Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects when the node.js runtime process accesses Docker configuration files, which may contain sensitive authentication credentials or registry settings. This behavior is atypical for standard node.js applications and could indicate credential theft or unauthorized container environment interaction.
Detects techniques associated with Golden SAML attacks, including the use of Mimikatz for ADFS token-signing certificate extraction, the execution of AADInternals PowerShell cmdlets for SAML token forgery, and unauthorized access to the ADFS configuration database (AdfsConfiguration.mdf).
Detects Node.js runtime instances interacting with multiple sensitive developer configuration and credential files (e.g., .gitconfig, GitHub CLI host tokens, Claude configuration, git-credentials) in a single session. This pattern is consistent with infostealer malware (such as Miasma/MYRA) attempting to harvest developer credentials for downstream exploitation.
This rule detects unauthorized attempts by non-browser processes to access sensitive browser-related files (Login Data, Cookies, Web Data, etc.) or interact with browser processes to extract secrets. It monitors for Sysmon Event IDs 10 (ProcessAccess), 11 (FileCreate), 7 (ImageLoad), and 1 (ProcessCreate) where a suspicious process (often located in temporary or user profile directories) attempts to read or interact with known browser credential storage paths.
Detects instances of a Node.js process accessing sensitive browser credential and cookie storage files, which is a common behavior associated with credential theft malware or malicious scripts.
This rule detects potential unauthorized access to web browser data files (such as logins, cookies, and history databases) or specific registry modifications indicative of browser hijacking or credential theft. It monitors for processes other than known web browsers accessing sensitive browser configuration files or creating registry keys in HKCU that might be used for persistence or browser configuration manipulation.
Detects multiple processes accessing sensitive browser data files like 'Local State' and 'Login Data', commonly associated with credential theft activities from web browsers.
Detects behavior indicative of the Vidar information stealer, specifically the mass access of web browser credential stores (Login Data, Cookies) followed by the execution of archive utilities (7z, rar, WinRAR) to stage stolen data for exfiltration.
Detects behavior consistent with the Vidar/Wingo loader, part of Operation Turb00, where a process probes for VM/sandbox artifacts, specifically the VMware Tools daemon path and WMI ETW restrictions registry keys, followed by a rapid process termination characteristic of sandbox evasion.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows system utilities (ntdsutil.exe, vssadmin.exe, esentutl.exe) to interact with the Active Directory database file (ntds.dit). This behavior is commonly associated with offline credential harvesting, where an attacker attempts to create a copy of the database to extract hashes offline.
Detects instances where files located in root or non-standard paths are opened by processes that are not core Windows system processes or Microsoft security products, which may indicate suspicious activity such as manual file interaction or discovery.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to access sensitive browser credential files (Login Data and Cookies) for Chrome, Edge, and Firefox. The rule applies risk scoring based on whether the accessing process is located in suspicious directories (e.g., Temp, Downloads) or if specific indicators associated with the Millenium RAT are present.
Detects the presence of a specific global event object 'Global\ShitSetupOn26126k' used as a mutex or single-instance check by the DragonReturn malware dropper.
Detects a multi-stage attack where an adversary reads local AWS credentials or configuration files (e.g., .aws/credentials, mcp.json) on a developer workstation and subsequently performs unauthorized AWS API calls from the same source IP. The rule correlates initial credential access on the endpoint with a sequence of AWS CloudTrail events starting with identity verification (GetCallerIdentity) followed by enumeration and potentially high-impact API calls (e.g., RunInstances, AssumeRole).
Detects a Node.js process, spawned as a child of an IDE (e.g., VS Code, Cursor), that accesses local AWS configuration or credential files followed by an outbound network connection to a non-AWS destination. This behavior is indicative of potential cloud credential exfiltration via malicious Model Context Protocol (MCP) server execution.
Detects processes accessing sensitive files on a Linux system, such as SSH private keys, shell history files, and various application-specific configuration or credential files (e.g., Claude, Codex, Gemini, Cline, Opencode, Kilo). The rule excludes common system processes like shells, SSH daemons, git, and curl to minimize noise while identifying suspicious file access.
Detects unauthorized file access to common developer credential storage locations on Linux workstations, including SSH keys, cloud provider configuration files, and browser session artifacts. This behavior is associated with the InvisibleFerret payload used in the Lazarus Contagious Interview campaign to exfiltrate identity and access tokens from developer machines.
Detects Python or Node.js processes accessing files associated with cryptocurrency wallets and browser extension storage. This behavior is indicative of credential or wallet theft, as observed in campaigns such as 'Contagious Interview' which involved threats like BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret.
Detects a sequence of events characteristic of a privilege escalation exploit (referenced as CVE-2026-46331). The chain involves an unprivileged user creating a user namespace, followed by the configuration of traffic-control (tc) filters, and finally accessing sensitive setuid binaries or memory files (/proc/self/mem), indicating an attempt to escalate privileges to root.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, ntdsutil, diskshadow, esentutl) or command-line execution (cmd, powershell) to access, copy, or create shadow copies of the Active Directory database file (NTDS.dit), which is a common indicator of credential dumping.
This rule detects file access events involving specific file names ('DscCoreR.mui', 'SyncRes.dat', 'GameInputInboxs32.mui', 'diagerr.xml', 'NtfsLog.etl', 'Ignored.Dat', 'VistaCompat.nls') that have been historically observed as indicators of the HUI Loader malware. HUI Loader is a custom DLL loader used by various threat actors to sideload malicious payloads.
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