Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of files with potentially executable extensions (e.g., .php, .jsp, .pl, .cgi, .sh, .py) within NetScaler web-accessible directories. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to deploy a web shell for persistence or command execution following a successful exploit of the web application.
Detects attempts to redirect Python package resolution away from the default PyPI index. This is achieved by monitoring pip CLI arguments (--index-url, --extra-index-url), environment variables (PIP_INDEX_URL, PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL, PIP_CONFIG_FILE), or the creation/modification of pip configuration files (pip.conf, pip.ini). Such activity is often associated with software supply chain attacks where an adversary attempts to force the installation of malicious packages from a controlled repository.
Detects a multi-stage infection chain associated with RedFlick, involving the delivery of VHDX files or PDF attachments. The rule correlates malicious activities such as SSH-based tool download (using PermitLocalCommand), PowerShell-based PDF decoding/extraction, PowerShell VHDX disk mounting, and silent MSI installation from remote URLs. It monitors for these activities within user-writable directories like Downloads or Temp.
This rule detects instances where the Faronics Deploy Agent process initiates the installation or download of ScreenConnect remote access software via PowerShell or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of authorized RMM deployment, but it is also a common tactic for adversaries to establish persistent remote access to endpoints.
This rule detects various methods used by adversaries to perform credential dumping from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. It monitors for direct process access with suspicious handle permissions, the use of comsvcs.dll via rundll32.exe for MiniDump creation, the execution of memory dumping tools like procdump, and the creation of LSASS memory dump files by Task Manager.
This rule detects potential exploitation of the Oracle PeopleSoft PSEMHUB component vulnerability (CVE-2026-35273). It identifies suspicious POST requests to the PSEMHUB HttpListeningConnector servlet, including obfuscated URL paths, followed by the creation of suspiciously named .jsp or .jspx files in the PSEMHUB.war application directory, which is indicative of a web shell deployment.
Detects the use of ntdsutil.exe to create an Install From Media (IFM) backup of the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) to a non-standard location, followed closely by the use of 7-Zip (7z.exe or 7za.exe) to archive that specific backup directory, which is a common indicator of credential dumping and exfiltration staging.
Detects the creation of an ASPX file within a member file upload directory, followed immediately by the execution of 'cmd.exe' by the 'w3wp.exe' web server process. This behavior is indicative of a web shell being uploaded and used to execute arbitrary commands on the server.
Detects the creation of web scripts (aspx, php, jsp) in typical web server directories followed by suspicious shell activity (cmd, powershell, or shell execution) originating from web server processes within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a web shell being dropped and subsequently utilized for command execution.
Detects a suspicious pattern where an AI coding agent or user creates a public GitHub repository with specific naming conventions (e.g., 'sweeper-demo', 'gitshot-images') and subsequently pushes content containing sensitive terms like 'screenshot' within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration of internal development screenshots to a public repository.
Detects a suspicious pattern where an AI coding agent or user creates a public GitHub repository with specific naming conventions (e.g., 'sweeper-demo', 'gitshot-images') and subsequently pushes content containing sensitive terms like 'screenshot' within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration of internal development screenshots to a public repository.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (DNS queries, network connections, file creation, and process execution) to identify matches against a predefined list of known malicious indicators, including IP addresses, domains, and file hashes (SHA256). The rule differentiates between confirmed malicious activity and low-confidence indicators, providing a prioritized view of potential threats.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (DNS queries, network connections, file creation, and process execution) to identify matches against a predefined list of known malicious indicators, including IP addresses, domains, and file hashes (SHA256). The rule differentiates between confirmed malicious activity and low-confidence indicators, providing a prioritized view of potential threats.
Detects a file named dnsapi.dll created/modified outside System32/SysWOW64/WinSxS (the only legitimate locations for the real system DLL). Now requires the file to BOTH land in one of the known NeedyMantis sideload staging folders AND match the published 3448-byte spoofed-config size -- previously the size check alone could match unrelated dnsapi.dll copies anywhere on disk; requiring both signals together removes that bypass.
This rule detects a sequence of suspicious activities involving files placed in 'ProgramData\Firefox'. It identifies the creation or modification of a non-standard executable within this folder, followed by its execution by a trusted process (or itself), and the subsequent creation of a Registry run key for persistence. This pattern is often used by adversaries for persistence mechanism implementation using masqueraded file names.
Detects the creation or modification of SSH authorized_keys or authorized_keys2 files. This is a common persistence technique used to maintain remote access by adding an adversary-controlled public key to a user's configuration, often performed after initial access through exploitation of public-facing services.
Detects rapid creation of numerous .lnk shortcut files on removable media volumes, specifically targeting filenames that mimic common installers (e.g., ChromeSetup, AnyDesk). This behavior is characteristic of worm-like malware attempting to use removable drives for persistence and lateral movement by masquerading as legitimate software.
Detects the creation of web shell-consistent files (.jsp, .jspx, .php, .cgi) within sensitive web application directories on Cisco Firepower Management Center (FMC) appliances. This rule is designed to identify potential post-exploitation activity associated with the authentication bypass vulnerability CVE-2026-20079, which has been observed being used by various threat actors to deploy web shells.
Detects the specific behavior of the NeedyMantis malware where a file named 'encryptbase64.ps1' is written to disk but is not subsequently invoked by any PowerShell process. This is indicative of shellcode masquerading as a script file, where the file is loaded directly into a process's memory to perform ROR-based API hashing and unpacking of a minimized PE loader.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events characteristic of NeedyMantis's hands-on-keyboard activity. The rule identifies file staging (creation or modification of suspicious DLLs from network shares) followed by remote command execution (via Impacket-like service interaction) and subsequent execution of binaries vulnerable to DLL sideloading.
Detects the creation or renaming of files to a .aspx extension within specific web application directories (member file-upload). The rule specifically filters for file operations initiated by the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) and requires a non-zero file size, identifying potential web shell deployment attempts.
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