Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious Launch Daemons on macOS by looking for files created or modified in the `/Library/LaunchDaemons/` directory. It filters out known legitimate binaries and then flags any remaining files that have low global prevalence (less than 2500 instances) and were first seen more than 90 days ago. Additionally, it checks if the certificate is invalid or not signed by Microsoft, indicating potential malicious activity. This rule is intended for hunting and not for direct alerting due to the need for whitelisting.
This detection monitors for the creation or deletion of files within the TokenBroker and AAD Broker Plugin cache folders. These folders store authentication tokens that, if accessed or manipulated by an unauthorized process, could indicate credential theft activity.
Detects the creation of systemd services used by the PCPcat malware for persistence on Linux systems.
Detects when the WinRAR process creates an executable or shortcut file in a user's Startup folder. This technique is used by adversaries, such as Paper Werewolf, to establish persistence.
Detects the mass renaming or creation of files with the '.01flip' extension, which is characteristic of the 01flip ransomware. A high count of these files on a single host is a strong indicator of an active ransomware infection.
Detects the creation or modification of the '/tmp/sslvpn.log' file, a known artifact of a new Linux variant of the Lazarus BADCALL backdoor.
This rule detects the multi-stage delivery of PlugX malware, attributed to Mustang Panda, leveraging HTML smuggling, DLL side-loading, and persistence via registry run keys. The detection chain starts with a browser dropping an MSI file (HTML smuggling), followed by msiexec.exe executing a known sideloading executable (gup.exe or robotaskbaricon.exe). Subsequently, a malicious DLL (libcurl.dll or RoboForm.dll) is side-loaded by the executable from the same path, and finally, persistence is established through a registry run key by the same sideloading executable.
Detects the mass creation of the 'RECOVER-YOUR-FILE.TXT' ransom note, a behavior characteristic of the 01flip ransomware. A high count of these notes on a single host is a strong indicator of compromise, suggesting that data has been encrypted for impact.
Detects the ransom note file 'How To Restore Your Files.txt' created by the RansomHouse 'Mario' encryptor.
Detects the creation of suspicious files (e.g., web shells, executables) by a Node.js or Next.js server process. This activity is a common post-exploitation step after a successful RCE, such as from exploiting CVE-2025-55182 (React2Shell), where an attacker drops a backdoor for persistence.
Detects potential exploitation of Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerability CVE-2025-61882, which allows for unauthenticated remote code execution. This rule looks for specific web request URIs, post-exploitation process activity, and known indicators of compromise (IOCs).
This rule detects the creation or modification of executable files with a single-character filename followed by '.exe' (e.g., 'a.exe', 'b.exe'). This pattern is often used by adversaries to evade detection or to make malicious files less conspicuous. The rule specifically excludes 'R for Windows front-end' to reduce false positives related to legitimate software.
This rule detects the presence and activity of the ShadyPanda malware campaign, specifically focusing on malicious Chrome extensions and their associated command and control (C2) and data exfiltration domains. It identifies the creation of files with known malicious Chrome extension IDs (ending in '.crx') and network connections to hardcoded C2 and exfiltration domains linked to the ShadyPanda campaign.
Detects the creation of malicious DLL files used for side-loading by the Ashen Lepus group's AshTag malware suite. These DLLs are often dropped in non-standard locations to be loaded by legitimate executables.
This rule detects the presence and activity of the ShadyPanda malware campaign, specifically focusing on malicious Chrome extensions and their associated command and control (C2) and data exfiltration domains. It identifies the creation of files with known malicious Chrome extension IDs (ending in '.crx') and network connections to hardcoded C2 and exfiltration domains linked to the ShadyPanda campaign.
Detects the creation of an unusually large 'bun_environment.js' file (>= 9MB). This is a characteristic of the Shai-Hulud 2.0 worm which uses extreme obfuscation, resulting in a massive payload file.
Detects the creation or modification of files with SHA256 hashes known to be associated with the Shai-Hulud 2.0 npm supply chain attack campaign. This rule specifically looks for file creation or renaming events where the SHA256 hash of the file matches a predefined list of malicious hashes.
Detects a PowerShell process that downloads a ZIP archive and extracts it to the ProgramData directory. This behavior is characteristic of the final stage of the JS#SMUGGLER campaign, which uses this technique to deploy the NetSupport RAT.
Detects the use of certutil.exe to decode a payload from a file with a misleading extension (e.g., .png) and save it as a DLL in a suspicious location. This technique was observed in the 'Operation Hanoi Thief' campaign.
Detects the creation of a project-local OpenAI Codex configuration file (`.codex/config.toml`) followed by the execution of the `codex` CLI from the same directory. This pattern is indicative of an attempt to exploit CVE-2025-61260, a command injection vulnerability that allows for arbitrary code execution.
This rule detects various activities associated with the Sha1-Hulud campaign, including the creation of malicious files (setup_bun.js, bun_environment.js) identified by their SHA256 hashes or filenames within .npm directories. It also identifies the execution of malicious preinstall scripts involving 'node' and 'setup_bun.js'. Furthermore, the rule looks for persistence mechanisms related to GitHub Actions, specifically the creation of 'discussion.yaml' within '.github/workflows' or 'run.sh'/'config.sh' within '/.dev-env/'. Finally, it detects destructive commands used as a fallback, targeting both Linux (using 'find', 'shred', 'xargs', 'delete') and Windows (using 'del', 'rd' on '%USERPROFILE%').
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