Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the installation of known malicious browser extensions associated with the ChatGPT Stealer campaign. These extensions are designed to steal AI session tokens and conversation data by monitoring file creation or renaming events in directories where browser extensions are typically installed.
Detects modifications to the RubyGems 'operating_system.rb' file, a technique used by APT37's SNAKEDROPPER malware to achieve persistence by hijacking the Ruby interpreter's execution flow. The rule specifically looks for file creation or modification events on the 'operating_system.rb' file within the RubyGems directory structure, while excluding legitimate 'gem install' operations to reduce false positives.
Detects the creation of configuration files (.cfg) in sensitive or temporary Linux directories. This behavior is associated with the GRIDTIDE backdoor, which stages a configuration file containing a key to decrypt its C2 settings.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events: a file named 'host.exe' being created in the Windows Startup folder, a 'runtime.zip' file being created in the local temporary directory, and subsequent network communication to the Telegram API (api.telegram.org) from the same device. This pattern is indicative of malware establishing persistence, staging data, and exfiltrating it via Telegram, potentially associated with malware like Small Sieve.
The rule detects write access to files named NTUSER.MAN by monitoring Windows Security Event Log event ID 4663.
Identifies a Windows Script Host process (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) creating a JScript (.js) file in a Startup folder. This is a common persistence technique used by malware, including the JScript downloader in the Remcos RAT campaign.
Detects the creation of the '___unique_id___' file in a temporary directory. This file is a specific artifact used by the PeckBirdy JScript framework to store a persistent victim identifier.
Detects file creation or process execution events involving the SHA256 hashes of malicious DLLs from the NCryptYo, DOMOAuth2_, IRAOAuth2.0, and SimpleWriter_ NuGet packages. This rule identifies the presence or execution of known malicious components associated with a supply chain compromise targeting ASP.NET developers.
Detects the creation or execution of a scheduled task named 'Batteries' pointing to the AppData Roaming directory, which is a specific persistence mechanism for the ValleyRAT campaign. This rule identifies the creation of the scheduled task via 'schtasks.exe', the creation of the legacy '.job' file for the task, or the execution of the payload 'WavesSvc64.exe' from its persistence location.
Detects the creation of files matching SHA256 hashes of known malware (SparkRAT, VShell, webshells) observed in the CVE-2026-1731 exploitation campaign. This rule specifically looks for file creation events where the SHA256 hash of the created file matches one of the predefined malware hashes.
This is a broad hunting query to find Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Notepad++ supply-chain attack attributed to the Lotus Blossom actor and the Chrysalis backdoor. It searches for known file hashes, file paths, network indicators (IPs, domains, URLs), and user-agents across multiple event types.
This rule detects various activities associated with the FoxKitsune malware, including network staging, suspicious file drops in SysWOW64, unusual svchost execution, service persistence, and attempts to tamper with Windows Defender. It correlates these events to identify potential FoxKitsune infections.
Detects the exploitation of the WinRAR path traversal vulnerability (CVE-2025-8088) where a compression utility process creates script or shortcut files in the Windows Startup folder for persistence. This technique has been observed in use by the Amaranth-Dragon threat actor.
Detects the creation of web shells (.aspx, .ashx) in the SmarterMail web root directory by the mail service process. This is a common persistence mechanism used by attackers after exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-24423 to maintain remote access.
This rule detects the creation of specific JSP web shell filenames (1.jsp, 401.jsp, 403.jsp) and suspicious CSS files in the Ivanti EPMM web application directory. This activity is indicative of post-exploitation persistence following the exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-1281 or CVE-2026-1340.
Detects creation of the LunarApplication directory used by an infostealer to stage credential and cryptocurrency theft.
Detects the creation of files in specific staging directories used by the CRESCENTHARVEST malware for collecting keylogs, browser data, and Telegram sessions before exfiltration. The rule specifically looks for 'daT.txt' in 'spool\Drivers\color', and any file creation within '\Windows\Temp\sysdriver\' or '\Windows\Temp\tdata\'.
Detects behavioral indicators associated with a malware campaign distributing a credential and crypto-wallet stealer disguised as a Windows 11 update. Detection is based on TTPs rather than IOCs for longevity: suspicious directory creation, obfuscated PowerShell execution, and registry-based persistence.
Detects the creation of specific persistence artifacts (a VBScript file and a startup shortcut) associated with the ModeloRAT payload delivered by recent ClickFix campaigns. Specifically, it looks for a VBScript file at '\WPy64-31401\python\script.vbs' or a shortcut file named 'MonitoringService.lnk' in a user's startup folder.
Detects the creation of JSP web shells or suspicious CSS files in the specific directory used by Ivanti EPMM for application distribution, a common post-exploitation step observed in this campaign.
Detects the creation of the file 'decrypted_appbound_key.txt' in the AppData\Roaming directory. This file is a specific artifact generated by the CRESCENTHARVEST malware after it successfully decrypts Chrome's app-bound encryption key, indicating browser credential compromise.
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