Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,543 detections
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Payload Ransomware Log File Creation
Cortex XDR
Detects the creation of 'payload.log', a specific log file utilized by Payload ransomware to track its operational parameters. This file is typically dropped at the root of the C:\ drive.
Detects RomulusLoader persistence behavior where Vulkan components (such as vulkan-1.dll or .bin files) are written to the Common Files directory. This activity is associated with TA4922 and their use of RomulusLoader for initial access and staging.
Detects MSBuild project files created beneath C:\ProgramData, an uncommon location that has been abused by threat actors to stage malicious project files for code execution.
This rule detects the creation of files with names commonly associated with ransomware notes (e.g., 'ransom_note', 'decrypt_files', 'pay_ransom') and common text file extensions (.txt, .html, .htm). It summarizes these events by device and time, flagging devices where at least one such file is observed.
This rule detects the creation or modification of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be associated with adware. It monitors device file events for these hashes and logs instances where they are created or modified.
Detects the creation of files with names commonly associated with LockBit ransomware, such as '.lockbit', 'lockbit_note', or '.abcd'. This rule specifically looks for these file names being created on devices, which is indicative of ransomware activity.
Hades Sentinel File Creation
Cortex XDR
Detects the creation of the '.bun_ran' sentinel file in the system temp directory, used by the Hades malicious PyPI loader to avoid repeated executions. This file acts as a marker to prevent subsequent infections or executions of the malware.
Detects the creation of files containing keywords such as 'vulnerability', 'assessment', or 'scan'. This rule aims to identify activities related to vulnerability scanning or security assessments being performed on a system, potentially indicating reconnaissance or unauthorized activity. The events are summarized by the initiating process account name and time to help identify the source of these activities.
This rule detects the deployment of a network logon script named 'logon.bat' within the 'SYSVOL' share over SMB (port 445). This activity is often associated with persistence techniques where an attacker modifies or creates logon scripts to execute malicious code when users log in to the domain.
This rule detects an attempt to exploit an unquoted service path vulnerability via an SMB file drop. Specifically, it looks for SMB traffic to port 445 on the home network containing the strings "Program Files" and ".exe" (case-insensitive). This pattern suggests an attacker might be dropping an executable file into a directory within "Program Files" that is part of an unquoted service path, which could lead to arbitrary code execution upon service restart.
This rule detects when Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) create INI files within the `C:\ProgramData\` directory. This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, such as macro-enabled documents dropping configuration files or payloads, or other forms of malware attempting to establish persistence or store data in a less scrutinized location.
This rule detects when an executable file (.exe) is dropped into a Windows 'Start Menu\Programs\Startup' folder via Server Message Block (SMB). This is a common technique used by attackers to establish persistence on a compromised system, ensuring that their malicious code runs every time the user logs in or the system starts.
Identifies the creation of PowerShell or batch files in unusual ProgramData subdirectories by command-line interpreters, which may indicate malware staging or persistence preparation.
Detects suspicious file downloads from the internet where common DLLs (wininet.dll, urlmon.dll, msxml3.dll) are initiating the file creation of executable, DLL, PowerShell, or batch files. The rule specifically looks for scenarios where 5 or more such files are created by the same initiating process on a device, indicating potential malicious activity like ingress tool transfer.
This rule detects suspicious file activity indicative of ransomware by monitoring for a high volume of file creations or renames where the filenames contain common ransomware-related extensions such as '.encrypted', '.locked', or '.ransom'. It aggregates these events over a one-hour period per device and triggers if 20 or more such events occur.
This rule detects the creation or modification of executable files (.exe, .dll, .sys) within critical Windows system directories (C:\Windows\System32\ or C:\Windows\SysWOW64\). Such activity can indicate an attempt to establish persistence, elevate privileges, or inject malicious code into legitimate system processes.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by monitoring for a high volume of file creation or renaming events where the new file names end with common ransomware extensions such as '.encrypted', '.locked', or '.crypted'. It aggregates these events over 5-minute intervals and triggers if 50 or more such files are observed on a single device.
Detects creation of hidden files and directories via remote SSH for artifact hiding
Detects DLL files dropped to network shares for search order hijacking
Detects the creation or execution of the SSH propagation payload script (.sshu-setup.js), used by the Hades stealer to propagate via SSH from compromised workstations. This rule identifies file creation/modification/renaming events for the specific script name, or process creation events where the command line references the script.
This rule detects the planting of script files, specifically PowerShell scripts (.ps1), on shared network drives. It looks for SMB traffic directed to a server on port 445 (SMB) that contains both the string ".ps1" (case-insensitive) and the string "\\share\\" (case-insensitive). This activity is indicative of an attacker staging scripts on a network share for potential lateral movement within a network.
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