Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the creation or modification of files within specific macOS directories associated with LoginWindow hooks and Authorization Plugins. These locations are commonly abused by adversaries to establish persistence or elevate privileges by injecting malicious code that executes during the login process. The rule specifically looks for file events in '/Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins/', '/System/Library/CoreServices/SecurityAgentPlugins/', '/Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins.bundle', or any file activity within a 'loginwindow' path. It excludes activities initiated by legitimate installers and software updaters to reduce false positives. Additionally, it filters for files with low global prevalence, indicating potentially suspicious or custom binaries.
Detects behaviors associated with the LCRYX VBScript ransomware, including modification of the hosts file to block security sites and the download of additional malicious payloads from known malicious URLs.
Detects suspicious file writes or modifications within the 'CryptnetUrlCache' directory. Malware abuses this directory to hide payloads and configuration files, blending in with legitimate system activity.
Detects potential DLL Search Order Hijacking activity where a DLL is created in a legitimate software directory, followed by a process execution from that same directory. This pattern is consistent with UNC1549's technique of dropping malicious DLLs to be loaded by trusted applications.
Detects the creation of a Launch Agent .plist file used by the DigitStealer malware. This Launch Agent dynamically retrieves its payload from a DNS TXT record, a technique used for resilient persistence.
Detects the creation of malicious disk images (.dmg) or a dropper file (.msi) associated with the DigitStealer macOS infostealer campaign.
Detects the creation and subsequent hidden execution of a batch file, a technique used by XWorm to stage malicious code. The rule looks for a .bat file created in a temporary or user profile directory, which is then immediately run invisibly using the 'cmd /c start "" /min' command.
Detects a pattern of behavior associated with VanHelsing ransomware's lateral movement, where an executable is written to a device over SMB and then executed shortly after. This is indicative of remote code execution techniques like those using PsExec.
Detects indicators associated with a watering hole attack originating from a compromised xubuntu.org website. This includes the creation of a tampered 'tos.txt' file, the dropping and execution of a trojanized dropper ('elzvcf.exe') in AppData\Roaming, and the establishment of persistence via a registry Run key.
Detects the creation of potential LANDFALL spyware delivery files. These are malformed DNG image files, often with filenames suggesting delivery via WhatsApp, used to exploit CVE-2025-21042.
Detects network connections to blockchain APIs that are indicative of EtherHiding techniques, specifically those used by UNC5342 to retrieve malicious payloads. It identifies connections to domains containing keywords like 'explorer', 'block', 'cypher', 'eth', 'bit', 'coin', or 'crypto', combined with suspicious URL patterns such as 'eth_call' (a read-only function call for smart contracts) or 'apiKey=freekey' (a common free API key used by threat actors).
Detects the creation of a Keras model file (.keras) that contains suspicious file paths or URLs. This may indicate an attempt to exploit CVE-2025-12058 for local file inclusion or server-side request forgery (SSRF).
Detects the use of command-line download tools to write a file with a web-related extension to a common web server directory. This behavior is consistent with webshell deployment, as seen in Sandworm campaigns.
PFX File Creation
Sigma
Detects the creation of PFX (Personal Information Exchange) files. PFX files contain private keys and certificates, making them high-value targets for attackers. Adversaries may create these files to exfiltrate digital certificates for impersonation, establish persistent access via certificate-based authentication, or bypass security controls. Analysts should investigate the process responsible for creating the PFX file, its parent process chain, and any unusual file locations outside of standard certificate stores or development environments.
KQL Query
Detects potential DLL sideloading associated with the Lazarus Group's DreamLoader campaign. This involves legitimate Windows executables (wkspbroker.exe, wksprt.exe) being executed from non-standard directories shortly after a DLL is created in the same location.
This rule detects the creation of executable files (.exe, .dll, .pyd) within browser extension folders (Chrome, Edge, Firefox) followed by a related registry modification within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of malicious browser extension installation or modification, often used for persistence or data exfiltration.
Detects WinRAR creating files in Windows startup locations, which may indicate an attempt to establish persistence by adding malicious files to the Startup folder. This behavior has been associated with exploitation of WinRAR path traversal vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-6218 or CVE-2025-8088.
Detects potential exploitation of 7-Zip vulnerabilities CVE-2025-11001 and CVE-2025-11002. The exploit uses a malicious archive to create a symbolic link, which redirects a subsequent file write to an arbitrary, often sensitive, location on the filesystem. This detection looks for a 7-Zip process writing a potentially executable file to an unusual location such as the Desktop, Startup, or System folders.
Detects various activities associated with the UTA0388 threat actor and their GOVERSHELL malware family. This includes network connections to known C2 infrastructure, creation of persistence via scheduled tasks, and execution of the malware payload, often involving DLL side-loading. The detection logic covers network communication with known C2 domains and IPs, creation of scheduled tasks with specific names, execution of the malware from common staging directories with specific flags, and the dropping of GOVERSHELL DLLs or files with known hashes.
Detects multiple TTPs associated with the exploitation of SharePoint ToolShell vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2025-53770) by the threat actor Storm-2603. This includes the initial exploit attempt, webshell creation, defense evasion using a vulnerable driver, and C2 communication.
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