshold limit to identify persistent, potentially malicious exfiltration activity from a specific source over a 60-second window.
Detects a device attempting to resolve a legitimate Microsoft/Banking domain, but receiving a non-standard/malicious IP indicative of router-level DNS hijacking.
This rule detects potential DNS hijacking or redirection by comparing the returned IP address from a DNS query against a known list of authoritative IP addresses for specific domains. If an internal DNS resolver returns an IP address that does not match the authoritative record, it flags the event as a potential DNS response mismatch. It includes risk scoring based on the number of distinct affected hosts.
This rule monitors incoming DNS traffic for A record responses containing RFC1918 private IP addresses (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, or 192.168.0.0/16). This behavior is characteristic of DNS rebinding attacks, where a malicious web service resolves to a victim's internal network address to bypass browser same-origin policies.
This rule monitors incoming DNS traffic for A record responses containing RFC1918 private IP addresses (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, or 192.168.0.0/16). This behavior is characteristic of DNS rebinding attacks, where a malicious web service resolves to a victim's internal network address to bypass browser same-origin policies.
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