Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule set detects various stages of the JFMBackdoor and Showboat malware, including DLL sideloading of FLTLIB.dll by fltMC.exe from non-standard directories, network connections to known C2 and staging infrastructure (namefuture.site or 23.27.201.160), command-line activity referencing a specific Pastebin URL used by Showboat for process-hiding code, and the creation of JFMBackdoor payload artifacts (flt.bin, scr.mui).
Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of 'btasc.cfg', a configuration file specifically associated with the JFMBackdoor malware. This file is used to store encrypted configuration data necessary for the backdoor's operation.
Detects the creation of the specific sentinel file '.bun_ran' generated by the Hades Python loader to avoid repeated executions.
Detects the creation of the specific sentinel file '.bun_ran' generated by the Hades Python loader to avoid repeated executions.
Detects the specific sequence of commands used in the ClickFix FakeCaptcha attack, moving a ZIP from Downloads, extracting it via tar, and silently executing a batch file. This rule looks for `cmd.exe` processes that contain `move`, `Downloads`, `tar`, `start`, `-xf`, and `/min` in their command line, along with specific payload filenames like `update.zip`, `u.zip`, or `update.bat`.
This rule set detects various stages of the JFMBackdoor and Showboat malware, including DLL sideloading of FLTLIB.dll by fltMC.exe from non-standard directories, network connections to known C2 and staging infrastructure (namefuture.site or 23.27.201.160), command-line activity referencing a specific Pastebin URL used by Showboat for process-hiding code, and the creation of JFMBackdoor payload artifacts (flt.bin, scr.mui).
This rule detects the creation of an Emond rule on macOS systems, which can be used for persistence. It specifically looks for network traffic containing the string "/etc/emond.d/" in a TCP flow to a server on port 22 (SSH). This indicates an attempt to establish or modify an Emond rule, which allows for scheduled execution of commands or scripts.
Detects the creation of the 'Oregon.wdlp' file in the Windows Startup folder, which is a known secondary persistence mechanism used by the BlackBeard malware, linked to the Boggy Serpens threat group.
Identifies the creation or modification of the hardcoded persistence and staging directory used by the JFMBackdoor malware, specifically 'C:\Users\Public\jfm'. This rule detects file system events within this specific path, indicating potential JFMBackdoor activity.
This rule detects an unusually high number of executable (.exe or .msi) file creations within common installation or binary folders (containing 'setup', 'install', or 'bin' in their path) by a single process within a one-hour window. This behavior could indicate the staging or unpacking of malicious software, or a legitimate but potentially suspicious installation activity.
This rule detects the creation of 'requirements.txt' or 'pom.xml' files on a system. These files are commonly used in software development projects (Python and Java/Maven, respectively) to manage dependencies and project configurations. Monitoring their creation can help identify legitimate development activities, but also potential malicious actions such as supply chain compromise where an adversary might introduce or modify project dependencies.
Identifies the SHA-256 hash associated with the BLUEBEAM (Godzilla) web shell payload (LoadLibrary.dll) dropped during KnowledgeDeliver exploitation. This rule looks for the specific hash across file creation, image load, or process execution events.
This rule detects various suspicious activities associated with a cryptojacking campaign, including the execution of 'RuntimeHost.exe' from unusual directories, creation of suspicious scheduled tasks, DLL side-loading followed by silent MSI execution, process hollowing into .NET utilities, Windows Defender exclusion attempts, and persistence mechanisms via startup folder shortcuts and registry run keys. These activities are indicative of an attacker establishing persistence and evading defenses to perform unauthorized cryptocurrency mining.
Detects file write operations to '/mnt/runner' indicating a sudoers configuration modification. This technique is utilized by the Miasma npm malware to grant passwordless sudo access for privilege escalation on GitHub Actions CI/CD runners.
Detects the creation of Vulkan components (e.g., vulkan-1.dll, .bin files) within the C:\Program Files\Common Files\ directory. This behavior is associated with TA4922 leveraging RomulusLoader for persistence via DLL sideloading.
Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of the TieringEngineService.exe executable within the System32 directory. This activity is associated with the RedSun exploit (CVE-2026-41091), which leverages Defender remediation redirection to plant a malicious binary. The rule specifically filters out legitimate Windows update operations originating from the WinSxS directory to reduce false positives.
Detects the creation of disk image files (ISO, IMG, VHD, VHDX, WIM) within temporary folders under a user's AppData directory. This activity can be indicative of malware staging or unpacking, often associated with initial access techniques where malicious payloads are delivered as disk images.
This rule detects various activities associated with the Nimbus Manticore implant, including its process execution with a specific argument, the creation of a scheduled task for persistence, and the staging of malicious files in a specific AppData directory. It looks for the execution of 'setup.exe' with 'doit' argument, the creation of a scheduled task containing 'BackupCheck', and the creation of specific files like 'setup.exe.config', 'TOTPGuard.dll', 'main.dll', and 'setup.exe' within the '\AppData\Roaming\2FAGuard\' folder.
Detects the creation of specific Payouts King ransomware artifacts, including its ransom note ('readme_locker.txt') and known encrypted file extensions ('.ZWIAAW') or temporary backup file extensions ('.esVnyj'). This rule focuses on file creation events indicative of a Payouts King ransomware infection.
Detects creation or manipulation of the ROTATE subdirectory within the Skylight Metrics Agent path by non-SYSTEM accounts. CVE-2026-7791 exploitation requires replacing the legitimate ROTATE directory with a junction point targeting the attacker's desired write location. The Skylight service then follows the junction during its log rotation, writing attacker-controlled files to the target with SYSTEM privileges. Any non-SYSTEM interaction with this specific path warrants investigation.
Detects the creation of the 'TieringEngineService.exe' bait file within a specific RedSun temporary directory pattern (RS-{GUID}) associated with the RedSun exploit (CVE-2026-41091). This activity indicates an attempt to exploit Windows Defender.
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