Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects logon scripts dropped to NETLOGON or SYSVOL for domain-wide execution
Detects the creation or modification of a VSCode package.json file that maps a keybinding to the 'workbench.extensions.installExtension' command while explicitly setting the 'skipPublisherTrust' flag to true. This technique can be used by adversaries to install malicious VSCode extensions without publisher trust checks, potentially leading to supply chain compromise or defense evasion.
This rule generates a comprehensive forensic timeline for a specific executable file, analyzing its origin (file creation/drops), execution context (process creation and child processes), network communications (outbound connections), and persistence mechanisms (registry modifications for run keys/startup and scheduled task creation/updates). It correlates events across different data sources based on the executable's file name or SHA256 hash.
Detects the creation of an MSI (Microsoft Installer) file on a device where the file's origin referrer URL indicates it was downloaded from a ZIP archive that was originally an email attachment. This could indicate a user opening a malicious ZIP file from an email, leading to the execution of an installer.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving PowerShell downloading content (using Invoke-WebRequest, iex, or DownloadString) followed by the creation of specific suspicious files (Browser Update.exe, update.zip, update.msi) on the same device within a 10-minute window. This correlation suggests a potential ingress of malicious tools or updates.
This rule detects the creation or modification of executable files (.exe, .dll, .sys) within critical Windows system directories (C:\Windows\System32\ or C:\Windows\SysWOW64\). Such activity can indicate an attempt to establish persistence, elevate privileges, or inject malicious code into legitimate system processes.
This rule detects a single process creating a large number of files with diverse file types within a short time frame (5 minutes). This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity such as ransomware encrypting files, data staging for exfiltration, or malware dropping multiple components.
This rule detects the staging (creation, modification, or renaming) and subsequent execution of executable files (.exe) within the 'C:\Users\Public\Music\' directory. This folder is an unusual location for executables and is often leveraged by adversaries for staging malicious payloads to evade detection. The rule specifically references 'Grixba' and 'Play Ransomware' in its context, suggesting it targets behaviors associated with these threats.
This rule detects when a single process modifies or creates three or more YAML files ('.yaml' or '.yml' extensions) within folders containing 'config' or 'pipeline' in their path, within a one-hour window. This behavior could indicate an attacker modifying configuration or deployment files, potentially for persistence, defense evasion, or impact.
Detects the creation of files ending with '.sig', '.asc', or '.cer'. These extensions are commonly associated with digital signatures, PGP/GPG keys, and certificates, which could indicate activities like code signing, certificate generation/import, or PGP/GPG key manipulation by an adversary.
This rule identifies accounts that create or modify 10 or more files, each larger than 200MB, within a one-hour period. This behavior can be indicative of data exfiltration, staging of large files, or other suspicious bulk file operations.
This rule detects suspicious file export activity by monitoring for the creation of files with names containing keywords like 'export', 'dump', or 'extract'. It triggers an alert if five or more such files are created by the same account within a one-hour window, indicating potential data exfiltration or staging.
Detects Hero proxyware artifacts being written or modified within the Windows SysWOW64 directory. Presence of these files may indicate installation of unauthorized proxy services or abuse of enterprise endpoints for traffic relaying.
Identifies the creation of '.node' payload modules by Lucid Stealer in the Common AppData folder, indicative of the SEA payload staging its remote control and theft modules. This rule specifically looks for file creation events where the file name ends with '.node' and the folder path matches a pattern under the user's local AppData 'Common' folder.
Detects the staging of the Lucid Stealer hidden self-copy loader and the SQLite CLI helper binary in the Temp directory. This rule specifically looks for file creation events in the user's Temp directory with filenames matching patterns associated with Lucid Stealer's staging activities: 'winupd_*.exe' for its self-copy loader and '_sq3e_*.exe' for its SQLite helper.
Detects the staging and installation of the G DATA Avk.exe sideloading set within the unexpected C:\Users\Public\GData\ directory, associated with a Mustang Panda PlugX campaign. This rule specifically looks for the creation of files named "Avk.exe", "Avk.dll", or "AVKTray.dat" in this suspicious public user directory.
This rule detects attempts to drop a payload into the Microsoft Word startup folder via SMB. The detection is based on the presence of the string "Word\STARTUP" (case-insensitive) in SMB traffic flowing to the server on port 445. This activity is indicative of persistence mechanisms used by attackers to ensure malicious code executes when Word starts.
This rule detects when a file containing the string "XLSTART" (case-insensitive) is written to a network share via SMB. This is indicative of an attempt to establish persistence by placing malicious files in the Microsoft Office startup folder, which will be executed when Office applications launch.
This rule detects the writing of a file containing both the string "Startup" (case-insensitive) and the string ".bat" (case-insensitive) to a remote host via the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol on port 445. This activity is indicative of an attempt to establish persistence by creating a startup script on a remote system.
This rule detects when a batch script (.bat) is dropped onto a network share, specifically targeting the NETLOGON share, which is often used for logon scripts. This activity can be indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence or execute malicious code on systems that process logon scripts from this share. The rule triggers if three such events are observed from the same source within 60 seconds.
This rule detects attempts to plant a DLL file in an application's 'Program Files' directory over SMB. This is a common technique used in DLL hijacking attacks, where a malicious DLL is placed in a location where a legitimate application will load it instead of the intended system DLL. The rule specifically looks for SMB traffic to port 445, containing '.dll' and '\Program Files\' in a case-insensitive manner, indicating a file transfer to a sensitive application directory.
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