Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of files containing keywords such as 'vulnerability', 'assessment', or 'scan'. This rule aims to identify activities related to vulnerability scanning or security assessments being performed on a system, potentially indicating reconnaissance or unauthorized activity. The events are summarized by the initiating process account name and time to help identify the source of these activities.
This rule detects when five or more driver-related files (.inf, .sys, or .drv) are created or modified within a one-hour window by the same initiating process account. This behavior can be indicative of malicious driver installation, rootkit activity, or other forms of persistence or privilege escalation.
This rule detects an unusual number of file creations or modifications where the filename contains keywords like 'patch', 'update', or 'fix' by a single account within a one-hour window. This could indicate an automated patching process, software deployment, or potentially malicious activity attempting to modify system files under the guise of an update.
Detects crafted RAR archives abusing NTFS ADS path traversal to drop malicious payloads.
Detects MSBuild project files created beneath C:\ProgramData, an uncommon location that has been abused by threat actors to stage malicious project files for code execution.
Detects the creation of PowerShell or batch scripts within the C:\ProgramData directory, which is a common location abused by malware for payload staging and persistence. The rule specifically looks for file creation events where the initiating process is cmd.exe or powershell.exe and the file extension is either .ps1 or .bat.
This rule detects a single process creating a large number of files with diverse file types within a short time frame (5 minutes). This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity such as ransomware encrypting files, data staging for exfiltration, or malware dropping multiple components.
This rule detects the creation of common ransomware ransom note filenames on a device. It triggers when two or more distinct ransom note files are created within a 5-minute window, indicating potential ransomware activity.
Detects suspicious file downloads from the internet where common DLLs (wininet.dll, urlmon.dll, msxml3.dll) are initiating the file creation of executable, DLL, PowerShell, or batch files. The rule specifically looks for scenarios where 5 or more such files are created by the same initiating process on a device, indicating potential malicious activity like ingress tool transfer.
This rule detects suspicious file creation or modification events in the root directory (C:\) for files commonly associated with boot sectors, such as 'bootsect.bak', 'bootloader', 'MBR', and 'VBR'. Such modifications can indicate ransomware activity or other forms of boot integrity compromise.
This rule detects the creation of specific configuration files (`setup.exe.config` or `updateconfig.xml`) that are associated with AppDomain Hijacking techniques used by the Nimbus Manticore threat actor. This activity indicates an attempt to manipulate application configuration to execute malicious code.
Detects indicators associated with the MiniUpdate RAT deployed by the threat group Screening Serpens. This rule identifies network connections to known C2 domains, the creation of a persistence scheduled task named 'WindowsSecurityUpdate', and the dropping of specific RAT module DLLs ('UpdateChecker.dll', 'InitInstall.dll', 'Updater.dll') in common user-writable directories. The file event detection is tuned to require multiple generic DLLs or the presence of 'InitInstall.dll' to reduce false positives.
Detects the creation of PowerShell or batch scripts within the C:\ProgramData directory, which is a common location abused by malware for payload staging and persistence. The rule specifically looks for file creation events where the initiating process is cmd.exe or powershell.exe and the file extension is either .ps1 or .bat.
This rule detects when a file is written to a remote Windows Startup folder via Server Message Block (SMB). The rule specifically looks for SMB traffic containing the string "Startup" and "\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\" (case-insensitive) in the flow to the server. This activity is often associated with persistence mechanisms where malware or an attacker attempts to execute code automatically upon system startup.
This rule detects attempts to drop a DLL file to a network share, specifically targeting the 'ADMIN$' share, which could indicate a DLL hijacking attempt. It monitors SMB traffic on port 445 for established connections and looks for content containing '.dll' and 'ADMIN$' (case-insensitive).
This rule detects attempts to drop executable files (.exe) into shared network folders (specifically those containing '\share\') over SMB (Server Message Block) protocol. This activity is indicative of an attacker attempting to move tools or malware laterally within a network.
Detects the creation or modification of TxF CLFS log files (FsTxLog.blf) within the System Volume Information directory, which is a primary staging mechanism for the YellowKey BitLocker bypass. The rule also identifies potential VMware MAC OUI within the Resource Manager GUID, indicating a high-confidence proof-of-concept artifact.
This rule set detects various stages of the JFMBackdoor and Showboat malware, including DLL sideloading of FLTLIB.dll by fltMC.exe from non-standard directories, network connections to known C2 and staging infrastructure (namefuture.site or 23.27.201.160), command-line activity referencing a specific Pastebin URL used by Showboat for process-hiding code, and the creation of JFMBackdoor payload artifacts (flt.bin, scr.mui).
Detects the creation or modification of an executable named 'GoogleUpdateService.exe' within a user's Windows Startup folder. This activity is indicative of the SStar Agent malware establishing persistence, as it masquerades as a legitimate Google update service but uses an atypical persistence mechanism (Startup folder instead of Scheduled Tasks or Registry Run keys).
Detects RomulusLoader persistence behavior where Vulkan components (vulkan-1.dll, vulkaninfo.exe) or encrypted payload files (.bin) are written to the Common Files directory by the TA4922 threat actor.
This rule detects the creation of specific files associated with AppDomain hijacking by the Nimbus Manticore threat actor. It looks for the creation of files like 'setup.exe.config', 'TOTPGuard.dll', 'main.dll', and 'setup.exe' within the '\AppData\Roaming\2FAGuard\' directory. The rule is tuned to trigger when at least two distinct campaign files are created within a 10-minute window on the same device.
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