Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the command-line pattern of reassembling a ZIP or CAB file from fragmented parts using the 'copy' command. This technique was observed in a campaign where adversaries manually reconstructed payloads on disk to evade detection by splitting them into multiple parts and then reassembling them.
Detects the download and staging of an official Python embedded runtime zip file from python.org into suspicious user-writable directories like %TEMP% or %LOCALAPPDATA%, followed by its extraction. This is a key staging technique used by malware like VOID#GEIST to ensure its scripts can execute regardless of the victim's environment.
Detects the creation or modification of Python scripts in the /unitree/etc/programming/ directory on Unitree Go2 robots. This activity is a strong indicator of exploitation of CVE-2026-27509 or CVE-2026-27510, where an attacker uploads a malicious script for remote code execution.
This rule detects when a process, potentially a Go-compiled binary (indicated by 'go' in the command line), establishes persistence by creating or modifying a registry run key or by dropping a file in a startup folder. This behavior is associated with the Moonrise RAT.
Detects persistence via an Internet Shortcut (.url) file in a startup folder that points to a local executable (file://). This is a known TTP of the PHALT#BLYX campaign.
Detects the creation or modification of a Claude Code settings file (`.claude/settings.json`). This file can be configured to automatically approve Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers by setting `enableAllProjectMcpServers` to `true` or by using `enabledMcpjsonServers`. This bypasses security prompts designed to warn users about potential command execution, which can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) as described in CVE-2025-59536.
Detects the loading of specific vulnerable drivers ('zam64.sys', 'UpdateCheckerX64.sys') used by ransomware groups like CrazyHunter and Interlock to terminate security products. The query combines multiple data sources to detect different stages of BYOVD activity, including driver file creation, registry entries for service creation, and command-line activity related to driver loading.
Detects the creation of an unusual lock file at `/usr/share/nano/.lock`. This specific path is used by a backdoored Go module (impersonating golang.org/x/crypto) to temporarily store harvested plaintext passwords before exfiltration. The rule specifically looks for file creation events at this highly specific path.
This rule detects files by their SHA256 hash that are known to be associated with the exploitation of CVE-2026-1731. This includes payloads such as SparkRAT, VShell, and various web shells and droppers.
Detects the presence of the unique 'ic-tracker-js' ID within script tags on web server files (.php, .html, .js), which is a high-fidelity indicator of a compromised WordPress site by the IClickFix framework. This rule looks for file creation or modification events where the initiating process command line contains the malicious string.
This rule set detects indicators of compromise associated with the RESURGE activity targeting Ivanti Connect Secure devices, as described by CISA. It looks for specific file hashes, the presence of a covert socket path (.logsrv), and modifications to key Ivanti filesystem artifacts such as LD_PRELOAD, DSUpgrade.pm, coreboot.img, and scanner.py. A match indicates potential compromise and requires further investigation to confirm the asset role, timing of file appearance, and comparison with approved maintenance windows. If hits are found, collect logs and file copies, reduce external exposure, and look for unusual activity like unexpected administrator actions or unfamiliar outbound connections.
Detects the creation of files within hidden folders on removable media that are designed to mimic the Windows Recycle Bin ($RECYCLE.BIN or $RECYCLE.BIN.USER). This technique is used by APT37's THUMBSBD and VIRUSTASK malware to stage malicious files (.rb, .dat) for bridging air-gapped networks.
This rule detects activity associated with UNC6201 exploiting Dell RecoverPoint VM (CVE-2026-22769), which involves the SLAYSTYLE/BRICKSTORM/GRIMBOLT malware. It identifies attempts to deploy WAR files via Tomcat Manager, suspicious WAR file uploads or modifications in Tomcat directories on Linux appliances, modifications to a persistence script named 'convert_hosts.sh', network communication with a GRIMBOLT C2 endpoint (149.248.11.71), and specific file hashes linked to the threat actor.
The rule detects an object access event (Event ID 4663) initiated by Windows Defender, where the target file is located outside the legitimate Microsoft Defender directories (C:\Windows\System32\ or C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\), indicating potential usage of a tool like "EDRStartupHinder".
Detects a high volume of file renaming operations to the '.ENCRT' extension, combined with the creation of the 'R3ADM3.txt' ransom note by the same process. This behavior is characteristic of the Gunra ransomware encryption routine.
Detects the creation of files with a 64-character hexadecimal filename followed by a '.keystore' extension. This is a unique artifact of the Gunra ransomware's 'separate keystore' mode used for storing encryption keys.
This rule detects indicators associated with the RenEngine campaign, which involves the deployment of HijackLoader, Lumma Stealer, and ACR Stealer. Detection is based on specific MD5 hashes of known malicious files, filenames used in the campaign, and command and control (C2) domains identified as part of the infrastructure.
Detects the presence of files matching the SHA256 hashes of known RESURGE malware components, including the main 'libdsupgrade.so' library, the 'liblogblock.so' log tamperer, and the 'dsmain' utility. This rule identifies the creation or modification of these specific files on a device.
Detects the execution or presence of files associated with the Muddled Libra threat actor's toolkit. This includes tools for tunneling (Chisel), Active Directory reconnaissance (ADRecon, ADExplorer), and the initial tool archive (goon.zip). The rule identifies process execution by hash, filename, or command line arguments, and file creation events for specific hashes.
Detects the creation of the covert socket file '/home/runtime/tmp/.logsrv', which is used by the RESURGE malware as a communication bridge between its hooked 'web' process and its 'dsmdm' SSH component on Ivanti Connect Secure devices.
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