Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario. This is identified by monitoring Windows Security Event ID 5145 for file creations ending with `\wbem\wbemcomn.dll` and filtering out legitimate system accounts (those ending with '$').
This rule detects the creation of Microsoft Office macro-enabled files (docm, dotm, xlsm, xltm, potm, pptm) when the creating process or its parent process is a suspicious utility often abused by adversaries. The suspicious utilities include cscript.exe, mshta.exe, regsvr32.exe, rundll32.exe, and wscript.exe. This behavior is indicative of potential initial access or execution techniques where malicious macros are delivered or generated.
Detects the creation of new DLL assembly files by "aspnet_compiler.exe" within the 'Temporary ASP.NET Files' directory, specifically in the 'assembly\tmp\' subdirectory. This activity could indicate abuse of "aspnet_compiler" to proxy execution through a build provider, potentially for malicious purposes.
Detects the creation of an 'ntds.dit' file, which contains Active Directory database information including credential hashes, by processes commonly abused by attackers or processes running from suspicious directories like 'Temp' or 'AppData'. This activity is highly indicative of credential dumping attempts.
Detects the creation of the 'ntds.dit' file, which contains Active Directory database information, by processes that are not typically associated with this activity. This rule specifically looks for 'ntds.dit' creation when the parent process is an uncommon executable (e.g., cscript.exe, powershell.exe, web server processes) or originates from suspicious directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Public). This activity often indicates an attempt to dump Active Directory credentials.
Detects the creation of new Office macro files on systems via applications such as web browsers or email clients. This rule identifies files with common Office macro extensions (.docm, .dotm, .xlsm, .xltm, .potm, .pptm) or those with Zone.Identifier streams indicating a download, when created by known browser or email client processes.
This rule detects the creation of files with specific web-related extensions (.ashx, .asp, .ph, .soap) in common web server directories such as '\inetpub\wwwroot\', '\www\', '\htdocs\', or '\html\'. This activity is often indicative of an attacker uploading a web shell to maintain persistence or execute commands on the compromised web server.
Detects the creation of ".rev" files by WinRAR, which can indicate potential exploitation of CVE-2023-40477. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution. The rule looks for file creation events where the process is either 'explorer.exe' (suggesting extraction via context menu) or 'WinRAR.exe', and the created file has a '.rev' extension. Further investigation for suspicious execution or WinRAR application crashes shortly after such file creation is recommended.
Detects the creation of the file "/tmp/rootlog" which is used by the TripleCross eBPF rootkit as a way to check if the backdoor is already running. This file acts as a lockfile to prevent multiple instances of the rootkit from running simultaneously.
This rule detects attempts to dump the NTDS.dit database to suspicious locations. It specifically looks for ESENT event ID 325 (New Database Created) where the data contains 'ntds.dit' and the path includes common suspicious directories such as Appdata, Desktop, Downloads, Perflogs, Temp, or Users\Public.
Detects the creation of an "Active Directory Schema Cache File" (.sch) by an uncommon process. This activity can be indicative of tools performing Active Directory-related operations, potentially for reconnaissance or command and control, such as LDAPFragger. The rule filters out common legitimate processes that create these files.
Detects the creation of specific files commonly associated with Mimikatz, a credential dumping tool. Specifically, it looks for files ending with '.kirbi' (Kerberos tickets) or named 'mimilsa.log' (related to MemSSP). This activity often indicates an attempt to steal Kerberos credentials or other sensitive authentication information.
This rule detects the creation of screensaver files (.scr) in locations outside of standard Windows system directories. Attackers often leverage .scr files, which are essentially executable files, to deliver and execute malicious payloads. By filtering out common legitimate system paths, the rule aims to identify suspicious instances where an .scr file might be dropped or created by an adversary, potentially as part of a defense evasion or execution technique. The rule's description specifically mentions the use of "rundll32.exe desk.cpl,InstallScreenSaver" as an example of how an attacker might execute such a file.
Detects the creation of specific files associated with the Goofy Guineapig malware, which attempts to impersonate Google Update components. The rule looks for 'config.dat', 'GoogleUpdate.exe', 'tmp.bat', and 'goopdate.dll' within the 'C:\ProgramData\GoogleUpdate\' directory.
Detects the creation of a file named "MoriyaStreamWatchmen.sys" in the 'C:\Windows\System32\drivers\' directory. This specific filename is associated with the Moriya rootkit, as detailed in the Securelist's "Operation TunnelSnake" report. The presence of this file indicates a potential rootkit installation attempt, which could lead to persistence and privilege escalation on a Windows system.
Detects the creation of a file named 'newdev.dll' in a user's AppData\Roaming directory. This specific file path and name are associated with the COLDSTEEL Remote Access Trojan (RAT) for persistence.
This rule detects the creation of files with the '.dmp', '.dump', or '.hdmp' extensions. These files are typically memory dumps generated by software during a crash. While often legitimate, memory dumps can contain sensitive information, including credentials, which could be exploited by adversaries. The rule aims to identify instances where such files are created to allow for investigation into the cause of the crash and to ensure no sensitive data is exposed or exfiltrated.
This rule detects attempts to export an Exchange Certificate Signing Request (CSR) to an unusual directory or with an .aspx file extension. This activity is suspicious because it could indicate an adversary attempting to place a webshell on an Exchange web server for persistent access. The rule specifically looks for the PowerShell cmdlet 'New-ExchangeCertificate' with parameters '-GenerateRequest', '-BinaryEncoded', and '-RequestFile', combined with suspicious file paths like '\\localhost\C$', '\\127.0.0.1\C$', 'C:\inetpub', or the '.aspx' extension.
Detects the creation of suspicious web shell files (ASPX, ASP, ASHX) by the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) in directories commonly associated with Microsoft Exchange or IIS web roots. This activity is indicative of potential exploitation of Exchange vulnerabilities, such as those used in the ProxyShell or ProxyNotShell attacks, to establish persistence via web shells.
Detects the creation of suspicious executable or script files within the OneNote temporary directory, indicating potential malware delivery and execution via malicious OneNote attachments. This behavior has been observed in recent malware campaigns leveraging OneNote files.
This rule detects when PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) creates a new PowerShell script file (.ps1). While this behavior can be benign in many cases, it can also indicate a dropper script attempting to establish persistence on a system. The rule filters out common legitimate scenarios such as PowerShell's internal script policy tests and temporary files created in user AppData\Local\Temp or C:\Windows\Temp directories.
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