Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This query is using the locations where malicious DLL images are often loaded from by regsvr32.dll and rundll32.exe.
Blog:
https://threathunt.blog/dll-image-loads-from-suspicious-locations-by-regsvr32-exe-rundll32-exe/
Blog:
https://threathunt.blog/dll-image-loads-from-suspicious-locations-by-regsvr32-exe-rundll32-exe/
Finding attackers hiding malware in the recycle bin.
Read more here: https://azure.microsoft.com/blog/how-azure-security-center-helps-reveal-a-cyberattack/.
Tags: #execution #SuspiciousPath.
Read more here: https://azure.microsoft.com/blog/how-azure-security-center-helps-reveal-a-cyberattack/.
Tags: #execution #SuspiciousPath.
The query checks for suspicious Tomcat process launches associated with likely exploitation of Confluence - CVE-2022-26134
Read more here:.
https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26134
Tags: #exploit #CVE-2022-26134
Read more here:.
https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26134
Tags: #exploit #CVE-2022-26134
'This detection highlights executables deployed to hosts via either the Default Domain or Default Domain Controller Policies. These policies apply to all hosts or Domain Controllers and best practice is that these policies should not be used for deployment of files.
A threat actor may use these policies to deploy files or scripts to all hosts in a domain.
This query uses the ASIM parsers and will need them deployed before usage - https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/normalization'
A threat actor may use these policies to deploy files or scripts to all hosts in a domain.
This query uses the ASIM parsers and will need them deployed before usage - https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/normalization'
This query looks for a Word document attachment, from which a link was clicked, and after which there was a browser download.
This query is not noisy, but most of its results are clean.
It can also hserve as reference for other queries on email attachments, on browser downloads or for queries that join multiple events by time.
Tags: #EmailAttachment, #WordLink, #BrowserDownload, #Phishing, #DedupFileCreate.
Implementation comment #1: Matching events by time.
Matching the 3 different events (saving attachment, clicking on link, downloading file) is done purely by time difference - so could sometimes link together unrelated events.
Doing a more exact lookup would create a much more complex query due to.
Implementation comment #2: Deduping DeviceFileEvents.
Oftentimes there are multiple DeviceFileEvents for a single file - e.g. if the file keeps being appended into before being closed.
So, we query only for the last reported file state to ignore intermediate file states.
Explaining the underlying data:.
BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event:.
This query uses the BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event, that includes clicks on http:// or https:// links (clicks outside of browsers), or on .lnk files.
For this event, RemoteUrl contains the opened URL.
This query is not noisy, but most of its results are clean.
It can also hserve as reference for other queries on email attachments, on browser downloads or for queries that join multiple events by time.
Tags: #EmailAttachment, #WordLink, #BrowserDownload, #Phishing, #DedupFileCreate.
Implementation comment #1: Matching events by time.
Matching the 3 different events (saving attachment, clicking on link, downloading file) is done purely by time difference - so could sometimes link together unrelated events.
Doing a more exact lookup would create a much more complex query due to.
Implementation comment #2: Deduping DeviceFileEvents.
Oftentimes there are multiple DeviceFileEvents for a single file - e.g. if the file keeps being appended into before being closed.
So, we query only for the last reported file state to ignore intermediate file states.
Explaining the underlying data:.
BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event:.
This query uses the BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event, that includes clicks on http:// or https:// links (clicks outside of browsers), or on .lnk files.
For this event, RemoteUrl contains the opened URL.
LemonDuck is an actively updated and robust malware primarily known for its botnet and cryptocurrency mining objectives. First discovered in 2019, LemonDuck has since adopted more sophisticated behavior and escalated its operations in 2021. Today, beyond using resources for its traditional bot and mining activities, LemonDuck steals credentials, removes security controls, spreads via emails, moves laterally, and ultimately drops more tools for human-operated activity.
'This query looks for writes of PE files to C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\.
This is a common directory used by malware, as well as some legitimate programs, and writes of PE files to the folder should be monitored.
Ref: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/27/untangling-knotweed-european-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits/'
This is a common directory used by malware, as well as some legitimate programs, and writes of PE files to the folder should be monitored.
Ref: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/27/untangling-knotweed-european-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits/'
The following query look for suspicious behaviors observed by the samples analyzed in the report.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Windows 7 zero-day for CVE-2019-0808
CVE-2019-0808 is a vulnerability that allows an attacker to escape the Windows security sandbox and run arbitrary code with admin privileges. This vulnerability affects Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2.
Exploits for CVE-2019-0808 were first observed as part of highly selective attacks using the Nufsys backdoor. Although the Nufsys-associated exploit was first described as a zero-day, the issue has since been patched.
The following query detects possible CVE-2019-0808 exploitation by finding suspicious file creation events associated with Nufsys.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0808
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0808
CVE-2019-0808 is a vulnerability that allows an attacker to escape the Windows security sandbox and run arbitrary code with admin privileges. This vulnerability affects Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, and Windows Server 2008 R2.
Exploits for CVE-2019-0808 were first observed as part of highly selective attacks using the Nufsys backdoor. Although the Nufsys-associated exploit was first described as a zero-day, the issue has since been patched.
The following query detects possible CVE-2019-0808 exploitation by finding suspicious file creation events associated with Nufsys.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0808
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0808
Identify masqueraded DLLHost.exe file created by PowerShell.
Show usb mounted and files copied
The following analytic detects the creation of the doas.conf file on a Linux host. This file is used by the doas utility to allow standard users to perform tasks as root, similar to sudo. The detection leverages Linux Auditd data, focusing on the creation of the doas.conf file. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to gain elevated privileges, potentially by an adversary. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands with root commands with root privileges, leading to full system compromise.
Detects the presence and execution of the Inveigh hack tool by monitoring for the creation of its characteristic log and executable files. Inveigh is a PowerShell-based tool used for network sniffing, LLMNR/NBNS/mDNS spoofing, and NTLM relay attacks.
Detects AnyDesk writing binary files to disk other than "gcapi.dll". According to RedCanary research, it is highly abnormal for AnyDesk to write executable files to disk besides gcapi.dll, which is a legitimate DLL that is part of the Google Chrome web browser used to interact with the Google Cloud API.
Detects the creation of temporary files (sam.tmp, sec.tmp, sys.tmp) in the Windows temporary directory, which are indicators of the RemoteKrbRelay SMB Relay attack module attempting to dump secrets from the Security Account Manager (SAM) and other system hives.
This rule detects the creation of 'TeamViewer_Desktop.exe' on a Windows system. This file is typically created during the installation of TeamViewer, a legitimate remote access tool. Adversaries often abuse such tools for command and control, making its installation a potential indicator of compromise.
This rule detects the creation of files with specific names or patterns commonly used by memory dumping tools to extract credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process memory. The rule looks for file creation events where the file path contains keywords like 'lsass', 'nanodump', 'sqldmpr', or specific filenames such as 'Andrew.dmp', 'Coredump.dmp', 'lsass.dmp', 'lsass.rar', 'lsass.zip', 'NotLSASS.zip', 'PPLBlade.dmp', and 'rustive.dmp'. This activity is indicative of an attempt to dump LSASS memory, which contains sensitive user credentials.
This rule detects the creation of a file named 'dumpert.dmp' which is the default output file name used by the Outflank Dumpert tool. Outflank Dumpert is a known tool used to dump the memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, typically for credential harvesting.
Detects the creation of an lsass.dmp file by the taskmgr process. This indicates a manual dumping of the LSASS.exe process memory using Windows Task Manager, which is a common technique for credential access.
This rule detects the creation of files with names commonly associated with credential dumping tools or files produced by them. It looks for specific filenames or patterns in the full path of newly created files, such as logs from fgdump, kirbi files, pwdump outputs, cachedump executables, procdump outputs, and Windows Credential Editor (WCE) related files. This indicates an attempt to extract credentials from the system.
This rule detects the execution or creation of files identified as Remote Access Tools (RATs) based on a Google Cloud Threat Intelligence (GCTI) feed. It correlates process launch, module load, or file creation events with known SHA256 hashes of RATs provided by the GCTI feed. The rule specifically looks for events where the SHA256 hash of the process or file matches a hash from the 'Remote Access Tools' threat feed within the GCTI graph.
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